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Previous research has highlighted that child neglect is a significant factor in child 
deaths, and should therefore be taken as seriously as other forms of abuse. Child neglect 
is a multifaceted, ‘wicked’ issue, which requires a multi-dimensional response from 
many professionals.  With such multi-dimensional perspectives, however, arise 
difficulties in defining the problem and agreeing solutions.  
 
The aim of this study was therefore, to examine how guidance about child neglect is 
passed from government to the Local Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs) for local 
implementation and coordination. The study adopted a qualitative, multiple case study 
approach, and used semi structured interviews. It used a governance network model to 
discuss and present the findings.  
 
Research findings indicate that child neglect messages coming out from government are 
disjointed, inconsistent and often unclear, making it difficult for LSCBs to develop a 
clear and informed understanding of the policy problem. In turn, LSCBs do not have a 
dissemination strategy for transferring their neglect messages to operational and front-
line practitioners. This is often an ad hoc process, and responsibility for disseminating 
guidance disappears once the send button has been pressed. Furthermore, front-line 
practitioners did not perceive email as being the most effective format for 
communicating guidance, preferring instead face-to-face forms of knowledge transfer.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.0 INTRODUCTION  
The aim of this study was to explore how Government guidance about child neglect is 
communicated to, and implemented by, Local Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs) 
and subsequently by frontline statutory services. Social Work in England and Wales is a 
state-governed activity. It deals with many multifaceted problems, such as child 
protection practice, for which there are rarely simple answers to complex questions. 
There is, therefore, a question as to how practitioners are guided in their practice by 
guidance provided by government around such complex issues.  
 
Child neglect is difficult for practitioners to assess because it encompasses many issues. 
For example, parental failure to provide for a child’s basic needs might either be a result 
of living in poverty, lack of parental education around caring for a child, or even a 
deliberate act of withholding basic needs such as food or care from a child, or multi-
causal (Devaney and Spratt, 2009). Such complex issues require practitioners to call on 
their professional judgement to assess the case carefully and make informed 
judgements. Informed judgements require practitioners to keep up to date with policy to 
inform their practice. Despite recent research in the field (for example, Brandon et al., 
2008, 2009; France et al., 2010; Davies and Ward, 2012; Baginsky and Holmes, 2015), 
we know comparatively little about how practitioners keep abreast of developments in 
child neglect policy research. 
 
Within this study, government guidance is taken to mean guidance from government 
funded research. One mechanism for conveying such guidance from government to 
front-line practice is the Local Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs). LSCBs are multi-
agency networks whose core function is to establish child protection priorities within 
their areas, develop multi-agency policies, and to, challenge and scrutinise multi-agency 
child protection practice to ensure that policy is implemented. Yet, to date, little 
research has been carried out on the role of the LSCBs as communicator, and policy 
implementer. This study aims to address this gap. 
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Within this study, the term practitioners (unless otherwise stated) is taken to refer to all 
those who work with children and young people in a range of disciplines (including 
Social Work, Health, Education), and their managers, who may be in a position to 
identify child neglect, make a referral for additional family support of some sort, or – in 
the case of front-line Social Work – need to make an assessment of possible neglect.    
 
1.1  BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
Commissioned by the previous Labour government, Lord Laming (a former Social 
Worker and advisor to the government) carried out reviews of the deaths of Victoria 
Climbié (who, aged 8, died in 2000 at the hands of her great aunt and great aunt’s 
partner) and Baby P/Peter Connolly (who, aged 18 months, died in 2007 at the hands of 
his mother and her boyfriend). Lord Laming made 108 recommendations for changes to 
practice in his first report following the death of Victoria (Laming, 2003) and a further 
58 recommendations in his subsequent report following the death of Peter Connolly 
(Laming, 2009). Yet, despite his many recommendations to improve practice, 
government concerns remained about current child protection practice in England and 
Wales, which highlight the difficulties of putting recommendations into practice. The 
Coalition government (2010-2015), noted concerns in child protection following the 
deaths of Victoria Climbié in 2000, and Peter Connelly in spite of Laming’s reports. The 
Coalition Government’s response was to commission Professor Eileen Munro (a 
Professor in Social Work at the London School of Economics) in 2010 to carry out a 
further review of child protection practice in England and Wales. Munro’s view was that 
there was an imbalance between bureaucratic processes and professional judgement in 
which the former seemed to take precedence.  Her findings (Munro, 2011) were 
intended to reform practice, such that practitioners were enabled to make professional 
judgements based more on professional practice and expertise, with less reliance on 
bureaucratic processes.  
 
Subsequently, the DfE and the DoH (also under the Coalition government) funded a 
major research initiative on safeguarding children from neglect and abuse in England 
and Wales, the findings of which were brought together in an overview report, authored 
by Davies and Ward (2012). This report provided an accessible account of the evidence 
base on which to develop policy and practice in order to improve child protection 
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practice. Yet what is not known is how effectively the findings from any of these reports 
were communicated to a local level, and how – or even if – these were interpreted and 
translated into local policy. To my mind, the government’s response to a high-profile 
child death is to respond with more policy guidance, but without ever checking whether 
the messages from research, guidance or policy are actually being transferred 
effectively to front-line practice.  
 
1.2  THE DEVELOPMENT OF LSCBs 
The public inquiry into the death of 6 year old Maria Colwell in January 1973 by her 
step father, William Kepple, concluded that it was the child protection system – as 
opposed to individual practitioners - which had ultimately failed her (see Butler and 
Drakeford, 2012). The system at that time did not encourage partnership working, clear 
communication or guidance on sharing information. One of the recommendations from 
the Colwell Inquiry was that local authority areas should establish Area Review 
Committees (ARCs) (DHSS, 1974) in order to improve information sharing, policy 
making and communication, as well as establishing interagency child protection 
conferences and child protection registers (Horwath, 2010). ARCs were non-statutory 
bodies, meaning that local authorities did not have to set up a joined-up committee if it 
did not deem it necessary in their area.  
 
By the late 1980s, interagency working within the field of child protection remained 
problematic (Lonne et al., 2009; Parton, 2014). Under the Children Act 1989, it was 
recommended that ARCs be replaced by Area Child Protection Committees (ACPCs). 
These were established by 1991. The shift to ACPCs was supposed to embed the notion 
of formal coordination between the agencies, rather than just ‘coming together’ 
(Horwath, 2010, p38), but they remained non-statutory entities (DoH, 2002). There was 
a requirement that those in management positions should represent their agencies on 
the Committee, in order to improve the level of engagement, commitment and improve 
decision-making processes and communication sharing within and among agencies.   
 
Unfortunately, this change failed to realise significant improvements. In 2003, the Joint 
Chief Inspectors report (DoH, 2002) found that, in some local authorities, ACPCs were 
not responding adequately to concerns over referrals between agencies; they were 
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judged to be poorly equipped to safeguard children and young people because of poor 
leadership, and lack of commitment from local agencies to support the work of the 
ACPC. Furthermore, in some areas, local agencies did not feel accountable to the ACPC 
for safeguarding children and the ACPC did not have sufficient authority to command 
agencies to report to them (DoH, 2002; Horwath, 2010).   
 
Following, the publication of the Every Child Matters green paper (DfES, 2003) and the 
implementation of the Children Act 2004, the Labour Government made a legislative 
change in transforming the non-statutory Area Child Protection Committees (ACPC) into 
statutory Local Safeguarding Children’s Boards (LSCBs), to be established in every local 
authority by 1st April 2006 (Local Safeguarding Children Board Regulations, 2006). The 
Children Act 2004 states that the role of LSCBs is to: 
(a) co-ordinate what is done by each person or body represented on the Board for 
the purposes of safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children in the area of 
the authority by which it is established; and 
(b) ensure the effectiveness of what is done by each such person or body for those 
purposes.  (HM Government, 2004, p13) 
 
The functions of the LSCBs are set out in section 5 of the Local Safeguarding Children 
Board Regulations 2006 (see Appendix 1). These objectives create a vast remit for the 
LSCBs, compared with its preceding bodies. According to the Working Together to 
Safeguard Children guidance (HM Government, 2006, which was the version that was 
current at this time) the aforementioned LSCB objective (a) to ‘coordinate’ local work 
was to be achieved through developing policies and procedures, planning children’s 
services, communication and responding to unexpected child deaths. Ensuring 
effectiveness (objective b) was to be achieved through monitoring safeguarding 
practice, conducting SCRs and analysing information collected on unexpected child 
deaths. 
 
In terms of developing policy, the LSCBs were given a wider remit than their 
predecessors (Davies and Ward, 2012), now including issues such as preventing sexual 
exploitation, child trafficking or online abuse. The remit for Serious Case Reviews 
(SCRs) carried out by the former ACPCs was expanded. Whilst the role of the ACPC was 
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simply to monitor the SCR process, this became a core function of the new LSCBs 
(Brandon et al., 2008). In addition to investigating child deaths from suspected 
maltreatment, LSCBs were to conduct SCRs in cases where children commit suicide, or 
are killed as a result of domestic violence, homicide by a parent with a mental illness, or 
other causes of death not directly as a consequence of maltreatment such as Sudden 
Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), (Brandon et al., 2008; Rose and Barnes, 2008). In 
addition to child protection, the new LSCBs had responsibilities to promote 
safeguarding and child welfare. For example, LSCBs are required to develop policy in 
relation to: 
 children’s safety and well-being, including the safety of children who are 
privately fostered (seemingly a reaction to the death of Victoria Climbié who 
was in the kinship care of her great aunt albeit this relationship was not known 
until after her death);  
 training practitioners working in children’s services;  
 recruitment;  
 investigation of allegation;  
 working with neighbouring children’s services authorities  
(France et al., 2010; Davies and Ward, 2012; Munro, 2010a; Morrison, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, representation on the LSCBs was also mandated. In line with the Children 
Act 2004, LSCBs must have a representative from the Local Authority, Police, local 
probation board, Youth Offending Team (YOT), Health (Strategic Health Authority, 
Primary Care Trust, and/or NHS [foundation] Trust), and from the Children and Family 
Court Advisory Support Services (CAFCASS), (HM Government, 2004, section 13). Since 
2009, LSCBs have been required under the Apprenticeship, Skills, Children and Learning 
Act 2009 to recruit two lay members to the Board, and to produce an annual report 
(Preston-Shoot, 2012). Similarly, as part of the Local Safeguarding Children Boards 
(Amendment) Regulations (2010), schools and Further Education colleges should have 
a representative on each Board (Preston-Shoot, 2012). The members of the LSCB are, 
however, unlikely to be involved in front-line practice and may not necessarily have a 
background in safeguarding (Morrison, 2010). 
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The move to a statutory body was significant because it signalled a strengthening in 
executive authority, strategic responsibilities, and accountability of Board members. 
This, in turn, was expected to bring about improvements in information sharing, 
communication and joined-up working across organisations involved in the child 
protection process to front-line practice (Laming, 2003; Lonne et al., 2009). However, 
few studies have examined the role of LSCBs as a strategic body, or how effective they 
have been in transferring and translating Government level policy to local level policy. 
 
1.3 THEORETICAL LENS 
The theoretical lens chosen for this study is governance theory, as it focuses on multi-
agency policy making in the context of complexity and uncertainty in the policy arena 
(Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). Specifically, the study draws on governance network 
theory (Kickert et al., 1997; Sørensen and Torfing, 2007; Torfing et al., 2012; Klijn and 
Koppenjan, 2016), as this provides a framework for exploring the complex interactions 
between public, private and voluntary sector actors. It is, therefore, appropriate to 
explore the role of LSCBs in negotiating multi-agency responses to child neglect, 
(Devaney and Spratt, 2009; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). In particular, it enables the 
policy negotiation process to be explored, how LSCBs learn about child neglect guidance 
from government, and how they translate into local policy to be implemented by front-
line practitioners.  
 
The governance network theory proposed by Torfing et al. (2012) includes six criteria 
against which the effectiveness of a governance network can be assessed. These so-
called ‘effectivity criteria’ (EC) help to identify how well a network: i) defines the policy 
problem in question; ii) is creative and innovative in practice development to match the 
policy problem; iii) has the ability to make joined-up decisions; iv) ensures a smooth 
implementation of the policy; v) responds flexibly to feedback; and vi) creates 
favourable conditions for further cooperation and coordination. I judged this as a 
suitable model to explore knowledge transfer from government to front-line practice 
via the LSCB because it allows the complexities of the policy process to be analysed, not 
just a focus on policy and practice outputs. 
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STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION  
In Chapter 2 I first examine why child neglect is best conceptualised as a wicked issue, 
and the multifaceted parameters of a child neglect policy framework. I then summarise 
the literature on the role of LSCBs and their importance as a conduit for disseminating 
government guidance.  
 
In Chapter 3, I critically appraise governance network and Torfing et al.’s (2012) model 
of effectivity criteria and defend its use in this study. 
 
In Chapter 4, I detail the research methods adopted, offering a rationale for their use, 
before describing the two LSCB case study areas from which the data were drawn. I 
then explore the ethical implications of the study and set out my approach to data 
analysis.  
 
In Chapter 5, I present the findings, using Torfing et al.’s (2012) effectivity criteria as a 
framework for analysis. I draw out the differences between Education, Health and 
Children’s Social Care across two LSCBs.  
 
In Chapter 6, I discuss and analyse the findings in relation to my four research 
questions.  
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Chapter Two: Literature review 1 – Child neglect as a 
wicked issue.  
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines child neglect as a wicked issue, and the role played by Local 
Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs) in tackling it.  I adopted a systematic approach to 
the literature search (see Appendix 2).  
 
2.1 PREVALENCE OF NEGLECT 
Based on annual returns of local authorities, the DfE statistics indicate that, in 2016-
2017, 48% of the children who were the subject of a child protection plan in England, 
were registered because of neglect, in comparison with 34% for emotional abuse, 8% 
for physical abuse, 4% for sexual abuse, and 6% for more than one category (DfE, 2017). 
This has been a consistent pattern since 2009-2010 (DfE, 2017). Whilst neglect is the 
most common reason why children are subject to a child protection plan, it is important 
to highlight that the day-to-day nature of neglect as experienced by children is far more 
complex than statistics convey. Furthermore, whilst the idea of safeguarding is a 
responsibility for all children’s services, the notion of thresholds (which families have to 
reach in order to have access to those safeguarding services) causes further confusion 
amongst professionals in universal and voluntary services (Horwath, 2007; Warner, 
2015). This all adds to the complexities of the issue.  
 
2.2 IDENTIFYING CHILD NEGLECT 
Several studies and inquiries about child protection practice in the UK take as their 
starting point (alleged) failings within practice (for example, DHSS, 1985; DoH, 1995; 
Laming, 2009; Munro, 2011; Davies and Ward, 2012). Each subsequently explores 
changes for practice, usually resulting in further processes being introduced. Typically, 
they call for practitioners working with children and families to intervene early as soon 
as they identify cases of need or risk, or more specifically for this study, neglect. Yet, 
what is not so clear is how, when, or even if, practitioners are fully aware of what 
constitutes neglect. This section, therefore, examines the recent literature around 
identifying child neglect, what is known about its complexities today, and how this 
differs between practitioner disciplines.  
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Defining child neglect has been a longstanding challenge within children’s services 
(Zuravin, 1999). Some attempts have been made to develop definitions of neglect and 
these include physical neglect (caregivers failure to provide a home, adequate personal 
hygiene, clothing, or medical care), educational neglect (poor school attendance and 
behaviour) and emotional neglect (care linked to the child’s emotional well-being) 
(Duerr Berrick, 1997; Rose and Meezan, 1997). But even these definitions, whilst a 
starting point, are viewed as problematic in respect of identifying whose responsibility 
it should be to respond. For example, should a child regularly missing or turning up late 
for school be the responsibility of the school, as an educational issue, or Social Services, 
as a neglect issue? (Duerr Berrick, 1997). But this becomes more complicated when we 
delve beneath the surface of the problem, because there may be wider factors at play for 
example a parent might not ensure a child gets to school for many reasons, such as 
economic factors, health factors, or other social factors (Stevenson, 1999). Determining 
when the parental neglect is intentional or unintentional is another challenge which 
may influence society’s response (Rose and Meezan, 1997; Stevenson, 1999). I think 
that this highlights the significant number of factors that any practitioner needs to work 
through to get to the source of the problem. Added to this is the notion of thresholds, or 
measurements, of neglect which determine how serious an issue needs to be in order to 
trigger a statutory response (Stevenson, 1999) which is problematic when we consider 
that different practitioners will have a different understanding of the problem and the 
reason for neglect (Duerr Berrick, 1997; Horwath, 2007). 
 
Daniel et al. (2011) carried out a systematic literature review focusing on whether or 
not practitioners are equipped to recognize and respond to the indications that a child’s 
needs are being neglected. The authors did not apply a specific definition of neglect to 
their search but instead focused on ‘unmet developmental need’ (ibid, p31) in order to 
cast the literature search net as wide as possible. Sixty-three empirical studies, 
including international work, were included in the review. The authors identify a lack of 
multi-disciplinary research in their literature search, and research focused more on 
health professions. Both of these points should be regarded with caution, therefore, in 
terms of how non-UK based research and research from one discipline can be applied to 
other disciplines within the UK.  
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Within their findings, the authors make a distinction between a generalised definition 
and more practice-based definitions, acknowledging the varied perspectives, of such an 
issue. Daniel et al.’s research sheds light on both the complexities not just of the breadth 
and depth of the definitional aspects of neglect, by positioning it within a wider politico-
socio-economic landscape which also determines both the caregivers’ neglectful 
behaviour, but also the practitioners’ location of the neglectful behaviour and responses 
to it.  Furthermore, Daniel et al. (2011) note that the complexity of what constitutes 
neglect can cause confusion for all practitioners working with children. This is in line 
with the findings from the Joint Chief Inspectors Report (2005), which highlighted that 
practitioners within non-social care services were unsure about how to recognise signs 
of abuse or neglect, and when - or how - to make referrals when concerned about a 
child. Furthermore, practitioners need to be able to identify child neglect within the 
context of other family problems such as poverty, substance abuse, mental health 
issues, domestic violence (Rose and Barnes, 2008; Daniel et al., 2011). In my opinion, it 
is important to make these differentiations because they might lead to different policy 
and practice responses being put into place such as the thresholds for services to offer 
intervention. 
 
2.3 ASSESSING AND DECISION MAKING IN CHILD NEGLECT CASES 
Brandon et al. (2008, 2009) carried out two biennial reviews examining the findings 
from published Serious Case Reviews. A sample of all SCRs carried out within the 
stipulated two-year timeframe, were selected for inclusion in each review. These 
biennial studies are useful because they draw together the findings from a number of 
SCRs in order to identify key learning which has potential to improve (multi-agency) 
practice and learning when transferred into everyday practice. Brandon et al. (2008, 
2009) locate the SCRs in context of the policy and legislation of the day. A couple of 
caveats need to be borne in mind when considering the findings. Firstly, their findings 
do not just relate to child neglect, but rather include all forms of abuse and neglect. 
Secondly, SCRs are only carried out when a child dies in suspicious circumstances or is 
seriously harmed, therefore, the findings offer insights into extreme cases of abuse, and 
do not include findings for children living in low level or non-life-threatening neglect.  
Also, as with any systematic review, the analysis is dependent on the quality of the 
original data. Within their findings, however, Brandon et al. (2008) noted that 
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practitioners (including all those within universal services for children and families) 
often felt helpless and overwhelmed by past information in relation to a family’s 
circumstances. In such cases, where children were known to have been removed 
because of neglect, Social Care practitioners found it difficult to understand and analyse 
past information in order to help them gauge whether or not a parent was currently 
able to look after their child, instead they simply started the assessment process again 
from the current point in time, referred to as the ‘start again syndrome’ (Brandon et al., 
2008, p5). This syndrome ‘prevents practitioners and managers having a clear and 
systematic understanding of a case informed by past history’ (ibid).  In addition, 
Brandon et al. (2009, p45) noted that ‘in spite of a raft of procedural guidance, 
practitioners and managers were often unclear about what they could or could not do, 
or should or should not do, in these cases. Assumptions were frequently made that 
other people were visiting the family or seeing the child or taking charge of the case as 
the lead professional’.  
 
Brandon et al. (2008; 2009) noted that neglect was a significant factor within their 
analyses and were subsequently commissioned by the NSPCC to conduct a systematic 
analysis of SCRs conducted in England between 2003 and 2011 (Brandon et al., 2013). It 
specifically explored how child neglect can lead to fatal outcomes, and the authors 
identified 46 neglect related SCRs from the specified 8-year timeframe. The authors 
found that neglect occurred in 60 per cent of the included SCRs, suggesting that it is a 
far more significant factor in child deaths than previously thought. They argue that 
neglect is ‘life threatening’ (ibid, p7) and should ‘be treated with as much urgency as 
other categories of maltreatment’ (ibid, p7). That said, they point to the fact too that 
only a very small number of child deaths are directly attributable to child neglect alone, 
which is why it is described as a contributory factor rather than a sole factor. Brandon et 
al. (2013) note that practitioners can often miss ‘life threatening risks’ (ibid, p15) in 
cases where parent-child relationships are already poor, and where children are often 
hidden from the view of practitioners in children’s services for example, Kimberley 
Carlile (Reder et al., 1993) and Khyra Ishaq (Radford, 2010).  In addition, within 
universal services ‘professional disagreement about the extent and impact of neglect 
can allow over-optimism about parental capacity to dominate’ (Brandon et al., 2013, 
p78). Again, though, I must emphasise that this systematic analysis drew on data from 
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extreme cases in which a child died, so the findings might not be applicable to less 
severe cases of child neglect, in which the signs might be differently understood.  
 
Brandon et al. (2013) note reasons why professionals may overlook certain factors in 
relation to child neglect, including staff workload and staff confidence but they do not 
explore thoroughly the reasons behind why or how this may occur. For example, they 
note that there might be ‘a pattern of professionals failing to recognise’ factors (ibid, 
p47), that there might be ‘a lack of awareness’ (ibid, p53) and that there ‘was a lack of 
skill, confidence and experience in dealing with the challenges’ presented’ (ibid, p68), 
but they do not explore from where or how professionals learn about policy and practice 
on neglect, or how this knowledge is communicated and interpreted within day-to-day 
practice. In my opinion, it is important to understand the knowledge transfer processes 
before evaluating and understanding knowledge translation, dissemination and 
implementation. Knowledge is no longer simply possessed by organisations but rather – 
with the growth of networks – it is the interactions between network actors that 
facilitates the flow of knowledge between sectors, organisations and professionals in 
order to improve innovation and performance (Huggins et al., 2012; Sohi and Matthews, 
2019). I have therefore interpreted knowledge transfer in this study to mean the 
sharing, distribution and dissemination of knowledge that might be used in tackling 
complex issues. Furthermore, Knowledge in this study refers to policy guidance and 
research messages relating to child neglect. Subsequently the notion of effective 
communication in this study refers to the practice of successfully transferring messages, 
or knowledge, to another party within the network. Both knowledge transfer and 
effective communication require a culture of open access and the sharing of messages 
both top down and bottom up (Minshall, 2009). Only once the knowledge transfer 
processes are understood should any attempt be made to assess knowledge translation, 
dissemination and implementation. 
 
Farmer and Lutman (2010) conducted a longitudinal (5 year) study of the case 
management of neglected children who had been looked-after and returned home. The 
study followed 138 children in seven local authorities in England. Farmer and Lutman 
collected data from case files as well as interviews with social work practitioners, 
parents and children, therefore, bringing an in-depth original perspective of the issue. 
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They examined details of neglect, the services involved and the management of the case 
over the 5 year period (Lutman and Farmer, 2013). They found that those working with 
abused and neglected children often minimised the level of harm or abuse, which in 
turn led to insufficient interventions and, in cases where families had multiple issues, 
neglect was often overlooked. Furthermore, in cases manifesting neglect, action was 
often only taken when triggered by a more severe or violent incident such as physical or 
sexual abuse, or domestic violence. Farmer and Lutman point out variations in proactive 
practice between different local authority areas, which creates disparities in outcomes 
for children, who, I would argue, are therefore, subject to a postcode lottery in relation to 
services received. Such differences need to be addressed to ensure all areas are 
delivering the best possible practice to improve the long-term outcomes for neglected 
children (Farmer and Lutman, 2012).  
 
On behalf of Action for Children, Burgess et al. (2013) carried out a review of child 
neglect in the UK. This research explored ‘the views of children and parents about 
seeking and receiving support’ (ibid, p1) in relation to neglect, as well as the views of 
professionals encountering child neglect.  This was the second annual review of child 
neglect commissioned by Action for Children, with the aim of increasing the evidence 
base on the impact of child neglect. This UK-wide, mixed methods study is the only 
empirical study that I found that examines the views of practitioners across universal 
services. It includes a breakdown of some of those results by different practitioner 
groups. Within their findings, Burgess et al. (2013, p4) reported that ‘neglect remains 
the most common initial category of those made subject to a child protection plan, or 
reason for registration’ and that definitions of neglect were often open to interpretation. 
This may, therefore, cause signs to be noted too late, or, on the other hand, practitioners 
working with children and families may ‘over-identify’ (Brandon et al., 2008, p20) 
neglectful and abusive behaviour in some cases in order to ‘reach a threshold to attract 
services’ (ibid). I would argue that this might cause conflict if other social care 
professionals feel that referrals have been made prematurely and the referral is rejected 
on the basis that it does not meet the intervention threshold (which is itself a moveable 
target depending on the politics-of-the-day and budget restraints). Such a refusal, 
therefore, can discourage the professionals in universal services from making a referral 
for extra support (Burgess et al., 2013; Gardner, 2008).  
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2.4 MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES OF CHILD NEGLECT 
Daniel et al. (2011) identified that perceptions of neglect differ between professionals 
and the general public, with professionals having higher thresholds of what constitutes 
neglect. Within their literature search, Daniel et al. (2011) found that health staff, 
especially health visitors, were more likely to take action in cases of neglect than school 
staff and police, who were least likely to intervene. That said, Burgess et al. (2013, p9) 
found that ‘primary school staff were more likely to notice the negative effects of neglect 
among children than their nursery school colleagues’. I think that this was because 
primary school staff were more likely to encounter neglect, because it is a legal 
obligation for all children to attend school regardless of a family’s economic situation. 
Furthermore, within their research, concerns were raised by participating professionals 
that staff within private nursery provision was much less aware of and unable to 
identify child neglect. Of course, it would be easy to argue here that children attending 
private nursery provision are more likely to be from higher socio-economic 
backgrounds and therefore less likely to be subjected to neglect. The assumption is 
generally that neglect and economic deprivation go hand-in-hand (Bywaters et al., 
2016; Bernard, 2018). There is research, however, which evidences that children from 
higher socio-economic backgrounds are more likely to be subjected to emotional 
neglect, rather than physical or emotional neglect, and emotional neglect is much more 
difficult for practitioners to identify (Luthar and Becker, 2002; Bernard, 2018). 
 
2.5 CHILD NEGLECT AS A WICKED ISSUE  
In contrast to ‘tame problems’, (Australian Public Service, 2007, p3) which are more 
definable and resolvable, wicked issues (W.I) are those which are difficult to define, 
difficult to resolve, or prevent and which require multifaceted policy and practice 
solutions (Rittel and Webber, 1973; De Corte et al., 2017). In discussing planning 
problems in public services as ‘wicked’, Rittel and Webber (1973, p160) use words such 
as ‘malignant’, ‘vicious’, and ‘tricky’ to describe them. Some scholars (for example 
Peters, 2017; Alford and Head, 2017; Turnbull and Hoppe, 2018) have questioned the 
relevance of wicked issues as a contemporary concept in public policy. In particular, 
Turnbull and Hoppe (2018) hold a rather disparaging view about Rittel and Webber’s 
concept, arguing that the concept of wicked issues is ‘fundamentally flawed’ (p321). 
They argue that, within Rittel and Webber’s W.I concept, there are only tame problems 
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or wicked problems, rather than a sliding scale of wickedness, which might be more 
plausible, and conceptually useful, than a binary alternative. In response to this, it does 
need to be remembered that this concept was constructed in the 1970s, before – as 
Peters (2017) points out – levels of complexity in social problems were more 
considered. That said, I think that that notion of wicked issues is still useful and 
pertinent today for arguments which I set out hereonin.  
 
Turnbull and Hoppe (2018), Alford and Head (2017) and Peters (2017) all allude to 
changes in public administration which may have altered the definition, and perceived 
complexities, of wicked issues. For example, the shift in the public administration 
systems of the 1970s to today’s decentralised complex governance structures makes 
dealing with most social ills less linear, more interactive and complex. Alford and Head 
(2017) and Peters (2017) do not dismiss the concept of W.I as Turnbull and Hoppe 
seem to. Peters (2017) argues that growth in complex policy making has turned W.I into 
a ‘fad’ (ibid p386), whilst Alford and Head (2017 p398) consider the term to be ‘applied 
indiscriminately’. They both highlight that although there are a number of difficult 
problems facing the public sector in contemporary society, many of these are not 
‘wicked’ in the way that Rittel and Webber had intended the term to be applied. Instead, 
quite often the concept is now stretched to fit a difficult problem, to categorise it as 
wicked and this is where the problem now lies because it is over-used and difficult to 
ascertain what truly is a wicked issue, in today’s society.  
 
Turnbull and Hoppe (2018 p317) argue that the term wicked issue is ‘appealing 
because it resists precise definition’ but I disagree with this argument. I think wicked 
issues can be defined. The term can be applied to socially constructed problems. Such 
problems are complex (not simple or straight forward) and multifaceted (that is to say 
that they can be viewed from various angles and require multiple organisations to work 
together). More importantly, however, such problems either have no solution or are 
resistant to a solution. Potential solutions may create further problems, as the issue 
transpires or morphs in other complicated ways. Therefore the problems need to be 
managed more so than resolved. Wicked issues therefore are not cyclical (which 
suggests a start and end point) but rather progress in a helical manner which suggests a 
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rolling continuum with no end point (because of the social constructivist nature of the 
issue). The term therefore is not and should not be redundant.  
 
Turnbull and Hoppe also argue that the term W.I is unhelpful in terms of analysis. But 
Rittel and Webber did not structure their ten features as an analytical model, it was 
simply a list of features to enable a problem is be identified as wicked or not. Such 
categorisation could then assist in beginning to understand the problem and respond to 
it as a W.I. That said, others (Peters, 2017; Alford and Head, 2017 and Turnbull and 
Hoppe, 2018) have attempted to develop alternative models for discussing complex, or 
wicked, problems. Turnbull and Hoppe (2018 p315) reconceptualise W.I as 
‘problematicity’, defined as ‘the distance between those who question or inquire into 
the problem’. They call this model the ‘questioning-distance framework’ (ibid p322). For 
example, within this model a policy maker might argue that child neglect policy is about 
parental unemployment not about maltreatment. Such a response represses the 
multifaceted nature of the problem by repressing the scope, and putting a ring-fence 
around (part of) the problem. But this is by no means the full scale or nature of the 
problem, and therefore invites other policy makers to question this context, and 
examine other angles of the issue. The issue may be closer to some policy makers 
interests than others, such that they will all be at relational odds.  
 
There are a number of problems with this model. Firstly, it assumes that there is more 
than one person working on a problem because there needs to be more than one 
‘questioner’ (ibid p324); each questioner assesses the problem from their own 
experiences, compares this to other questioners in order to gauge the distance. 
Secondly, Turnbull and Hoppe criticised Rittel and Webber’s W.I model for not being a 
useful analytical model, but I do not think that  this ‘questioning-distance’ model is any 
better at analysing the degrees of wickedness of a problem. It seems overly complicated. 
I am unsure how this might be applied systematically to various problems or between 
different policy makers because it is difficult to see at what point agreement might be 
reached and action taken. Within networks such discussions naturally occur as part of 
the nature of the network’s remit so it is unclear how much this model adds to 
something which, I think, occurs on a regular basis anyway within organisations.  
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Alternatively Alford and Head (2017) developed a typology of problems matrix (see 
figure i) which centres on two key elements of a wicked issue: the problem (the y axis), 
and the actors involved (the x axis). The matrix should be viewed as a continuum, 
starting from tame problems in the bottom left, progressing to the most complex 
problems – wicked problems – in the top right corner. This model appears more user-
friendly and has clearer, more specific degrees of ‘wickedness’, which is what Turnbull 
and Hoppe (2018) seemed to be aiming for but did not quite achieve in my view, 
certainly not with any distinctiveness or ease of applicability.  
 
Both models, however, seem overly complicated if the purpose of the argument is to 
identify whether or not something is a wicked issue in the first place. Furthermore, it 
might be quite difficult to apply broad categories of problems (e.g. climate change, or 
poverty, or child neglect) to these models. Such broader umbrella terms would need to 
be broken down to its smaller components (e.g climate change is caused by an increased 
use of fossil fuels, poverty is lack of education, child neglect is caused by lack of good 
parenting) and those smaller components applied for more detailed identification of the 
degrees of wickedness.  
 
Figure i) Alternative types of complex problems 
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(Alford and Head, 2017 p402) 
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Rittel and Webber (1973 pp161-167) proposed ten features (see figure ii) which can be 
applied to any issue to identify whether or not it is a wicked issue. When all ten features 
apply the problem is classed as wicked. Rather than reconceptualising Rittel and 
Webber’s model, Peters (2017) expanded it with three further elements which he felt 
were missing, yet crucial in the decision-making around complex issues. These were 
multiple actors, social features and political features. He stated that ‘wicked problems 
involve multiple actors and are socially and politically complex’ (Peters, 2017 p388). I 
think that these two models can be drawn together into a single matrix, with Peters’s 
(2017) three features adding extra depth to those of Rittel and Webber’s (see figure ii).  
 
Using figure ii, I will apply Rittel and Webber’s (ibid) ten distinguishing features, within 
which I will also apply Peters’ additional characteristics of multiple actors, social and 
political complexities to the umbrella term of child neglect (rather than breaking it into 
constituent parts) in order to explain why child neglect, in broad terms, should be 
conceptualised as a wicked issue. 
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Figure ii: Applying Rittel and Webber’s (1973) ten features of a wicked issue with Peters (2017) further features to child neglect. 
Rittel and Webber’s (1973) 
ten features of a wicked issue 
Peters (2017) Further features 
Political Social Multiple actors 
1. There is no definitive 
formulation of a wicked 
problem. 
 
Politically, there is no single Government department 
dealing with the root causes of child neglect. 
Depending on how it is defined then depends on 
whether it is dealt with by DoH, DfE,  DWP, or even 
the Home Office. This further adds to the complexities 
when trying to respond to its issues.  
 
Describing neglect may cause 
operational difficulty because 
definitions often fall into the category of 
broader family needs such as parenting 
(in)capacity making it socially complex 
(see section 2.2) 
 
Child neglect is multifaceted and its 
complex nature makes it difficult for 
multiple actors to identify, or 
understand what constitutes child 
neglect. 
2. Wicked problems have no 
stopping rule 
 
Child neglect has been a long-standing political and social (Peters, 2017) issue and will continue 
to be an issue for years to come because wicked issues are difficult to define, therefore there is 
no clear, definitive end to the problem: the parameters of the notion of child neglect will shift. 
Those dealing with the problem will, 
more often than not, find that it is an 
endless, unresolvable spiral because 
as one solution is found a further 
problem occurs. Multiple actors 
working on the issue, will draw to an 
end (either temporarily or 
permanently) because they run out 
of money, time, or find that they have 
done the best that they are presently 
able to with the resources that they 
have.  
 
3. Solutions to wicked problems 
are not true-or-false, but 
good-or-bad. 
 
There is no true or false answer to resolving child 
neglect. Political responses to it will depend on the 
politics of the day, and what the political priorities 
are. Such political responses will either be good (and 
well received) or bad and poorly designed. Equally as 
politics changes (e.g. through general election) policy 
responses can change or disappear, thus changing the 
outcomes for children facing neglect.  
 
Child neglect is a socially constructed 
concept and therefore its definition 
changes with society. True or false 
solutions cannot be applied to concept 
which is fluid. What works (good 
solution) today might not be a suitable 
solution for child neglect in the future, 
and therefore becomes a bad solution.   
Given the multiple actors involved 
with dealing with child neglect, each 
will judge any proposed policy 
solutions, based on their own 
experience, values, knowledge. This 
will vary amongst the actors who 
will then need to negotiate a solution 
because there will be no single 
true/false answer within such a 
political and social issue.  
 
4. There is no immediate and no 
ultimate test of a solution to a 
Governments cannot predict the outcomes of any 
policy solutions to child neglect. Often it may take 
Within child neglect, the variables 
cannot be controlled, therefore a policy 
Whilst the merits or consequences 
cannot be appraised immediately, 




many years for any effects to be seen. The outcomes 
may not necessarily be as intended.  
solution may work in one area but not 
another. This might not be predictable 
upon implementation and may take time 
to evidence.  
they may be appraised differently by 
the different actors involved. A 
successful solution to one may not be 
seen as such by another.  
 
5. Every solution to a wicked 
problem is a “one-shot 
operation”; because there is 
no opportunity to learn by 
trial-and-error, every attempt 
counts significantly. 
 
On the one hand it might be argued that the 
government does pilot initiatives, but even then the 
consequences from these pilots or trailblazers leave 
‘traces’ that might have irreversible consequences.  
There is no room for trial-and-error 
because every solution, no matter how 
small, ‘leaves “traces” that cannot be 
undone”. This is applicable to child 
neglect; because solutions are dealing 
with children’s well-being, and may 
therefore, have catastrophic 
consequences.  
 
The multiple actors involved in child 
neglect need to carefully consider 
and negotiate any policy being 
implemented locally in order to 
minimise harmful consequences  
6. Wicked problems do not have 
an enumerable (or an 
exhaustively describable) set 
of potential solutions, nor is 
there a well-described set of 
permissible operations that 
may be incorporated into the 
plan.  
 
In political terms, at any given time there could be 
any number of potential solutions to child neglect.  
In social terms, there could be any 
number of social ills or complexities 
impacting on child neglect at any given 
time, and these will always change over 
time.  
The multiple actors involved in child 
neglect need to judge which 
solutions should be pursued at which 
time. But given the varied 
professional background of the 
multiple actors, each will have their 
own view on what should be done, 
when and how which adds another 
set of issues to resolving the issue.  
 
7.  Every wicked problem is 
essentially unique 
 
Political responses to child neglect are not a one-size 
fits all. The root causes of child neglect vary, and the 
problem changes over time. Therefore there political 
equations or rules cannot be applied to child neglect 
to formulate a policy response. Each problem needs a 
different political response.  
Each child’s experiences of neglect and 
how they respond to their 
circumstances, will differ. The solutions 
to those problems, therefore, need to be 
tailored to the individual child or family.  
 
 
The multiple actors involved with 
child neglect cases will be 
responding to different elements of 
the causes of child neglect.  
8. Every wicked problem can be 
considered to be a symptom 
of another problem. 
 
The multi-dimensional elements of child neglect are essentially the symptom of a State regulated 
problem. Solving one element highlights deficiencies or problems in another (or several other) 
areas. A physically neglected child may be hungry and dirty because the parents have no money 
for groceries. This might lead to the question of whether or not one or both parents are 
employed; if yes, then is there a wider issue of minimum wage? Do the parents need extra 
benefits to supplement their salaries? If only one, or neither parent is in employment, does this 
lead to a bigger question of a) state welfare benefits (are these fit for purpose and so on.) or b) 
Unfortunately, practitioners at the 
operational level cannot resolve the 
bigger problems on a day to day 
basis and are often, fire-fighting the 
fallout for example, the child who is 
hungry, or the parent trying to 
access benefits. 
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the State needs to increase employment opportunities. The symptom of child neglect always 
leads to another, bigger problem. 
 
 
9. The existence of a 
discrepancy representing a 
wicked problem can be 
explained in numerous ways. 
The choice of explanation 
determines the nature of the 
problem’s resolution 
Child neglect might be explained by poor parenting skills, poor education, poor economy (low-
paid, or not enough, jobs), inadequate state benefit system, health problems (child or parent) or 
disability (child or parent), but not one of these is the single known cause for neglect, and any 
one of these may lead to any of the others. They do not occur in any identifiable sequence either.  
 
Those working to find solutions to 
the problem will lean towards one of 
these as a cause, and they will err 
towards the one which makes most 
sense to them. This, however, is 
where a network approach is useful 
in seeing the problem from multiple 
perspectives. 
 
10. The planner has no right to be 
wrong 
 
In political terms, bad policy decisions or poor policy 
outcomes can be costly and damaging to a political 
party’s reputation. 
As identified through the previous 9 
features, ill-thought out policy solutions 
can have lasting, irreversible effects on 
the political party, and within society. 
The word “planner” could easily be 
changed in my context with 
practitioners in children’s universal 
services. That is to say social 
workers, early years’ practitioners, 
teachers, police officers, health staff 
and so on, and the meaning would 
still apply. This has clearly been 
evidenced in child abuse and neglect 
cases when practitioners have 
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Wicked issues require strategic coordination which might take the form of a network, or 
partnership, between relevant agencies that are able to respond to its consequences 
(Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). Wicked issues, such as child neglect, cut across both the 
many layers of government (government to front-line level) as well as being cross-
sectoral (Ferlie et al., 2010; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). Network approaches offer 
benefits as ideas, resources and expertise can be drawn from several relevant sources in 
order to tackle a problem from many different angles. Such collaborative problem 
solving fosters an ethos of joint ownership of the problem and, therefore, joint 
responsibility for alleviating it (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a; Torfing and Sørensen, 
2014). In relation to child neglect, having a network consisting of actors from Health, 
Housing, Education, and Social Services (amongst many others) enables it to explore a 
variety of causes, and develop the multifaceted responses, drawing on the varied 
knowledge, expertise, skills and resources.  
 
The next section moves on to examine the role of the LSCB as a specific network for 
responding to wicked issues such as child neglect.  
 
2.6 IMPACT OF LSCBs 
France et al. (2010) carried out an in-depth empirical study which examined ‘the extent 
to which LSCBs have overcome the weaknesses of Area Child Protection Committees, 
and the effectiveness of the Boards in meeting their objectives’ (France et al., 2010, pi). 
The researchers used a mixed methods approach across six areas in England, involving:  
i) a quantitative survey to gather extensive data across England; ii) a content analysis of 
minutes from various meetings, and iii) qualitative interviews (a mix of face to face and 
telephone) with LSCB members and front-line practitioners. This evaluation focused on 
leadership and governance, board membership, participation of core agencies and inter-
agency working, training and performance, communication between bodies involved, 
resources and costs and the impact on professional practice, all of which had been 
identified as weaknesses in previous multi-agency arrangements. However, it did not 
focus on how guidance from policy are accessed and shared in practice.  
 
France et al. (2010) concluded that LSCBs had effected some improvements on their 
predecessors. They noted that LSCBs had succeeded in achieving acknowledgement 
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from practitioners, at strategic and operational level, that safeguarding children is a 
shared responsibility, thus enhancing the notion of joined-up working. However, 
weaknesses continued to exist in their ‘Governance arrangements’ (France et al., 2010, 
pi), and differences in opinion were apparent in terms of the wider remit given to 
LSCBs, as some Board members felt that their role should be narrowly focussed on 
protecting children from harm. The research uncovered uncertainty from the LSCBs in 
terms of whether or not they were informing and affecting operational practice in terms 
of safeguarding children.  
 
There may be a number of reasons for this. France et al. (2010, p113) note that 
‘differences in organisational culture and differences in language and terminology can 
raise challenges ... Large and complex structures involving a wide range of partners can 
also be problematic’. This point reflects that made by Pressman and Wildavsky (1984, 
pxxiv) who, in relation to discussing policy implementation, noted that ‘the longer the 
chain of causality, the more numerous the reciprocal relationships among the links and 
the more complex implementation becomes’. France et al. (2010) argue that, because 
some Boards were trying to cover a remit which was deemed to be too wide 
(addressing child protection policies, carrying out SCRs, preventative work and 
implementing new wider business requirements) they were struggling to be effective.  
 
In addition, strategic level decision-making and policy making are never conducted in a 
neutral environment; such decisions are made in a social and political context and are 
influenced by a range of professional perspectives whose organisations have competing 
political agendas in terms of the best practice for safeguarding children (Corby and Cox, 
2000). This may also impact on whether, and how, services interpret and implement 
particular policies and procedures. The influence generated at operational level is likely 
to depend on how well the LSCBs exercise their statutory powers, understand local 
infrastructure, inter-agency relationships and the influence and stature of key 
individuals such as the Director of Children’s Services. That said, while the LSCB is a 
statutory body, they ‘… do not have any statutory powers to insist on changes to policy 
or practice’ (France et al., 2010, p129), which was also a core criticism of its 
predecessors (Horwath, 2010). However, the Working Together guidance (2013, p60) 
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stated that LSCBs, while not having the authority to ‘direct other organisations’, do have 
a duty to make clear ‘where improvement is needed’.  
 
Munro (2010a, 2010b, 2011), and Ofsted (2011) took a more positive view of the LSCB 
role. Munro’s (ibid) three-part review took a ‘systems approach’ (Munro, 2010a, p10) to 
assessing the child protection system as a whole. The review analysed previous data as 
its main method of assessment. As this review was heralded as a turning point in 
reducing bureaucracy and targets in social work, and giving professional judgement and 
decision making back to practitioners, it is an important review. In relation to LSCBs, 
Munro highlighted the role which LSCBs took in managing the ‘holistic approach to child 
protection’ (ibid, p10), and ensuring coordination, communication between agencies 
and performance management in early help provision (see Green, 2012). Thus, Munro 
was keen to suggest strengthening the responsibilities which the LSCBs hold in relation 
to monitoring the impact of training, practice and learning, as well as being able to 
‘identify emerging problems in the system’ (Munro, 2010b, p77).  
 
Building on from Munro’s comments about the important role that LSCBs have in 
monitoring working together practices, Ofsted (2011) published a report to help LSCBs 
reflect on their practice and improve through sharing good practice. Ofsted used 
evidence from their own inspections carried out from 2009 to 2011, visits, interviews 
and requests for examples of good practice from five chosen areas (from which they 
received 12 examples). They gained the views from a number of professionals across 
universal services, not just social care. The 2011 Ofsted report evidenced much good 
practice in LSCBs, in terms of leadership, business planning, partnership working, 
including engaging front-line practitioners and children, as well as developing 
relationships with other networks such as the Children’s Trusts. In particular, it noted 
the shift from a compliance culture to a learning culture in all areas. It highlighted that 
LSCBs are learning from Serious Case Reviews and disseminating this learning - through 
training - to professionals (Ofsted, 2011). Whilst this report relays useful findings in 
relation to the work of LSCBs, it seems as though the report was produced in light of the 
success of Munro’s review, about developing a learning culture rather than a 
compliance one, which is ironic because Ofsted is not generally perceived as promoting 
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a learning culture (but rather a fault-finding culture) (see, for example, Jeffrey and 
Woods, 1996; Clarke, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, Preston-Shoot (2012) and Green (2012) contributed to an important and 
timely debate deliberating the chances of a successful implementation of the reforms set 
down in the Munro review (2011). Preston-Shoot (2012) focused his view on the effects 
of a changing political landscape and the role of LSCBs. In his opinion, whilst 
acknowledging positive elements of LSCBs in their role in safeguarding children, (such 
as being crucial in terms of promoting good practice, developing learning, monitoring 
outcomes and overseeing multi-agency practice to minimise duplicate service 
provision), all of this needs to be achieved within the local authority austerity measures 
which are being implemented by Central Government. This is potentially problematic 
given that LSCBs are funded by contributions from Local Authorities, Health, Police and 
other public services, all of which are having their budgets cut and are being forced to 
make savings, which might be detrimental to the sustainability of LSCBs in some areas. 
Similarly, Green (2012) noted that partner organisations are expected to contribute 
financially to the running of their LSCB; however, the funding provided by agencies 
varies. In the current climate of austerity cuts, it might be assumed that one of the 
savings that organisations are likely to make, might be their contributions to the LSCB, 
for example Green (2012, p18) claimed that ‘the absence of a statutory duty [for 
financial prescription] will make contributions less’. 
  
In addition, LSCBs are also criticised for being another expensive, bureaucratic tool of 
government, which duplicates the work of other joined-up mechanisms such as 
Children’s Trusts and Health and Well-Being Boards and consumes financial and staff 
resources which might be better used elsewhere. This leads to a question about how 
well such joined-up entities are working in transferring knowledge and changing 
practice.  
 
2.7 THE GOVERNMENT’S SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN RESEARCH INITIATIVE 
The Coalition government sponsored Safeguarding Children research initiative (Davies 
and Ward, 2012) was to shape the day-to-day practice of strategic and operational 
managers, policy makers, front-line practitioners and service providers working to 
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safeguard children from neglect and emotional abuse. This included those in Health, 
Education, the Police, and Family Justice and was not just limited to Children’s Social 
Care. This statement of intent from page 12 clearly stipulates that: 
‘Safeguarding Children across Services: Messages from Research provides an 
Overview of the key messages from 15 studies, distilled to meet the needs of those 
professionals who seek to utilize such research findings to shape their day-to-day 
work. These include strategic and operational managers and practitioners, 
commissioners and providers of services, and policymakers in all those agencies 
that are required to work together to safeguard children: although these are 
primarily those who work in Children’s and Adults’ Social Care, Health, 
Education, the Police and the family justice system, the messages are relevant to 
staff in many other agencies in both the statutory and independent sectors.’ 
 
Therefore, within this ‘safeguarding children’ research initiative, the Government 
identified a core research focus of exploring neglect and emotional abuse (the main 
factors in Victoria Climbié’s case), within which three specific areas were identified as:  
 ‘Identification and initial response to abuse 
 Effective interventions after abuse or its likelihood have been identified 
 Effective inter-agency and interdisciplinary working to safeguard children’ 
(Davies and Ward, 2012 p12). 
Eleven of the fifteen studies within the Review (Davies and Ward, 2012) were 
specifically commissioned as part of this initiative. Of the remaining four, therefore, two 
biennial analyses were included from an on-going programme of government funded 
biennial analyses of SCRs; two further studies were included in the research initiative 
because they were reporting during the same time frame (Davies and Ward, 2012). 
Three out of these 15 studies focused specifically on child neglect (Daniel, Taylor and 
Scott, 2009; Farmer and Lutman, 2010; Stein, et al., 2009) and the two biennial analyses 
of SCRs had many findings relating to the presence of child neglect prior to a child death 
(Brandon et al., 2008; Brandon et al., 2009). Therefore, given the intention of the 
research initiative, those it aimed to influence, this research initiative seemed a good 
test case to use to evaluate how well LSCBs are in disseminating and operationalizing 
government sponsored research into everyday practice.  
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2.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined existing literature around the complexities which 
practitioners have in defining, identifying and assessing child neglect. The chapter then 
conceptualised child neglect as a wicked issue, and why a network response is one 
suitable approach to tackling such issues. It also examined the impact of LSCBs from 
current literature. What this chapter highlighted was that what we do not presently 
understand is how guidance around child neglect is transferred to front-line practice 
and the processes that that guidance passes through before informing practice.   
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 2 – Governance 
Networks 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Part two explores governance network theory and then explains Torfing et al.’s (2012) 
effectivity criteria (EC) in order to assess if LSCBs are fit for purpose in terms of being a 
means for knowledge transfer to front-line practitioners. 
 
3.1 SELECTING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
There were several theoretical frameworks that I could have adopted to examine the 
issue of the operationalization of LSCBs. I considered policy communication theory, 
Implementation theory, and Governance theory (see Appendix 2). I was drawn to policy 
communication theory first because initially I thought that what I was examining was 
how child neglect guidance was communicated. This would have required documentary 
analysis as well to examine the content of particular policies. I discounted this theory, 
however, because I thought this would not enable me to examine the wider social 
factors around knowledge transfer, for example, policy negotiation. In terms of the 
documentary analysis as well, it proved difficult to find comparable policy documents 
across participating areas.  
  
Dissemination and Implementation (D.I) science theory was a strong contender because 
this would have enabled me to examine how (or if) the guidance filters into practice. D.I 
science draws on the works of Lewin’s action research, Cochrane’s systematic reviews 
(1970s) and Rogers’s ideas of innovation and adoption (1960s) (Estabrooks et al., 
2018). However,  I discounted this because in my mind there was a step before this that 
needed to be examined, and that is how the guidance, or knowledge, is transferred from 
top (government) to bottom (front-line practitioner), and what are the decision-making 
processes that are involved in whether or not something is transferred. Therefore, I 
selected governance theory because this enables such processes to be examined from 
the more human element of working together to operationalize policy guidance. 
Governance theory enables an exploration of the operationalization and coordination of 
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networks. The next section examines governance theory and its application to this study 
in more detail.  
 
3.1.1 Governance theory 
-  The shift to governance structures and the definition of governance 
The ideas that dominated traditional forms of government and public administration 
centred around the fact that central government should dominate society and the 
economy. Yet, such public administrative forms have been criticised for being too 
‘formalistic, narrow-minded, exclusive, conservative, inflexible, uncoordinated, 
undemocratic, and, more importantly, out of step with reality’ (Torfing and Sørensen, 
2014, p330). Expectations of the electorate on the delivery of public services, the 
limitations of the public sector services and the shift from a sense of society to a sense of 
individualism with the leap to neoliberalist values (which began to emerge with the 
Conservative government of the late 1970s and 1980s), lead people to question whether 
or not the government was overloaded. With this shift to neoliberalism, the 1970s also 
saw the increase in private sector contracts to deliver public services, and the 
increasing privatisation of public services, (Ling, 2000; Torfing and Sørensen, 2014; Ojo 
and Mellouli, 2016). Central Government was becoming decentralised, moving to a 
position of steering policy-making, or governance, rather than leader or director. With 
such moves, the emphasis shifted from macro (national) level policy making to meso 
(regional, or middle level) policy and decision making.  
 
Governance can be seen to be a way to coordinate or steer independent actors, with 
common goals or purpose, from the public, private and voluntary sectors for the benefit 
of society (Torfing and Sørensen, 2014; Ojo and Mellouli, 2016; Kapucu et al., 2017). 
Governance theory suggests that such steering or coordination is deemed to be 
horizontal, rather than vertical, or top-down (Ojo and Mellouli, 2016; Kapucu et al., 
2017). Governance is a ‘process of governing’ (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016, p5) rather 
than a structure, in which governments shift from the stance of imposing solutions, or 
practices, to allowing actors to be more creative or innovative in terms of how or what 
they deliver, as long as the outcomes are achieved. This suggests meso-level action and 
initiative to take charge at a local level, rather than leading from the top. Yet, with this 
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neoliberalist approach to public services delivery, and the increase of decentralisation, 
services still needed to be coordinated, more so than governed.  
 
For the purpose of this study, with a focus on Local Safeguarding Children Boards, 
governance is taken to mean government steering and coordinating policy 
development, but enabling LSCBs to respond to their own local level needs and 
demographics, in terms of how and what is delivered, as long as it is within the 
Government’s policy agenda.  
 
- Models of governance 
The concept of governance can be divided into four perspectives of governance: 
 Good governance or corporate governance  
 Multi-level governance  
 New Public Management (NPM) 
 Network governance  
Each of these implies a slightly different way of steering. Therefore, I needed to identify 
a relevant model of governance that would support an investigation of the 
operationalization of LSCBs. 
 
Good governance / corporate governance is concerned with ‘the principles of a properly 
governed state and how government operates’ (Ojo and Mellouli, 2016). Multi-level 
governance emphasises the use of networks to transect agency boundaries and 
hierarchies (Ojo and Mellouli, 2016; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). I discounted these two 
models because this study is neither exploring how the government operates, nor how 
LSCBs transects boundaries and hierarchies. Rather it aimed to explore the 
communication and interactions within and beyond the LSCB as a network to transfer 
policy.  
 
Both NPM and network governance could have been selected as the model for 
evaluation of LSCBs. New Public Management (NPM) employs private sector 
performance and monitoring tools in combination with traditional public 
administration (Andresani and Ferlie, 2006; Cairney, 2012; Torfing and Sørensen, 2014; 
Ojo and Mellouli, 2016), to enable the government to be hands-off, and steer from afar 
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whilst still holding the delivering agencies (public, private or voluntary sector) to 
account through performance targets. As Andresani and Ferlie (2006, p416) state ‘NPM 
reforms are typically “top-down” in nature, driven by a “reformist” central government 
trying to squeeze more value out of large operational agencies and functions’. NPM uses 
a model of consumer choice, and stakeholder voice, to hold delivering agencies to 
account by the service user, and the government, (Torfing and Sørensen, 2014). One key 
element of the NPM regime is the emphasis on management through performance 
measurement, monitoring and evaluation, and having an audit trail whose ultimate 
focus is on value for money or best-value, rather than service quality.  
 
NPM was discounted as the most useful model of governance, because NPM based 
models of effectiveness (that is to say, working together for, and reaching, a common 
goal) and efficiency (doing more with less) are not always the best ways for measuring 
the performance of networks because they are output and economically driven as 
opposed to thinking about processes and stakeholder satisfaction (Klijn and Koppenjan, 
2016; Greenwood, 2016). But more importantly, for my study, NPM is not a good model 
for exploring how practitioners deal with wicked issues such as child neglect, or for 
exploring the implementation of policy. NPM’s focus on performance monitoring – 
whilst relevant to a degree here – detracts from the complex nature of child neglect. I 
therefore selected Governance networks as the governance model for this study.   
 
3.1.2 Governance Network theory 
The first wave of governance network research is very much connected to works by 
Rhodes (1981, 1990, and 1997) and Marsh and Rhodes (1992). These researchers 
talked more of policy networks than governance networks, but highlighted the changes 
taking place within public administration and the shift towards a network-based 
approach to government and policy-making. They sought to explain why and how 
governance networks are formed, the impact of the market in such set ups, and ‘linking 
the rise of network governance to new societal trends’ (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a, 
p14).  
 
Later theorists argued that governance networks should be examined through different 
theoretical perspectives. The theories of network governance (for example, Sørensen 
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and Torfing, 2007; Torfing et al., 2012; Kickert et al., 1997; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004, 
2016) are concerned with the levels of complex interaction between the actors. Such 
interactions include (but are not limited to) interactions across the sectors (public, 
private and voluntary) and organisations within them, interactions between network 
actors regarding developing and disseminating policy guidance; all with the purpose of 
delivering a particular agenda for the benefit of a local community which those agencies 
or actors serve (Greenwood, 2016; Kapucu et al., 2017).  Within this model, the 
government plays more of an influencing role than a directing role, and power is shared 
among the network actors to enable them to coordinate their agenda. Andresani and 
Ferlie (2006, p417) articulate how network governance ‘may be a post-NPM form, 
better able to cope with higher levels of social complexity and uncertainty than the top-
down and state-centred approach now strongly associated in some jurisdictions with 
the NPM model’.  
 
To me, writers such as Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) and Peters (2013) seem to 
approach the notion of governance networks through balancing the traditional top-
down policy making approach with emerging horizontally coordinated networks. In my 
opinion, they argue that for governance networks to function successfully, an element of 
the traditional public administration model is still needed in order to guide the 
networks. This adds a further element to the complex interactions noted in the previous 
paragraph, in that, along with the complex horizontal interactions, one needs to include 
the interactions from the top into the networks. In relation to understanding LSCBs, I 
am inclined to agree that the arguments of Goldsmith and Eggers, and Peters is perhaps 
a more accurate picture of the governance environment in which LSCBs are operating. 
This is because LSCBs are operating alongside other meso-level strategic networks 
(such as Children’s Trusts, Health and Well-Being Board and so on) but they are 
strategically determined, and accountable to, Central Government departments. They 
are an entity that was devised by Central Government, to carry out the strategic work of 
central government and they are, therefore, very much beholden to targets set by 
Central Government. As Sørensen and Torfing (2007) explain network governance 
operates in a political and economic climate over which those involved in the network 
have no control, and such political, economic and social processes can affect how 
successful (or not) a governance network might be at any given time. Such factors may 
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affect the motivation and participation of relevant network actors because of an actor’s 
inability ‘to gain real political influence’ (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007b, p96). 
 
A Governance network, therefore, can be defined as a particular form of multi-agency 
steering, which can usefully be applied to the policy development and execution of the 
LSCBs. Governance networks consist of organisations who are ‘operationally 
autonomous’ from each other yet ‘dependent’ on each other’s resources (Sørensen and 
Torfing, 2007a, p9). In theory, the actors within a governance network operate within a 
self-regulating, implied framework rather than a fixed structure, and operate through 
negotiations and bargaining.  They have been set up for a public purpose or function 
within a certain geographical area (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a). This, therefore, 
makes them ideal for dealing with wicked issues (Ferlie, et al., 2010). Figure iii 
summarises the ways in which LSCB can be described as a governance network.  
 
Figure iii: linking the governance network description to LSCBs 





Must have representatives from multiple agencies.  
 
Operationally autonomous from each other 
Each agency has own strategic plan, 
organisational structure, etc. 
 
Dependent on each other’s resources 
Staffing, financial contributions,  expertise 
 
Established for a public purpose 
Safeguarding children within their area.  
 
Implied framework developed through 
negotiation  
 
Business Plan is consulted with  representatives 
and service users in the area (e.g. children)  
 
Geographically set 
Usually the same parameters as the local 
authority.   
 
3.2 EVALUATING GOVERNANCE NETWORKS 
The growth in governance networks raises the question of evaluating their effectiveness 
in steering and coordination across sectors, and how to measure their effectiveness in 
improving performance (Sørensen and Torfing, 2009; Torfing et al., 2012; Klijn and 
Koppenjan, 2016; Greenwood, 2016). Of course, what an effective governance network 
looks like, and by whose judgement is it effective also needs consideration. Given the 
multi-sectoral and multi-professional nature of many governance networks, what is 
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classed as effective or impactful by one member, might not necessarily be the same for 
another (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016).  
 
I mapped the layers of communication through my chosen network (see Figure iv), in 
order to illustrate the complexities in knowledge transfer that often become enmeshed 
within a wicked issue, such as child neglect. I therefore needed to find an evaluation 
model that would help me to capture such complexities and issues in the knowledge 
transfer process.  
 
Within governance network theory, I identified two evaluation methods that could have 
been adopted as part of this study to support my investigation of the operationalization 
of LSCBs in communicating and disseminating government sponsored research 
messages: Koppenjan and Klijn’s (2004; 2016) actor, game and network analysis model, 
and Torfing et al.’s (2012) Effectivity Criteria (EC) model. 
 
- Koppenjan and Klijn’s (2004; 2016) actor, game and network analysis model 
In relation to this 3-step analytical model, Koppenjan and Klijn (2004, p133) state that 
‘the actors, game and network analysis must provide an overview of the conditions and 
circumstances under which complex decision-making processes of wicked problems 
take place’.  
Step one is the actor analysis.  In short, this step aims to assess ‘who the most important 
actors are, what problem perceptions they hold, and what their position is with respect 
to the problem situation’ (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004, p135). This helps to identify the 
different actors’ perceptions of the problem or issue.  
Step two is the game analysis. This explores how decisions are arrived at and solutions 
are devised.  
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Figure iv; Mapping the lines of communication and policy interpretation, horizontally and vertically, in relation to this study (based on Goggin et al. and 
Bowe et al., 1992)
Various LSCB sub groups  
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
Home Office                                             Dept of Education (DfE)                        Dept of Health (DoH) 
Association of independent LSCB Chairs 
(AILC) 
                      Independent Chair                  Board Manager 
LSCB      












Children’s  Social 
Services operational 
team managers 
                  
Head teachers/ Designated 
Safeguarding Lead 
     
Primary    Secondary    SEN 
Designated Safeguarding 
Nurses 
   
CCG     NHS 
 
Hospitals      GP practices 
Front-line social 
workers 
                  
 interpretation 


















H O R I Z O N T A L 
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Step three, the network analysis, focuses on the background of the network actors (for 
example, home organisation, membership of other networks) which enables a cross 
analysis to be carried out on such relations and the impact on the rules of the network 
being analysed.  
This model was designed to identify and deal with uncertainties within the network. In 
this context, uncertainties are more than a lack of knowledge, but include ‘strategic and 
institutional characteristics of the interactions’ (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004, p133). This 
model cannot remove the uncertainties, but rather, helps to map them out in order that 
they can be dealt with more effectively within the network, if and when they arise. 
In their later publication, Klijn and Koppenjan (2016) refer to process analysis and 
institutional analysis, rather than game analysis and network analysis respectively, but 
the important questions posed under these headings are, to all intents and purposes, 
the same as the 2004 model. I think ‘game’ and ‘network’ give a clearer indication of the 
phases and purposes of the analysis, and so refer to these terms in this thesis.  
Although the model is designed to be used sequentially as a 3-stage model, there does 
not appear to be any reason why just one section of the model could be used, if so 
required. For example in a study on professionals awareness, or perceptions, of a given 
issue (for example child sexual exploitation), step one might only need to be used.  
One problem of the model that I perceive is that more often than not, governance 
networks have more than one goal that they are working towards at any one time (for 
example, LSCBs are not just working towards prevent child neglect, they will have many 
other aspects of safeguarding work that are taking place simultaneously). These goals 
can often change, each actor may hold different goals as their priority in comparison 
with other actors, and the effects may not necessarily be measurable. Therefore, in this 
scenario, using this model, the researcher would need to be quite specific about what 
they were setting out to measure within the governance network, rather than allowing 
the actors to identify the starting point.  
This model of governance network analysis could have been adopted for this study 
because it explores interactions between the actors, including examining how decisions 
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are arrived at. The game analysis phase might have enabled me to explore the 
background of the actors, and enabled cross-sector differences (Health, Education, and 
Children’s Social Care) to be drawn on. The network analysis phase might have enabled 
me to draw on interactions, positive and negative relationships. However, the model 
(Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004, p136-137, or Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016, pp261-262) is 
very detailed and poses some specific questions which could be answered using both 
quantitative or qualitative data, depending on whether what was required was breadth 
or depth, or both. Therefore, I discounted this model because it would not have allowed 
me to examine the knowledge transfer beyond the network (from Government into the 
network and from the network out to front-line practitioners) because it focuses on the 
internal workings of the network, and not beyond the network.    
 
-  Torfing et al.’s (2012) model of Effectivity Criteria (EC) 
Torfing et al. (2012, p172) established a set of six criteria (see Figure v) which could be 
applied to a governance network in order to evaluate the extent to which it was 
producing and implementing better policy solutions.  
 
Figure v) Sørensen and Torfing’s (2009, p242; 2012, p172) effectivity criteria: a model for 















1. Produce a clear and well-informed understanding of the often complex and 
crosscutting policy problems and policy opportunities at hand;  
 
2. Generate innovative, proactive and yet feasible policy options that match the joint 
perception of the problems and challenges facing the network actors;  
 
3. Reach joint policy decisions that go beyond the least common denominator while 
avoiding excessive costs and unwarranted cost shifting;  
 
4. Ensure a relatively smooth policy implementation based on a continuous 
coordination and a high degree of legitimacy and programme responsibility among all 
the relevant and affected actors, including target groups, client advocacy groups, 
stakeholder organizations, public administrators and politicians;  
 
5. Provide a flexible adjustment of policy solutions and public services in the face of 
changing demands, conditions and preferences;  
 
6. Create favourable conditions for future cooperation through cognitive, strategic and 
institutional learning that construct common frameworks, spur the development of 
interdependency and build mutual trust. 
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These criteria help the researcher to establish whether or not a governance network 
delivers in the way the literature on governance networks promises that they should, as 
well as enabling the procedural elements of the governance network to be explored. 
Greenwood (2016, p37) offers a post-positivist discussion on the coordination 
challenges in evaluating governance. He identifies Torfing et al.’s effectivity model as a 
suitable evaluative model if the purpose of the research is to enable ‘the discovery and 
drawing together of knowledge dispersed across various actors and closely inter-
twined with policy actors’ incentives to act effectively on the basis of this knowledge’.  
Greenwood praises Torfing et al. for recognizing ‘the epistemological dimension’ (ibid, 
p37) in evaluating complex interactions in networks, (in contrast to traditional 
positivist methods) and for leaving open the operationalization of their effectivity 
criteria. I interpret this to mean getting to the crux of how complex interactions operate 
and how they are subjectively worked through, rather than simply accepting that 
complex interactions occur within networks. But rather than being prescriptive in how 
to apply the model, Torfing et al. have simply offered guidelines to be adapted.  
 
From the two evaluation models I selected Torfing et al.’s effectivity criteria model 
because, as my study aimed to examine where guidance about child neglect originate, 
and how such guidance was passed through the LSCB network to front-line 
practitioners, this model seemed to provide a good model within which to inform my 
data collection and examine my research findings (see Figure vi). The criteria, therefore, 
require a qualitative approach in order to gauge network actors’ personal and 
professional judgements and experiences on the issues being addressed, rather than a 
quantifiable measure which might enable more exact comparisons between networks to 
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Figure vi) Mapping my requirements against the two evaluation models 
My requirements from the 
model 
Koppenjan and Klijn’s (2004, 
2016) actor, game and 
network analysis model 
Torfing et al.’s (2012) model of 
Effectivity Criteria 




Allows network actors 
experiences to be explored 
 
  








Malleable to own study 
 
  





3.3  THE 6 CRITERIA 
EC 1. Produce a clear and well-informed understanding of the policy problems.  
Torfing et al. (2012) link this first criterion to the idea that governance networks are 
useful for dealing with wicked issues. Due to the complex nature of wicked issues, a 
complicated and complex discussion process is required of the root causes of the 
problem, how it should be tackled, and who is accountable and for what. Therefore, 
before the LSCB can devise a ‘clear and well informed’ policy and implement it, the 
actors in the network need to agree on a shared understanding of the problem (Ojo and 
Mellouli, 2016).  
 
This leads to another problem which might be working through the multiple 
‘perceptions’ (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016, p46) of a complex problem. This, therefore, 
requires those within the network to be able to negotiate, discuss and manage conflict 
that may arise. Attached to this notion are issues around power and influence in terms 
of policy negotiation and formulating an agreed definition or agreed policy. I will use 
Torfing et al.’s (2012, p48) definition of power which they refer to ‘as the ability to 
shape and secure particular outcomes’ [my added emphasis]. They closely align this to 
politics – with a small p – which they class as ‘conflict-ridden decisions that are 
structuring and shaping social and economic relations’, and the two are interconnected 
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in the arena of multiple actors coming together in a networked environment. Conflict-
ridden here refers to conflict as uncertainty and lack of consensus. Despite arguments 
(for example, Stoker, 1998; Skelcher et al., 2005) to the contrary, networks are not 
without conflict and power struggles and these need to be managed (Torfing et al., 
2012).  
 
Conflict might be closely linked to power, influence and authority as a challenge to the 
ability of networks to resolve wicked issues. But conflict may also arise as a contrast to 
consensus (Koppenjan, 2007) and uncertainty (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). In relation to 
conflict, Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) note that conflict regulation mechanisms can halt 
opportunistic behaviour (that is to say, one network actor using their position to further 
their own or their organisation’s interests), especially among newer partners or in 
newer, less well-established partnerships. Koppenjan (2007) argues that consensus – 
whilst being viewed as harmonious behaviour within a network - has drawbacks. He 
argues that a consensus culture and avoidance of conflict, reduces excellence, 
innovation, creativity and competition in policy design and implementation. Network 
actors become complacent and do not challenge the choices being made. By contrast, 
conflict can demonstrate the importance that actors place on certain issues and this can 
drive discussion, debate and possibly the gathering of information or research on a 
certain issue in order to find new solutions. Both points are valid in my view. I interpret 
conflict, lack of consensus and uncertainty as positive elements of networks, in as much 
as they ensure that policy problems and decisions are examined from all angles, and 
that no network actor is being enabled to use their position for their own gain. 
 
Conflicts may also arise when network actors are operating across other governing 
structures. For example, each actor within the network has to balance the needs of the 
network with the remit of their own home agency, or other networks to which they also 
belong.  This can lead to the individual having to grapple with different ideologies and 
values from various angles. That said it is important to note that a certain level of 
conflict can be beneficial in terms of turning autocratic adversaries into mutually 
respectful collaborators who may sometimes disagree, when the disagreement enables 
more constructive discussion and innovative ideas to emerge (Mouffe, 2005 as cited by 
Torfing and Sørensen, 2014). This is drawn on in the research in terms of exploring how 
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LSCB representatives balance the remit of the LSCB with that of their home 
organisation.  
 
In theory, there is no hierarchy between the participating members within the LSCB, as 
each participating member is horizontally interdependent and autonomous, guided by 
an Independent Chair. This does not necessarily mean that each actor is ‘equal in terms 
of authority’ within the LSCB (Mayntz, 1993b as cited by Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a). 
Some partners may have greater influence due to length of time in post or time served 
on the Board, which means they might carry greater sway than others, but this may 
equally come down to professional status and professional confidence upon discussing 
certain issues such as challenging child neglect.  
 
In relation to managing conflict in horizontal networks, it is suggested that the manager 
or chairperson of the network should take on a facilitator-type role rather than one of 
leader or director.  Koppenjan and Klijn (2004, p11) describe them as being ‘mediator 
and stimulator of interaction and not one of central director’. That said, they need to be 
careful not to get drawn into conflicts between the actors and to remain impartial. This 
could be seen within the LSCBs with the shift towards having an Independent Chair 
following the Laming report (2009).  
 
EC 2. Generate innovative, proactive policy that match the perception of the 
problems facing the network actors 
Torfing et al. (2012) refer to the extent to which the actors engaged in a governance 
network bring together different ideas and perspectives which enable creativity, 
innovation and proactivity to be utilised in the policy making process. Of course, this 
depends on how much freedom networks are given to be self-organising and self-
governing.  
 
At the macro level, some argue (Rhodes, 1997, 2017; Cairney, 2009) that with the shift 
from government to governance, government’s power has been depleted. In the UK, the 
key example is decentralisation, whereby government powers are devolved to local 
organisations through contracting out services. This, in turn, renders the government as 
inspector of services, rather than deliverer (Rhodes, 1994; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009), 
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thereby enabling local-level policy makers to be more innovative, proactive and creative 
in how they design and implement policy at the local level. 
 
Others (Newman, 2005; Torfing et al., 2012; Torfing and Sørensen, 2014) argue that 
government’s power and authority has not been depleted, but it has simply shifted.  
This, therefore, means that the government – as inspector - exerts power over the 
networks by ‘regulating and controlling the political agenda’ (Torfing et al., 2012, p55), 
potentially eroding the opportunities for innovative and proactive policy-making.  I am 
more inclined to agree with this latter view because of the evidence around the increase 
in managerialist measures (such as performance targets) and inspection measures 
(such as Ofsted) which the government has implemented as a way to control local 
strategic and operational practice.  
 
According to Torfing and Sørensen (2014), central government’s power remains, but it 
has been transformed into that of metagovernor of the governance networks (Newman, 
2005; Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a; Klijn and Edelenbos, 2007), that is to say, the 
coordinator and, what I view to be the puppet master, holding the strings of the vast 
array of growing networks and partnerships across society. With the growing number 
of networks, there needs to be an overarching authority (that is to say, the government) 
to be able to regulate their activities if they are to be an efficient asset to public life in 
terms of delivering more (service) for less (resources) (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007a; 
Rhodes, 2017). This can reduce creativity, innovation and proactivity in policy-making 
networks, by retaining control of their agendas. 
 
Flinders (2005, p86) makes an observation which is highly relevant to this argument. 
He questions how a government could be committed to devolving power yet was viewed 
as ‘having a strong centralising and controlling approach to governing’. My 
interpretation of this is that government on the one hand shifted power from itself to 
local strategic bodies, but at the same time still wanted to have some control over what 
those strategic bodies were doing locally. This might be viewed as the government 
absolving itself of responsibility by pushing strategic bodies centre stage, whilst it 
retreats and controls from backstage. This is very applicable to the role of the LSCB 
which, on the one hand, was charged with steering safeguarding policy, yet at the same 
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time was not given the ‘teeth’ to do so (Horwath, 2010), and therefore, the opportunities 
for innovation, creativity, and proactivity, with which to commit that policy into 
practice.  
 
Managerialist measures are interesting in relation to this criterion on ‘innovative’ and 
‘proactive’ policy. On the one hand, managerialism is the development of performance 
targets and indicators in order for government to be able to monitor and control front-
line practice, in an attempt to create a compliant culture (Munro, 2011). On the other 
hand, however, this notion of performance targets and monitoring conflicts with the 
ideas of innovation, proactivity and creativity that emerged with governance networks 
because neglect is subjective, not easily categorised, and is difficult to translate into a 
checklist of targets (Morrison, 2010), or an audit trail for monitoring purposes. 
 
Peters (2013) offers an interesting perspective on policy coordination, in terms of 
trying to balance out the vertical, hierarchical dominance from horizontal utilitarian 
approach to policy coordination and implementation. He seems to approach the issue of 
policy and ‘collective action’ (Peters, 2013, p570) from a utilitarian perspective. Within 
this, he assumes that network actors will cooperate in order to collectively achieve 
better outcomes for their service users.  Yet, at the same time he recognises that 
government is still trying to maintain some control in order to manage a coherent 
approach to delivering policy. This can have a positive outcome in that, as Peters (2013) 
argues monitoring practice can sometimes lead to strategic level leaders learning from 
front-line practices, because practitioners may have found more innovative and creative 
ways for implementing a given policy and dealing with clients. He states, ‘Public 
servants in the field charged with implementing programmes when faced with real 
clients with multiple needs may find better ways of addressing the issues than would 
senior public servants back in the national capital’ (ibid, 2013, p578). There are some 
flaws with this view in that, firstly, this suggests that senior managers are taking an 
interest in what front-line practitioners are doing and with what effect, and secondly 
that they are open to learning from what seems to be working in their area. The other 
factor to consider might be the cost implications involved in practitioners innovative 
and creative methods, and whether or not it is financially sustainable.   
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EC 3. Reach joint policy decisions that go beyond the least common denominator while 
avoiding excessive costs and unwarranted cost shifting  
This criterion predominantly reflects the dilemma that governance networks have in 
terms of reaching joint decisions and their financial implications in terms of footing the 
bill for a policy solution. It focuses on seeking the extent to which network actors are 
prepared to pay for initiatives upheld within a policy decision and to what extent are 
those costs pushed outside of the governance network to unwitting organisations. 
Whilst both aspects are relevant to the effective operation of LSCBs, only the focus on 
reaching joint policy decisions was directly relevant to this study, which was concerned 
with knowledge transfer and communication. 
 
Networks may need to operate within and across other networks, and these should be 
viewed on a horizontal, level playing field rather than within a hierarchical structure. 
This is what makes governance networks different to other forms of governance, and 
why this is wholly relevant to the discussion of LSCBs and wicked issues such as child 
neglect. 
 
Furthermore, the horizontal structure of networks has seemingly replaced hierarchies 
(Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). But this has caused fragmentation of service delivery as 
universal services are provided by public, private and voluntary sector services. 
Therefore, despite arguments to the contrary, the government’s role as metagovernor 
might be deemed necessary in order to coordinate the parts of the jigsaw and monitor 
the budgets/costs. 
 
EC 4. Ensure a smooth policy implementation based on continuous coordination 
among the actors involved. 
Given the web of governance networks and fragmented service delivery, policy 
implementation and coordination through a network is not an easy task. Accountability 
can be closely aligned with notions of continuous coordination, implementation and 
program responsibility. These concepts have led to a stronger emphasis on 
organisations as a whole, as well as individual practitioners being held responsible, or 
accountable, by other people for their actions (Esmark, 2007; Klijn and Koppenjan, 
2016; Jacobs and Schillemans, 2016). In this respect, accountability may flow vertically 
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(that is to say, bottom up) or horizontally across the network. In order to be held 
accountable, someone (within government, or a network, or an organisation) needs to 
set the benchmarks for the goals, or behaviour and expectations that are required to be 
met, and by which an actor is scrutinized for adhering to, or not (Esmark, 2007; Klijn 
and Koppenjan, 2016). 
 
There is a close alignment between accountability for one’s actions, and being 
scapegoated when something goes wrong (Esmark, 2007; Jacobs and Schillemans, 
2016) and nowhere is this more evident than in media reporting in the area of social 
work. Peters (2016) examined how network actors change their behaviour because of 
the media.  On the one hand, the increase in media encroachment into governance and 
policy making has opened up the policy agenda to scrutiny and accountability.  
 
Furthermore, print media closely aligns itself to a particular political party (Peters, 
2016). In the UK, most newspapers (especially tabloids) are right wing, and three 
companies (News UK, Daily Mail and General Trust [DMGT], and Trinity Mirror) control 
almost 70% of national newspaper circulation. This exposes the readership to 
exceedingly biased information. Nowhere is this more obvious than with child 
protection cases where a child tragically dies, and there follows a media witch-hunt for 
those practitioners involved with the case. This was particularly evident in the case of 
Victoria Climbié in which the social worker, Lisa Arthurworrey, was put on the 
Protection of Children Act (PoCA) list which banned her from working with children 
(Davies, 2014). Sharon Shoesmith, the Head of Haringey Children’s Services at the time 
of the death of Baby P was also publicly castigated, and seemed to have a trial by media, 
with only the Guardian publicly defending her, and the work of social workers. 
Following the death of Daniel Pelka in 2012 there was a media drive behind David 
Cameron’s call to jail social workers in cases where children are killed by their parents 
or carers, and social workers allegedly failed to intervene. Peters (2016, p16) likened 
this to being in a ‘goldfish bowl’ and ‘knowing that every action will be subjected to 
close inspection and media coverage’. 
 
Such media scapegoating drives up and reinforces accountability of actions. Media 
coverage of such high-profile cases, it might be argued, has driven up standards within 
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children’s child protective services in recent years. As Jacobs and Schillemans (2016, 
p23) stated ‘the media are an important trigger that “activates” formal accountability 
institutions, that is, parliaments and regulators, and can also be an instrument of 
accountability in itself’. Peters (2016, p16) discounts this argument, stating that all this 
does is ‘produce safe decisions that may not produce the type of policy change 
required’, which is not useful or productive when dealing with wicked issues which 
require more complex, and innovative policy solutions.  
 
Accountability within governance networks is problematic for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the number of organisations involved in a network and their interdependence 
may mean that organisations resist the responsibility, and therefore, not accepting 
joint-accountability for elements that are delivered by someone else within the 
network, (Esmark, 2007; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). Bache et al. (2015, p65) refer to 
an ‘accountability vacuum’ in governance structures, which in turn leads to ‘fuzzy 
governance’ (ibid) and ‘fuzzy accountability’ (ibid). Whilst their research is discussing 
climate change, these terms are also useful in explaining what is occurring here. They 
argue that politicians favour a complex governance architecture because it is easier to 
lose the ‘socio-political challenges’ (ibid) in the complex structures and place the blame 
for unpopular actions, and accountability for that onto someone, or something, else. 
Within their research, Bache et al. (2015) identified that, in the area of climate change 
policy, a combination of multiple organisations, a lack of quality concerns, and the 
government’s drive to push down responsibility and accountability, has designed 
governance structures rife with blame games and blame avoidance. This applies to 
understanding LSCBs and how they operate.  
 
Furthermore, those actors sitting on the network and representing their home 
organisations can represent, speak for and commit (financially, strategically) their home 
organisation to the values and remit of the network. Similarly, networks may need to 
operate within and across other networks, and these should be viewed on a horizontal, 
level playing field rather than within a hierarchical structure. This is what makes 
governance networks different to other forms of governance, and why this is wholly 
relevant to the discussion of LSCBs and wicked issues such as child neglect. 
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EC 5. Provide a flexible adjustment of policy solutions in the face of positive and 
negative policy feedback and changing conditions. 
Governance networks in theory should reduce implementation resistance (Sørensen 
and Torfing, 2007a). Goggin et al. (1990) aimed to establish a ‘communications model’ 
(Goggin et al., 1990, p19) in order to analyse policy implementation within inter-
governmental partnerships in the U.S. They explored what influences the acceptance or 
rejection of a new policy between each level of government. While the examples used by 
Goggin et al. relate to American federal/State relations, the notion of levels, or layers of 
Government, and the difficulties of policy flow between these layers have wider 
applicability. It can be applied to the field of child protection within England, where – I 
would argue - the flow of policy guidance through diverse layers suggests a compliance 
model is needed for successful policy execution which discounts elements of policy 
resistance or even misinterpretation of policy guidance.  
 
Bowe et al. (1992) draw on the qualitative notion of communicating and interpreting 
‘policy texts’ (that is to say, official policy documents including speeches and 
commentaries). They claim that policy texts are not necessarily clear and may be 
misunderstood. Crozier (2008) makes a similar point, noting that guidance is 
transformed as recipients of that information re-interpret it in ways not intended by the 
sender. Their point is that, policy documents will evolve through (re)interpretation by 
agencies and individuals along the communication and dissemination continuum. They 
state that ‘policy is not simply received and implemented ... rather it is subject to 
interpretation and then “recreated”’ (Bowe et al., 1992, p22) and this will occur in a 
governance network with actors approaching an issue from different perspectives (as 
was identified under criteria 1). Lupton et al. (2001, p49) concur stating that ‘the 
transition from “knowing” to “doing” is a complex and unpredictable process, affected 
by a range of factors at the individual, group and social level’.  
 
Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) discuss how to communicate through networks, using 
technology to connect network actors. They (2004, p94) highlight the importance of ‘a 
digital backbone’ to support a successful network and ensuring good electronic links to 
all of the actors within the network. But equally they highlight the disadvantages of the 
demise of face to face communication as working together moves beyond a single 
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organisation into networks beyond the organisation.  In today’s digital society, there has 
been a switch from face to face communication to a bombardment of email or other 
electronic communication, which can become unmanageable (Goldsmith and Eggers, 
2004; Korkki, 2013; Batista and Figueiredo Marques, 2017). Similarly, electronic 
communication may cause confusion about what is being required as meaning may not 
be clear. Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) are right to argue that a governance network 
needs coherent electronic links to the relevant network actors, but in relation to LSCBs, 
meetings of the network actors will be held face to face on a regular basis, and certain 
information between meetings may be circulated electronically, as a secondary 
communication medium.  
Of course, this all makes the assumption that front-line practitioners are able to keep up 
to date with policy and regulation changes. Many practitioners are already 
overwhelmed with workload pressures and either do not have time to locate relevant 
policy documents or do not have the time and space to read and comprehend such 
documents. Klijn and Koppenjan (2016) refer to an information overload and ambiguity 
of messages, as information in a variety of formats from various perspectives rains in on 
micro level actors. As Laming (2003, section 1.26, p5) noted when conducting the 
inquiry into the death of Victoria Climbié, the greatest defence of front-line practitioners 
was “no one ever told me”, as senior managers distanced themselves from the reality of 
practice. 
Lupton et al. (2001, p40) made the connection between regulation and communication, 
noting that replacing professional knowledge and judgement with evidence-based 
practice makes two assumptions. Firstly, it assumes that judgement can be ‘codified’ 
(ibid) and, therefore, generalised and communicated across sectors or professions. 
Secondly, there is an assumption that once the recipient has received such codified 
information; they will know to act on it, and how to take an appropriate, unhindered 
course of action. This again assumes a compliant culture and does not consider – as 
noted by Cooper (2013) - that busy front-line practitioners may find it difficult to keep 
up to date with the latest practice recommendations and changes.  
Lupton et al. (2001, p45) highlighted that communication and information sharing are 
also likely to prove problematic when organisations are undergoing change, ‘especially 
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when professionals do not feel in control’ (ibid). Restructuring causes feelings of 
uncertainty which impacts on knowing how to, or being willing to, share information, 
especially if restructuring creates job insecurity, increased workload, or if there are 
feelings of competition between agencies fighting for survival or competing for the same 
funding streams.  
 
EC 6. Create favourable conditions for building mutual trust.  
Both trust and shared values are an attribute of successful governance networks. Bevir 
and Rhodes (2007, p79) state that ‘trust is essential for co-operative behaviour’, whilst 
shared values act ‘as the glue that holds the complex set of relationships in a network 
together’. Successful governance networks will develop protocols and rules within the 
network for sustainable joined-up working that stands the test of time. This is the 
development of network cohesion, a sense of mutual responsibility and, of course, trust 
which arises through continuous working together for a common goal. Trust must be 
mutually beneficial and advantageous for each of the partners in the network. Trust is 
defined as ‘the perceptions of the good intentions of another actor’ in the network, and 
’the expectation that the other actor will respect the interests of the “trusting” actor’ and 
refrain from opportunistic behaviour’ (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004, p83). Actors trust 
that other actors will deliver as expected. Governance networks which can foster an 
atmosphere of positive conflict in terms of open debate and discussion will build a 
trusting environment in which actors feel safe and valued enough to openly air their 
views, concerns and ideas about wicked issues (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Klijn and 
Edelenbos, 2007).  
 
That said, trust does not just happen within a network. It needs to be fostered over time, 
(which is very often resource intensive) and this will happen as people’s social and 
political experiences within the workplace and indeed within partnership working is 
nurtured and developed, (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007b; Davies, 2011; Klijn and 
Koppenjan, 2016). Therefore, the longer a network exists the greater the level of trust is 
likely to be, and the more successful the governance network. Interactions are built on 
and rooted in mutual trust of fellow members rather than being contractually 
connected. Of course, where this notion fails is that, whilst governance networks have a 
degree of autonomy from the government, it still controls the overall structure in which 
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networks operate (as explored as part of the second criterion), and have ways to stop, 
or change, the operation of some networks should it so wish. This creates an uncertain 
operating environment for the actors in the network, but also affects trust-nurturing 
and trust-building within the network, which may suddenly be required to change tack. 
 
Conversely, trust can easily become mistrust. If one partner fails to deliver on one 
occasion, then previous experience and perceptions may prevail and the actor may be 
given the benefit of the doubt. But if the partner continuously fails to deliver, trust is 
eroded and the future stability of the network may be in jeopardy (Koppenjan and Klijn, 
2004). Furthermore, trust may leave newer members of the network more vulnerable 
to more confident, autocratic network actors, and more susceptible therefore, to their 
professional sway. This can equally result in exploitation of the newer professional’s 
views which may ultimately lead to misplaced trust as their experience and confidence 
as a network actor grows.  
 
Whilst Koppenjan and Klijn, (2016), Torfing et al. (2012) and Sørensen and Torfing 
(2007b) are emphatic about the need for trust within governance networks, not all 
research on governance networks is quite so optimistic about the need or requirement 
for trust within the network (Davies, 2011). In such cases, trust was either seen as not a 
strong enough concept on which to build and sustain a governance network, being 
resource interdependent was a stronger bond than trust, and even that low-levels of 
trust did not necessarily lead to network failure if the partners operated pragmatically 
(Davies, 2011). 
 
In my view, in relation to wicked issues, such as child neglect, those practitioners 
working in such fields are doing so for utilitarian purposes; they generally want to make 
a difference to society in some way. Therefore, those operating within governance 
networks in order to resolve a wicked issue will put to one side their own individual 
ideologies and values in order to create a joint, agreed ideology and values base which 
will be for the greater good. In order to do this, they will automatically trust the other 
network actors, until a point when someone gives them some reason to question that 
trust.  
 
Page 59 of 168 
 
3.4 SUMMARY 
Governance network theory was identified as being a useful lens through which to 
examine multi-agency network arrangements dealing with wicked issues, such as child 
neglect. It is useful in this context because it takes into account multiple perspectives of 
the network actors, and how they interact in order to produce and disseminate policy 
and practice guidance. Further to this Torfing et al.’s effectivity criteria were explored 
as being a useful analysis framework for this research.    
 
In short, this research offers a timely opportunity to explore views on the role of the 
LSCB from a practitioner level, in order to offer an argument for the necessity and 
importance of LSCBs, as a governance network to steer child protection policy and 
practice in local areas.  
 
The next chapter will move on to examine and justify the choice of research methods 
being used within this study.  
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the rationale and justification for the methods chosen within this 
qualitative study. Details on ethics issues and approval are also discussed.  
 
4.1 THE RESEARCH AIM   
Through the literature review I identified the need to examine: 
- How government guidance is operationalized, communicated and filtered 
through to front-line practice.  
- How effective the LSCB is as a mechanism for transferring such guidance.  
Understanding such processes should help LSCBs identify gaps in their joined-up 
working and communication practices to front-line practitioners.   
 
In order to do this, I chose to focus on how government guidance about child neglect are 
communicated to, and implemented by, Local Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs) 
and then down to frontline statutory services. The research was guided by the following 
research questions: 
1. How does the Government interact with LSCBs to disseminate and drive forward 
its child protection guidance? 
2. How does the LSCB identify or learn about the child protection (neglect) 
guidance from Government? 
3. How does the LSCB communicate child protection (neglect) guidance to 
operational teams within statutory services? 
4. When developing local child neglect policy, what factors help or hinder policy 
implementation from LSCB strategic level to operational practice? 
 
4.2 THE METHODOLOGICAL PARADIGM 
There are two major research paradigms: positivist research and interpretivist 
research. The positivist paradigm is associated with the works of Auguste Comte who 
believed that only that which can be experienced by the senses, and measured in an 
objective, quantitative way is real knowledge. Everything else should be rejected 
(Babbie, 2001, 2017; Bryman, 2008). In this paradigm, research should be value neutral 
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and the researcher completely impartial. This paradigm has been criticised because the 
observer is not ‘value-free’ (Robson and McCartan 2016, p21). Therefore, post-
positivists accept that the researcher can influence what is seen and how it is recorded. 
Within this, however, they still align themselves with an objective, theory-testing 
approach, rather than theory building. Within my study, the positivist and post 
positivist paradigm were not appropriate because such rigid and randomised design 
requirements, needed within objective theory testing research, are impractical when 
exploring aspects such as human interaction, views and opinions (Robson, 2011, 
Robson and McCartan, 2016).  
 
The interpretivist paradigm was appropriate because this is concerned with people’s 
perspectives, experiences and understandings of particular issues in their natural 
settings, for example where they live or work (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Ormston et al, 
2014; Robson and McCartan, 2016). 
 
4.2.1 Interpretivist data collection 
Qualitative methods of data collection were used to collect thick descriptions (Lewis et 
al, 2014; Bryman, 2008; Thomas, 2009) of practitioners’ understandings of policy and 
research guidance in relation to child neglect.  Thick description within interpretive 
research requires the researcher to not just proffer simply what was observed/said 
(which would be thin description) but requires the researcher to give more context to 
the findings (such as mannerisms, reactions, environment). This extra context allows 
the reader to judge the meanings as interpreted by the researcher in order to gauge the 
validity, credibility and transferability of the findings to other similar settings (Bryman, 
2008; Thomas 2009). Within this study, , my role as the qualitative researcher was to 
collect thick descriptions from my research participants, and interpret the meanings 
attached to the issues being studied (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Robson, 2011), using a 
governance network framework through which to analyse and assess the findings, as 
opposed to trying to prove a theory or hypothesis.  
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4.3 THE RESEARCH METHODS 
4.3.1 Designing the qualitative case study  
A case study is a flexible, empirical approach that is appropriate for exploring a 
phenomenon or policy implementation and processes of change within real life 
situations, or organisations (Hakim, 2000; Yin, 2009). What makes the case study 
approach popular within interpretive research design is the variety of research tools 
that can be used within it (for example, interviews, observations, documentary analysis, 
focus groups and so on) in order to examine something in depth, gaining a multiplicity 
of views (Hakim, 2000; Denscombe, 2017; Lewis and McNaughton Nicholls, 2014). 
Hakim (2000, p59) likened the case study approach to the ‘social research equivalent’ of 
a microscope in other scientific experiments. I interpret this to mean that it puts an 
intense spotlight on something which needs to be scrutinised in varying magnifications. 
 
There are criticisms of the case study approach, such as generalisations cannot be made 
to the wider population from one (or even multiple) case studies (Denscombe, 2017; 
Bryman, 2008; Gilbert, 2008). Others (Yin, 2009; Thomas 2011; Flick 2014) argue, 
however, that theoretical generalisation, or theoretical replication, can instead be 
applied to case study research (see below). But, sometimes within a case study, the 
purpose is not to be able to draw generalisations, but to research an instance because of 
its uniqueness. Positivists argue that case study research does not provide hard data 
and lacks scientific rigour that quantitative methods provide. Yet the counter argument 
to this are that the purpose of the case study is to provide an in-depth examination of a 
particular phenomenon which cannot be gained through statistical measures alone 
(Denscombe, 2017). Furthermore, the fact that a key element of case studies is the in-
built triangulation achieved by drawing on a variety of methods as part of its design, 
and the multiplicity of views gained, strengthens credibility of the research (Hakim, 
2000). In relation to their use of multiple methods and in-built triangulation, Yin (2009, 
p117) highlights that ‘those case studies using multiple sources of evidence were rated 
more highly, in terms of their overall quality, than those that relied on only single 
sources of information’. 
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I decided that the case study approach was relevant in my study because I wanted to 
put under the social microscope, the knowledge transfer processes of the LSCBs, by 
gaining a multiplicity of perspectives.  
 
Case study research may include single or multiple cases. A single case study might be 
relevant if: 
 The case represents a critical case, or test case, of a particular theory 
 It is an extreme, unique, deviant or outlier case, or is a typical, or critical case.  
 The case is longitudinal. 
(see Hakim, 2000; Denscombe, 2017; Yin, 2009; Thomas, 2011) 
By contrast multiple case studies may be relevant if the purpose of the study is more 
specifically the phenomenon (in this study the LSCBs as a means for knowledge transfer 
and policy implementation) being studied rather than the case (a specific LSCB) within 
the study. Within this approach each case serves to offer a comparison of the 
phenomenon in contrast to other cases, to generate a ‘cross-case analysis’ (Thomas, 
2011, p141). 
 
For this study, I had initially anticipated that a single case study, carried out on one 
LSCB area, would be appropriate. I carried out a mapping exercise of LSCB membership 
within all West Midlands LSCBs in order to try and find an element of parity between 
LSCB membership in terms of roles or agencies involved, but it was clear that there was 
no standard set up across the different LSCBs.  Therefore, given, that I found no model 
LSCB, I felt that trying to assess and interpret knowledge transfer in one LSCB might not 
offer sufficient useful insight. I decided that a multiple case study approach of two 
LSCBs, would generate more useful data.  
 
Upon selecting a multiple case study approach, two further decisions needed to be 
made: whether or not to nest the case studies, and whether or not to carry them out 
sequentially. The two case studies were selected from one region, but this was a choice 
of logistics rather than being a key focal element of the phenomenon in question. 
Therefore, the case studies were not nested within the wider case (the region) (Thomas, 
2011) (see Figure vii). I could have selected two case studies from different regions but 
in order to offer a more useful basis of comparison, it was more useful to select two case 
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studies working within the same regional demographics. Fieldwork within the case 
studies was carried out in parallel rather than sequentially. The fieldwork of the second 
case study was not dependent on the findings from the first case study; therefore, I did 
not need to complete one case study before beginning research in the other.  
 
Figure vii: Illustrating the multiple case studies.  
 
4.3.2 Selecting the multiple case studies: one region and two local areas 
- Firstly, selecting the region 
As child neglect is deemed to occur most often in families living in areas of poverty and 
deprivation, this was a good indicator to use when selecting the region. In terms of child 
neglect, the West Midlands region has the fourth highest rate of child neglect at 12.7% 
of the national figure, (see Figure viii).  
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Figure viii: No. of children who were subject to a child protection plan because of child neglect at 
31st March 2013.  
  No. % 
England 17930 100 
London 2,620 14.6 
South East 2,480 13.8 
North West 2,380 13.3 
West Midlands 2,280 12.7 
Yorkshire & The 
Humber 2,030 11.3 
East of England 1,730 9.6 
South West 1,640 9.1 
North East 1,560 8.7 
East Midlands 1,210 6.7 
Source: www.education.gov.uk  
 
The Department for Communities and Local Government (2011) indicated that the West 
Midlands region had consistent levels of multiple deprivation as opposed to other 
regions which fluctuate between the one percent and 20% most deprived. As illustrated 
in Figure ix, the West Midlands region had the fourth highest percentage (at 9%) of the 
very highest index (1%) of multiple deprivation ranks and has the third highest (15%) 
of the top 20% of multiple deprivation ranks. Other areas (for example, East of England 
and South West) also had fairly standard levels of deprivation but the percentages were 
much lower than the West Midlands overall. Yorkshire and the Humber had consistent 
levels with a greater percentage of deprived areas falling in the one percent most 
deprived category, but as shown in the previous table its child neglect rates were lower 
than the West Midlands.  
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Figure ix: Regional breakdown of levels of deprivation 









North East  12% 10% 9% 8% 
North West  52% 35% 28% 22% 
Yorkshire and The 
Humber  
17% 18% 17% 14% 
East Midlands  5% 5% 6% 7% 
West Midlands  9% 17% 17% 15% 
East of England  2% 2% 3% 4% 
London  0% 7% 12% 19% 
South East  3% 4% 4% 6% 
South West  2% 3% 4% 4% 
(Source: Department for Communities and Local Government 2011 p7) 
 
- Secondly, selecting the LSCBs 
Ofsted (2014) reported that some LSCBs do not grasp the extensiveness of child neglect 
within their areas which makes it difficult to evaluate their effectiveness in responding 
to it. It also reported that the areas ‘providing the strongest evidence of the most 
comprehensive action to tackle neglect were more likely to have a neglect strategy 
and/or a systematic improvement programme addressing policy, thresholds for action 
and professional practice at the front-line’ (Ofsted, 2014, p5). As this research focused 
on how child neglect guidance was communicated and implemented, it was necessary to 
purposively select LSCBs in the West Midlands who had identified child neglect as a key 
priority for action within their current Business Plan and Work Programme, in order 
that there was neglect guidance to follow through the transfer and communication 
processes. 
 
I conducted a mapping exercise of the priorities of each of the LSCBs in the West 
Midlands region in order to identify which two had the strongest emphasis on child 
neglect,. Despite the role of LSCBs in overseeing child protection practice and training 
within their areas, not all LSCBs in the West Midlands classed child neglect as an area of 
priority for their strategic work. At the time of selecting areas, both Area A and Area B 
had developed, or were, developing policies related to child neglect which was the 
reason they were selected for this study.  
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4.3.3 Sampling of research participants 
The sampling of participants was achieved using a purposive method (Babbie, 2001, 
2017; Denscombe, 2017).  This required the sample to be ‘hand-picked’ (Denscombe, 
2017 p41) based on prior knowledge of the specific population in question and in 
relation to the aims of the research project (Babbie, 2001, 2017).  
 
Through the mapping exercises conducted for the purposes of selecting LSCBS, I found 
that LSCB membership varied substantially. That said, however, there are some core 
sectors which are covered: Education, Local Authority (including Social Services), and 
Health. These are also the core funders of the LSCB (Davies and Ward, 2012). In terms 
therefore of ‘hand-picking’ the participants, I decided that I needed to include: 
- The Assistant Directors of Children’s Social Services (rather than the Director) 
because they have responsibility for safeguarding children in their area (whereas 
the Director is also responsible for education services as well).  
- The Independent Chairs of the participating LSCBs because they are independent 
from any of the other organisations (often are not from the area), and they have 
a key role of managing and facilitating the discussion, and decision-making 
processes.  
- LSCB representatives from Health, Education and Children’s Social Care because 
these sectors are the core funders of the LSCB and, for comparative purposes, I 
could ensure that there would be a representative from each of these on the 
participating Boards (given the disparity of Board membership). 
- Designated Safeguarding Managers from Health, Education and Children’s Social 
Care but managers who had never sat on any LSCB because I wanted to explore 
the views of those with no previous experience of the Board and how it 
functions. I wanted managers from Health, Education and Children’s Social 
Services though because I wanted to trace guidance filtering through these 
sectors.  
- Front-line practitioners from Children’s Social Care because these are the 
practitioners dealing with child neglect on a daily basis and for whom the 
transfer of child neglect guidance is particularly important. It might have been 
useful to speak to front-line practitioners within Education and Health, but I 
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think that the standard answer (which is the right answer in these cases) is that 
“I would speak to the designated safeguarding lead”.  
 
At this stage, I excluded other LSCB-related roles (for example the Board Manager, the 
Training Coordinator) because I did not consider them to have a specific role in the 
decision-making and policy implementation process. They were also not clearly 
spanning organisational boundaries in the same way that board representatives from 
health, education and children’s social care were, therefore the knowledge transfer 
processes would have been different.  
 
For the purposes of this research, I organised the interviewing process into four phases, 
essentially following the policy implementation and communication process crudely 
from top to bottom. These phases were divided as detailed in Figure x. The actual 
number of participants is detailed in Figure xi. 
 
Figure x: Proposed participants 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Children’s Social 
Services 
LSCB participants Designated 
Safeguarding lead, 
(non-LSCB) 
Front-line practitioners,  
Relevant to research 
questions 1, and 2 
Relevant to 
research questions 
1, 2,and  3 
Relevant to research 
questions 3, and 4 
Relevant to research 
question 4 
1 CSC Assistant Director  1 Independent 
Chair  
1 Health 





1 Education  
1 Children’s Social 
Services 
1 group of 6-10  
 x 2 case studies  
Total; 2 Assistant 
Directors  
8  LSCB 
representatives 
6 safeguarding managers 2 group discussions of 12-
20  
Figure xi: Number of participants in the research. 
 ROLE Area A Area B TOTAL 
Phase 1 CSC Assistant Director  1 1 2 
Phase 2 LSCB Representatives  4 4 8 
Phase 3 Non-LSCB designated safeguarding leads 4 3 7 
Phase 4 Front-line practitioners 11 5 16 
 TOTAL PARTICIPANTS 20 13 33 
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Whilst the fieldwork in each case study was carried out in parallel, the interviews within 
each case were conducted sequentially. Fieldwork from phases one and two were 
completed before moving onto phase three. Phase three was completed before 
commencing phase four. This enabled me to check information given in phases one and 
two by following up responses with participants in phases three and four. For example, 
by asking participants in phases one and two, how they disseminated certain 
information, I could then ask participants in phases three and four if that was how they 
viewed it, and gain perspectives on effectiveness.   
 
4.4 DATA COLLECTION 
4.4.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
I used semi structured interviews. These enable the interviewer to gain in-depth 
information from the interviewee with some flexibility in running order, whilst 
ensuring that key ideas or questions are covered in each interview (Fielding and 
Thomas, 2008; Thomas, 2009; Robson and McCartan, 2016). The semi-structured 
interviews in this research were carried out either face-to-face (phases one and two), by 
telephone (phase three) or in groups (phase four). Data were collected between March 
2015, and August 2015 (with one group interview being carried out in summer 2016). 
All interviews were recorded using a Dictaphone (with participants’ consent, which will 
be discussed under the Ethics section). In addition, handwritten notes were made 
during each interview. Each interview was transcribed verbatim for data analysis 
purposes.  
 
i) Face to face interviews 
In phases one and two, I used face to face interviews to gain the perspectives from the 
Assistant Director of Children’s Services and representatives of the LSCBs. Flick (2014 , 
p230) discusses ‘elite’ interviews as interviews with people occupying senior posts in 
institutional hierarchies who can offer an insight into institutional systems and 
routines. Requesting an individual face to face interview places importance on the issue 
in question inasmuch as the researcher has specifically sought individuals with 
knowledge of a particular phenomenon and demonstrates to that participant that you 
are placing value on their views in relation to this phenomenon (Cohen, Manion and 
Morrison, 2011). Furthermore, a face to face interview enables the researcher to pick up 
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on non-verbal cues such as body language, which adds to the level of thick description 
being collated.   
 
In interviewing such senior, or ‘elite’, persons, Flick (2014, p231) highlights that the 
researcher needs to take the position of the ‘informed outsider’ [my added emphasis] if 
they want to be taken seriously and be deemed as a ‘competent exchange partner’ (ibid). 
Several of my research participants made comments within their interviews which lead 
me to assess that the face to face interviews were deemed successful by the 
participants.  One participant said that the interview was “cathartic” [Area B, LSCB 
member, Health], whilst another described it as being “a mutually beneficial taped 
interview” [Area B, Independent Chair] because it would focus the Board’s discussions 
in the future on child neglect policy. 
 
These initial ‘elite’ interviews required more time than subsequent interviews in order 
to establish a solid basis for further exploration within the manager and practitioners 
elements. I calculated that these interviews needed about 1 hour, and 1 hour was a 
realistic amount of time to request of senior professional (Flick, 2014). Robson (2011, 
p281) notes that ‘anything under half an hour is unlikely to be valuable; anything going 
much over an hour may be making unreasonable demands on busy interviewees. All 
face-to-face interviews were recorded using a Dictaphone, along with field notes 
recorded by the interviewer. The shortest interview lasted 40 minutes and the longest 
was 70 minutes.  
 
ii) Telephone interviews 
I had initially planned to conduct face-to-face interviews with safeguarding managers in 
phase three, but due to issues of time (on my part and the on the part of the 
participating safeguarding managers), cost and, in an attempt to increase participant 
numbers, I decided that telephone interviews would be appropriate. The telephone 
interviews had some of the same benefits as the face to face interviews (in terms of only 
talking to one person at a time, and therefore being confident about whose opinions are 
gained from whom, being able to follow-up interesting points, demonstrating a value in 
the interviewee’s knowledge and experience of a particular phenomenon by 
purposively seeking out specific individuals with certain expertise). One disadvantage 
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to undertaking telephone interviews, though, was the inability to gain non-verbal 
responses to their questions which could add to the thick description being collated. 
Furthermore, the qualitative telephone interview was likely to be shorter than the face-
to-face interview (Bryman, 2008; Robson and McCartan, 2016), with Bryman (2008) 
noting that it might potentially last on average 20-25 minutes. The shortest telephone 
interview lasted 15 minutes and the longest was 40 minutes.  
 
The telephone interviews were an appropriate tool to use. One participant stated “I’m 
glad you asked me to do this because it has forced me to actually find out what the 
business plan was because I was so used to, just-tell-me-what-I-need-to-do” [Area B, 
Designated Safeguarding Lead, Education] and another said “it has been really 
interesting to kind of reflect really, I don’t get to do that too often” [Area A, Designated 
Safeguarding Lead, Health].  
 
iii) Group interviews  
Group interviews are used to gain a range of views simultaneously to see how 
individuals react to others’ views, and to identify group behaviour and processes within 
an institution. I opted for this mode of data collection as an efficient means of securing 
the views of front-line social work practitioners. Group interviews are inexpensive to 
organise and run, they produce rich data, and the group process and stimulation can aid 
memory recall in group members (Fontana and Frey, 2003; Fielding and Thomas, 
2008). Group interviews can also help to increase the number of people included, 
thereby augmenting the diversity of the responses (Gomm, 2008). Group interviews are 
not, however, without their difficulties. The researcher needs to ensure that there are 
no dominant voices within the group that might silence others and that each participant 
can voice an individual opinion (Fontana and Frey, 2005; Gomm, 2008). Equally 
individual responses may be subsumed by the group as there is pressure to conform 
within a group situation. Despite this, I thought that for this study, the benefits 
outweighed the disadvantages, and that group interviews would be useful to gain front-
line practitioners collective experiences.  
 
Initially I had intended to use teams for my group interviews, and to tag my questions 
onto the end of a team meeting. It is useful to use such ‘pre-existing groups’ (Finch et al, 
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2014 p233) if the research concerns work-related matters, because pre-existing groups 
can discuss shared situations and explore shared meanings. This was crucial to this 
research which was designed to explore policy implementation and how policy 
translated into practice. Kitzinger and Barbour (1999, p8-9) highlight that pre-existing 
groups are ‘the networks in which people might normally discuss (or evade) the sorts of 
issues likely to be raised in the research session and the “naturally occurring” group is 
one of the most important contexts in which ideas are formed and decisions made’. 
However, in reality this did not happen as intended because I was reliant on a given 
contact within children’s social services finding participants. Subsequently it came 
down to finding interested front-line practitioners, and not necessarily teams.  That 
said, however, they were practitioners who knew each other from the same offices, and 
worked with neglect cases.  In hindsight, this was perhaps better because it gave me a 
broader scope of views from within the organisation, rather than just from one team. 
When recruiting group participants from the same organisation, the participants can 
provide insight into an everyday issue simply in the way that they discuss the issue. 
Gomm (2008, p228) noted that ‘in the group they may “talk the talk” of the organisation, 
in ways that would not happen in one-to-one interviews’. 
 
In Area A, two group interviews took place. Due to the geography of the county and the 
difficulties in getting front-line practitioners together, I was advised that it would be 
easier to convene two separate group interviews; one in the north of the county and one 
in the south. Three participants took part in the first group discussion in the morning, 
and eight took part in the second one later that same day. 
 
Area B posed more difficulties in getting front-line practitioners together. A group 
interview was arranged but only one out of the expected five participants attended. He 
agreed to an individual interview instead. I deemed this to be appropriate because he 
had been interested enough in the research to agree to participate in a group interview, 
and because, given his experience, I thought he could offer useful and meaningful 
insights. One of the other expected participants emailed me later that day to say that she 
wanted to participate but had told her manager that she could not do that date and time. 
Again, because of her considerable experience of working with child neglect cases, I 
thought she would have some insightful views, and she agreed to meet me for an 
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individual interview. Whilst useful, these individual interviews were not a replacement 
for a group interview, and I subsequently needed to re-arrange a group interview.  
 
I persevered to re-arrange the group interview, but this took a further twelve months to 
arrange because continued organisational restructuring resulted in my named contacts 
either leaving or being deployed into other posts.  I finally had three front-line 
practitioners take part in a group discussion.  
 
Despite the difficulty in setting up the group interviews and being reliant on someone 
else to assist in finding participants, I am confident this was the right method to choose. 
Prior to deciding on group interviews, I had considered using online questionnaires 
with frontline practitioners because I thought that this would reach a greater number of 
participants and I had used online questionnaires in previous research with 
practitioners. In the course of the interviews and group interviews, it became evident 
that a questionnaire would not have been appropriate because some practitioners 
identified themselves as “form exasperated” and categorically stated that had the 
research been a questionnaire they would not have taken part. Instead they appreciated 
the fact that I had taken the time to go and talk with them in person.  
 
iv. The Interview Schedules 
Interview schedules were devised to enable consistency between interviews in order 
that a comparison could be made between the different professional groups. Separate 
interview schedules were drafted for the Assistant Directors of Social Services (phase 
one), and members of the LSCB being interviewed face-to-face (phase two), the 
safeguarding managers being interviewed by telephone (phase three), and a further 
separate topic guide for the group interviews with social work practitioners (phase 
four).  
 
I had also anticipated using national and local research / policies to focus some 
discussion within the study. In terms of national guidance, I focused on the 
government’s safeguarding children research initiative (Davies and Ward, 2012), as 
detailed in Chapter 2. The studies were subject to ‘rigorous peer review’ (ibid), and 
findings from the research were discussed ‘by the Advisory and Implementation Group’ 
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(ibid). The role of this group was to ensure that findings and presentation of material 
would be accessible to its intended audience, that is to say professionals with a 
responsibility to work together to safeguard children.  
 
In terms of my selection of local policies, however, this did not work out as planned, 
because:  
- Area A should have had a new child neglect policy implemented by December 
2014, but at the time of starting the fieldwork (March 2015) this had still not 
been written. Therefore, instead I focused on the dissemination of the Threshold 
for Services document which had been rewritten and implemented. The focus of 
this document was to re-route needed services towards early intervention 
services to divert families from an already overburdened social work services.  
- In Area B, the Failure to Thrive policy was used to focus the discussion on local 
policy implementation. This policy came out of a serious case review across two 
LSCB areas, in which a child died as a result of neglect because the markers of 
growth had not been used effectively to acknowledge the child’s failure to grow.  
 
With this guidance in mind, each interview schedule was structured thematically, as 
shown in Figure xii. Some themes occurred in more than one interview schedule, and 
some were specific to a particular phase.  
 
As part of the interviews in phases one and two, I wanted to explore possible influences 
in developing child neglect policy within LCSB and the local authority. Therefore under 
the theme identifying and developing child neglect policy guidance, I gave the research 
participants a list of possible influences in child neglect policy (government, messages 
from research, serious case reviews, views of your policy lead, front-line practitioner 
voices, and media) and asked them to place them in order of the most important/most 
influential.  This list was informed by the literature review (see Figure xiii).  
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Figure xii: themes of each interview schedule 
 




1  2  3  4 
The role of the LSCB and its priorities 
 
2     
Government policy guidance 
 
1     
Identifying and developing child neglect 
policy guidance 
 
2     
Policy implementation problems 
 
1     
Interpreting and communicating to 
operational level 
 
3     
Identifying, developing and communicating 
child neglect 
 
3     
Factors that help or hinder policy 
implementation 
 
4     
Policy monitoring 
 
3     
Political context 
 
4     
Learning about child neglect priorities in 
your area 
 
4     
 
Figure xiii; possible policy influences as derived through the literature review. 
Policy influencer Reason for inclusion 
The government  Child neglect is a politically driven activity. It was necessary 
to compare with other influencers whether this was the 
main policy driver. 
Messages from research  Following the publication of the Davies and Ward report, 
(2012), (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
SCRs  To identify how much of an influence SCRs are in the policy 
making arena. 
The media   To explore if increased media reporting is driving pressure 
to intervene in cases, and to identify if the media is an 
influencer in policy making. 
Views from the policy lead  To identify how much authority was given to this role  as 
many – but not all - LSCBs have a policy lead as a stipulated 
position.  
Front-line practitioner voices   To identify if policy was driven by everyday practice, and 
how much weighting was given to such local and current 
experience in comparison with other factors. 
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4.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
Twenty-two semi-structured interviews were completed with over 16 hours of 
recorded material. Qualitative research produces a vast amount of data which can feel 
unwieldy (Gibbs, 2002; Spencer et al., 2014a; Robson, 2011; Robson and McCartan, 
2016), therefore care needs to be taken over choosing the right analysis method to 
‘maximise the potential of a full qualitative analysis’ (Spencer et al., 2003, p210). I used 
NVivo to assist with the data management and analysis. There are a number of 
criticisms levelled at qualitative software programmes such as NVivo for example the 
software cannot do the actual analysis in the same ways that quantitative software tools 
can; it cannot comprehend qualitative texts; the researcher cannot be as close to the 
material in an e-format; it takes too long to learn how to use the software; problems of 
compatibility and so on (Gibbs, 2002; Flick, 2014). However, for me it provided a good 
tool with which to manage the large amount of data generated and helped me to apply a 
systematic approach to analysis.  
 
4.5.1 Selecting a thematic data analysis strategy. 
I adopted a thematic coding analysis strategy (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Flick, 2014). 
This strategy combines elements from other qualitative analysis approaches such as 
narrative analysis, discourse analysis and grounded theory analysis. Broadly speaking, 
this method is useful for helping the researcher to identify themes, or concepts, and 
analysing patterns in the rich data (Spencer et al., 2014b; Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
 
Whilst being praised for having a flexible approach to tackling qualitative data analysis, 
the strategy is not without its limitations and criticisms. Braun and Clarke are criticised 
for drawing a qualitative data analysis approach based only on their experiences of 
analysing interview data, and therefore not applying the approach to other forms of 
qualitative data (Flick, 2014). Furthermore, the analysis may not sufficiently detract 
itself from theory or literature and may be constrained by these. Whilst I acknowledge 
these criticisms, this would not affect my study which was based on interviews, and 
designed around the governance network model, therefore I decided that a thematic 
analysis strategy would be relevant to this study.  
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Braun and Clarke (2006) state that there are six decisions to be made when selecting 
thematic analysis and these should be explicitly discussed in the methods section, and I 
now turn to this, and the decisions I made. 
 
1. What counts as a theme? 
For Braun and Clarke (2006, p82) ‘a theme captures something important about the 
data in relation to the research question and represents some level of patterned 
response to meaning within the data set’. I think it is important to note that Braun and 
Clarke do not ‘buy into the notion’ of themes emerging from the data. Instead, they are 
advocates of the researcher being an active part of the analysis process and making 
active choices about what is and is not applied to the data. For them, analysis is the act 
of interpretation rather than a passive act of waiting for something to emerge (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006; Saldaña, 2013). For Braun and Clarke something should be drawn out 
as being a theme if it is relevant to a research question. Within this study, the thematic 
analysis was relevant because the interview schedules were structured using 
subheadings which linked back to the main research questions. 
 
2. A rich description of the dataset or a detailed account of one particular aspect?  
The former is useful if the purpose of the research is to give the reader a thick 
description of the entire dataset, and length is not an issue, whilst the latter is more 
relevant if the researcher wants to concentrate more specifically on the themes within 
the data. As I have identified Torfing et al.’s effectivity criteria as a model with which to 
evaluate the performance of my selected governance network, providing a detailed 
account of particular aspects within the case studies was evidently more appropriate.  
 
3. Inductive versus theoretical analysis? 
Within the inductive approach, themes are driven from the bottom up and strongly 
linked to the data, and thus the themes in the data may bear little resemblance to the 
questions posed to participants. Conversely the theoretical analysis is driven by the 
researcher’s theoretical interest in the subject matter (in the case of this study, 
governance network theory) and equally maps onto specific research questions (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006). This study adopted a theoretical analysis of the data inasmuch as it 
was drawing on a governance network model.  
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4. Semantic or latent themes? 
Taking a semantic approach to themes requires the researcher to name themes using 
the exact phrasing that the participant said, and not looking beyond what the 
participant said. By contrast the latent themes go beyond what has simply been said to 
‘examine underlying ideas, assumptions, and conceptualisations – and ideologies - that 
are theorized as shaping or informing the semantic content of the data’ (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006, p84). What this suggests is that, rather than just providing a description of 
what someone has said, the latent approach also looks at further factors to explain why 
they might have said it, and what drove them to have such an opinion (see also Saldaña, 
2013). Within this study I focused on the political environment in which the 
practitioners were operating which also put their semantic responses, into a more in-
depth contextualisation and interpretation.  
 
5. Epistemology: essentialist/realist versus constructionist thematic analysis? 
Braun and Clarke (2006) argue that the essentialist/realist approach leads to a 
straightforward theorisation because the relationship between experience, language 
and meaning is fairly straightforward and one dimensional. By contrast, the 
constructionist thematic analysis ties in closely with the thematic analysis at the latent 
level. Within this constructionist framework, the thematic analysis is a moveable feast, 
as individual accounts are situated within a social constructivist context which may 
change over time. In this particular study, social work is a State dominated service, 
therefore structural and political elements will have affected individuals’ responses (see 
Chapter 1).  
 
6. The many questions of qualitative research? 
Braun and Clarke (2006) remind the reader of the various stages and types of research 
questions involved within a qualitative study. As well as the broad research questions 
which drive the overall study, there are more refined questions posed to participants 
and questions being driven by the data. They argue that it is important to be cognisant 
of these questions, their role within the study and the weighting that they are given.  
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Therefore, in summary this study considered specific aspects, using latent themes 
within a constructivist approach driven by the theoretically informed research 
questions.  
 
4.5.2 My thematic analysis.  
Having worked through the six decisions, I set out to analyse my data. Firstly the raw 
data needed to be made more manageable through identifying ‘themes and concepts’ 
(Spencer et al., 2003, p214) which could then be applied as labels to the data in order to 
organise them (using NVivo helped me to do this), As I had identified Torfing et al.’s 
effectivity criteria as a model to assist with the analysis, I had some preconceptions on 
some themes that I would be looking for within the data (for example in stages 1 and 2, I 
was anticipating themes on communication from Government to LSCB. In stage 3 I was 
anticipating a theme on communication from the LSCB to Designated Safeguarding 
Lead). I used these anticipated themes as a starting point to apply to the data. This 
enabled me to become more submerged in the data, which in turn allowed other themes 
to emerge that I did not anticipate (for example, the role of Multi-Agency Safeguarding 
Hub [MASH], the visibility of the LSCB to front-line practitioners, and inclusivity of 
Board members).  
 
I adopted a systematic approach to the data analysis. That is to say, I examined the 
transcripts from stage 1 before moving onto stage 2 etc. In my mind this was following 
the theoretical thematic analysis in a top-down manner. For the most part, I had themes 
as derived from the theory and from each stage of the fieldwork process (for example, 
codes that started with L1 [for example L1.MSGS.GOVT] were the assistant directors 
responses in both case studies, and codes starting L2 [for example L2.EFFCOMM.LSCB-
REP] were responses from the LSCB representatives etc.).  This enabled comparisons to 
be made across the two case studies. 
 
During this phase of the data analysis, I maintained the language and expressions used 
by the participants, rather than abbreviating or paraphrasing at this stage (see Ritchie 
et al., 2003). This was important to maintain the original meaning of the text and avoid a 
process of Chinese whispers occurring between data analysis and writing up the 
findings.  
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As the number of themes grew, I began to merge them under broader headings (Spencer 
et al 2014a; Saldaña, 2013) as I moved from first level coding where codes are 
formulated close to the original text, to second level coding, in which my codes were 
more abstract (Flick, 2009). For example, ‘austerity’, ‘CSE’, ‘poverty’, ‘MASH’, ‘neglect’ 
were merged under a broad theme of government priorities. Similarly, ‘blind faith’, 
‘expectation that guidance are shared’, and ‘quality assurance’ were merged together 
under the broad them of tracing the through flow of messages.  
 
I first applied the themes before exploring comparisons between the cases because 
within a thematic approach of data analysis, (Flick, 2014), through carefully and 
systematically carrying out these preparatory stages, I was able to move onto a thematic 
analysis applying latent themes which enabled a better, more enriched data analysis. As 
Ritchie et al. (2003, p237) state ‘the very process of labelling, sorting and synthesising 
brings deep familiarisation with the evidence available. This gives the analyst a full and 
detailed picture of what has to be portrayed in the later analyses’.  
 
Having applied the themes and subsequently the labels to manage the data, I then 
developed ‘descriptive accounts’ (Spencer et al., 2003, p214) through the research 
phases. Whilst this led to descriptive analysis, this approach helped me to make more 
sense of the data in a narrative form (that is to say, ‘what’s the data telling me?’). This 
enabled me to identify more clearly comparisons across cases (Robson, 2011; Robson 
and McCartan, 2016) from which I could build up to a more ‘explanatory accounts’ 
(Spencer et al., 2003, p215) in which I identified patterns and connections emerging 
from the data, (Spencer et al., 2003, 2014). This approach also highlighted gaps in the 
data analysis, so I was able to go back to the NVivo database and draw out further 
details. For me, this was a cyclical process (see Figure xiv) until I felt that I had 
saturated the analysis process.  
 
Page 81 of 168 
 





I was then able to apply Torfing et al.’s (2012) model to the findings. This enabled me to 
move away from a descriptive, narrative approach to the findings and apply criticality 
(the “so what?” question) to the data. 
 
4.5.3 Ensuring quality within the study 
-  Triangulation and research credibility 
The credibility of the research can be enhanced through measures taken in the data 
collection and data analysis stages. One of the best ways of ensuring the trustworthiness 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967), or consistency (for example, Hammersley, 1992; Robson 
2011; Robson and McCartan, 2016) (that is to say, validity) of qualitative research is 
through triangulation of the findings (Lewis et al 2014). Triangulation involves the use 
of several methods to strengthen the findings (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Stake, 2005; 
Bryman, 2008; Robson and McCartan, 2016). Triangulating the multiple research 
methods enables the researcher to find patterns or discrepancies within the findings, 















further  data 
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There are four approaches to triangulation (Robson and McCartan, 2016; Yin 2009; 
Flick, 2014) 
 Data triangulation: using more than one data collection source within the study 
in order to support a phenomenon 
 Observer, or investigator, triangulation: using more than one observer or 
researcher. 
 Methodological triangulation: adopting a mixed methods approach, using 
quantitative and qualitative elements.  
 Theory triangulation; using more than one theory or perspective.  
Data triangulation was the only option for this study because it was conducted by one 
researcher and collected only interview data. Data triangulation was achieved through 
interviews with different categories of people (the Assistant Directors of Children’s 
Services, the LSCB representatives, the safeguarding managers and the teams of front-
line practitioners), in order to gain perspectives from along the knowledge transfer 
continuum.   
 
The dependability (for example, Lincoln and Guba, 1985) of the data is achieved through 
an auditing process. Careful and systematic data management is also crucial to the 
dependability of the study. This has been achieved here through clearly explaining the 
steps taken in carrying out the research and justifying the decisions made. This enables 
the reader to make their own assessment on whether elements (such as sampling is 
appropriate, data analysis strategies) have been correctly applied. 
  
- Generalisability 
Within the interpretative paradigm, qualitative researchers need to be concerned with 
the ‘transferability’ and ‘fittingness’ (Flick, 2014, p495) of their findings to other 
comparable situations or scenarios. Generalizability from small-scale qualitative studies 
to the wider population beyond the cases involved (external generalisability) is not 
feasible. Instead, however, what such studies should be concerned with is ensuring 
internal generalizability (Robson and McCartan, 2016). This relates to generalizability, 
or transferability and fit, of the findings in relation to the setting studied.  
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Ensuring internal generalizability relies on how the sampling was carried out, and the 
parameters that were establish in the sampling framework. The internal generalisability 
of this study can be applied to other LSCB areas with a similar demographic to those 
which participated in the research and have a focus on child neglect within the business 
priorities (Lewis et al, 2014; Flick, 2014). Through the use of thick descriptions 
generated in this study, the reader should be able to assess a ‘degree of similarity, or 
congruence’ (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p268) between the participating LSCB and their 
own LSCB area.  
 
- Researcher Reflexivity 
It is good practice for a researcher to state their particular position in relation to the 
topic being examined because our experience, values and understandings help us to 
make sense of social issues and the meanings we attach to them. This implicates the 
researcher in the analysis of their data, and the construction of knowledge derived from 
it (Gibbs, 2002; Denscombe, 2017; Bryman, 2008). By making explicit one’s own 
position the reader is able to assimilate how and why a researcher may have reached 
the conclusions they did. 
 
In relation to my study, I was able to maintain a certain level of objectivity because I am 
not a representative of any LSCB, nor am I employed within the children’s services or 
child protective services. As a consequence, I do not have any direct insight or previous 
experience of the policy operations of the LSCB or policy development within children’s 
social or protective services; and I was not drawing on any knowledge or experience 
gained prior to undertaking this research. I hoped that by being a neutral body in this 
sense, the participants felt both that I carried out the research with no prior 
(mis)conceptions of the policy workings of the LSCB, and therefore, that they felt they 
could be open and honest without feeling that they were being judged.  
 
I am, however, employed as a Senior Lecturer within a Higher Education Institution in 
England; I teach on the BA (Hons) Working with Children, Young People and Families 
programme, and am course coordinator for BA (Hons) Applied Social Science. 
Previously I was also a secondary school teacher. I have knowledge and understanding 
of theory surrounding child protection policy and practice gained from these roles, both 
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of which may have influenced the questions I asked of the participants or the way I 
interpreted the research findings (Flick, 2009, 2014). Such a position may conversely 
hinder the research as participants may have felt that without the actual working 
experience of children’s services, I had no legitimate cause to question and analyse 
those working within the field.  
 
4.6 ETHICS 
Ethical approval was granted in September 2014 from the School for Policy Studies 
Research Ethics Committee at the University of Bristol (see Appendix 3). I was also 
granted ethical permission from the Research Governance Frameworks within both 
local authorities. This section now examines those ethical issues of most relevance to 
this study. 
 
- Informed consent and confidentiality 
Contacting participants in phases one and two of the study was straightforward because 
those contact details were easy to find on websites. This was more difficult in phases 
three and four (with the exception of schools, who publish the name of the Designated 
Safeguarding Lead on their website) because such details were harder to find. For phase 
three, in the case of Health, I asked the LSCB representatives in the research if they had 
any useful contacts. In the case of social services for phases three and particularly phase 
four, I was reliant on being given a named contact who might help me to find relevant 
participants. 
 
In order to gain informed consent (Webster et al, 2014; SRA, 2003; Robson and 
McCartan, 2016) the participants needed to know: what the study was about; what their 
role would be in the research (including an approximate time scale); what would be 
done with the research findings, and that their participation is voluntary (Webster et al, 
2014). Participants also needed to be informed that their identity would remain 
anonymous (SRA, 2003; Webster et al, 2014), and any information which they imparted 
would remain confidential inasmuch as it would not be traceable to an individual, 
unless they imparted something which indicated that either they or someone else is at 
risk of harm (Webster et al, 2014). This was particularly crucial for those participants 
(for example, at phase four) who had been put forward by a manager. Equally another 
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participant at phase two was also anxious about this because of saying some 
controversial points which they thought might identify them.  I reassured participants 
that the areas involved would not be named, and job titles would not be used, only 
broad sector names.  
 
All participants were asked for permission (and agreed) to be audio recorded. Lewis 
(2003, p67) notes that ‘consent is not absolute’, therefore whilst informed consent may 
have been gained in advance of the interview process, I reiterated the key ethical points 
noted above prior to commencing an interview in case consent needed to be 
‘renegotiated’ (ibid).  
 
- The Right to withdraw 
All participants were informed that they could withdraw from the research up to four 
weeks after completing the interview (Denscombe, 2017) and that any information 
which they had given in the study would not be used (SRA, 2003). All participants were 
given my contact details in case they needed to contact me following their participation. 
No participants withdrew from the study.  
 
4.7 SUMMARY 
This study adopted a qualitative, multiple case study approach to examine how 
government guidance about child neglect are communicated to, and implemented by, 
Local Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs) and then down to frontline statutory 
services. A purposive sampling method was used to identify 33 participants within each 
case study. Using a semi structured interview approach; the study gained the views of 
CSC assistant directors, LSCB representatives, designated safeguarding leads, and front-
line practitioners. A thematic data analysis strategy was used to analyse the findings, 
which will be presented in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Five: Findings  
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter uses Torfing et al.’s (2012) model of effectivity criteria as a frame in which 
to present the research findings. After detailing the context of the two case studies, the 
chapter examines the procedural elements of policy interpretation, communication, 
knowledge transfer, through exploring findings by area, sector and, in some cases, 
professional group (see the research phases in Chapter 4, p67).  
 
5.1 CASE STUDY CONTEXT 
The study had 34 participants: 20 participants in Area A, and 14 in Area B. The majority 
of participants (N=28) were female.  
 
- Area A 
Area A has 14 members on the LSCB.  In phases one and two of the research I undertook 
five face to face interviews with the Assistant Director of CSC, the Independent Chair 
and three LSCB representatives, whose job titles were Service Manager, Education 
Safeguarding Manager and Designated Nurse for child protection in Area A. These 
participants had experience of working in children’s services ranging from 23 years to  
41 years and had been working in Area A from three years to 15 years. They had a mean 
of 3.5 years of serving on Area A’s LSCB. Two of them had experience of serving on 
another LSCB elsewhere.  
 
The Independent Chair had a background in the police force in which he had gained 
safeguarding experience through being the Head of Child Abuse Investigations. He had 
been chairing LSCBs since 2012 and had been the Independent Chair of Area A since 
July 2014 (eight months at the point of the interview taking place). At the time of 
interviewing he was also the Independent Chair for another LSCB.  
 
In phase three I conducted telephone interviews with four Designated Safeguarding 
Leads (an operations manager, a GP partner, a Head teacher, and a lead nurse for 
safeguarding children). These participants had experience of working in children’s 
services ranging from 20 to 38 years, and between 14 and 27 years of working in Area 
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A. These participants managed teams of staff ranging from seven to 45 people. One 
person had experience of being part of an LSCB subgroup; these are constituted with a 
key focus, for example signs of safety subgroup, multi-agency training subgroup, 
performance analysis subgroup. The subgroups may vary from LSCB to LSCB depending 
on the LSCB priorities.  
 
In phase four (group interview with front-line practitioners), there were 11 participants 
(all social workers) with work experience ranging from 18 months to over 15 years. 
One person had some experience of sitting on an LSCB subgroup. 
 
- Area B 
Area B has 34 members on its LSCB. In phases one and two of the research I undertook 
five face to face interviews with the Assistant Director of CSC, the Independent Chair 
and three LSCB representatives, whose job titles were Divisional Lead in Social Work, 
Designated nurse in Safeguarding Children, and Head teacher. These participants had 
experience of working in children’s services ranging from 23 to 40 years and between 
one and 25 years working in Area B. They had served a mean of six years on Area B’s 
LSCB, and three participants had experience from being representative on other LSCBs.  
 
The Independent Chair of Area B also had a background in policing, this time as a Child 
Abuse Investigator. He was also Head of the Public Protection Unit (which was a multi-
agency single site for police officers, social workers, nurses, probation officers and other 
similar roles) during which time he sat on adult and children’s safeguarding boards. He 
had previous experience of chairing the Adult Safeguarding Board (outside of Area B) 
and had been the Independent Chair of Area B’s LSCB since May 2013 (nearly two years 
at the point of interviewing for this study).  
 
In phase three, I conducted telephone interviews with three Designated Safeguarding 
Leads whose job titles were named nurse for safeguarding children, Vice Principal, and 
Divisional lead. These participants had experience of working in children’s services 
ranging from 19 to 39 years, and between eight and 16 years within Area B. They 
managed teams ranging from one person to 200 people. One person had experience of 
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substituting for their manager on the LSCB and two participants had experience of 
sitting on an LSCB subgroups.  
 
In phase four, there were five participants (all social workers) with work experience in 
children’s services ranging from six months to over 15 years. One participant had 
experience of sitting on an LSCB subgroup.  
 
5.2 THE FINDINGS EXPLORED THROUGH TORFING ET AL.’S (2012) EFFECTIVITY 
CRITERIA (EC). 
EC 1: Produce a clear and well informed understanding of the policy problems 
and policy opportunities at hand 
The themes that emerged from the research findings under this first criterion were:  
Multiple perspectives of a policy issue,  
Child neglect and the political agenda 
 Child neglect and the policy drivers 
Managing conflict, power and influence  
An example of disagreement / a conflict of opinion 
Managing power and influence, and the role of the Independent Chair 
 
5.2.1 Multiple perspectives of a policy issue  
This section is split into two parts. I firstly examine the views around whether or not 
child neglect was seen to be on the political agenda, following the arguments of Rose 
and Barnes, (2008) Daniel et al. (2011) and Burgess et al. (2013) that child neglect is a 
serious factor in many child deaths, and is a complex matter that needs to be dealt with. 
I then move on to examine what influences professionals’ views of child neglect (for 
example, media, serious case reviews, research and so on) in order to gauge what 
weighting different professionals attach to different policy drivers.  
 
- Child neglect and the political agenda 
In phases one and two of the research, participants from across Education, Health, and 
Children’s Social Care in both areas did not consider child neglect to be on the political 
agenda at the time of interview. They claimed that if it was on the agenda, then the 
priorities for tackling child neglect were “not particularly clearly articulated” [Area A, 
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LSCB member, Children’s Social Care]. Tackling child neglect was felt to be submerged 
in other political agendas such as child poverty (see The Child Poverty Strategy 2014-
2017, Child Poverty Act 2020 and the establishment of the Child Poverty Unit) and Early 
Help (for example, intervening early with relevant support services in a child’s or 
family’s life before they reach crisis point) (see the Children Act 2004 and the 
establishment of the Sure Start programme; the Allen Report, 2011; the Children and 
Families Act 2014).  Such responses suggest that little has changed since research 
undertaken by Daniel et al. (2011) and Rose and Barnes (2008) who noted that the 
complexity of what constitutes child neglect causes confusion for practitioners. 
 
- Child neglect and the policy drivers 
I now examine more specific factors which influence the perspectives on child neglect 
and its policy development at LSCB-level, such as serious case reviews; messages from 
research; government; views of the policy lead; practitioner voices; the media.  
 
Overall, respondents from phases one and two considered serious case reviews to be 
the biggest influence on LSCB policy, with all participants from each sector saying that 
LSCBs would take notice of the findings of these before anything else. Neither 
participating area has had to deal with many SCRs in their area, but each was influenced 
by the national perspective on high profile cases. Serious case reviews were closely 
followed by messages from research (for example, findings from published Government 
research), then government (for example, Government Directives), and practitioner 
voices (for example, front-line practitioners being consulted and listened to in the policy 
making process). In Area B, where they had a policy lead (as some LSCBs do), their 
views had least weight. In Area A there was no such role on the LSCB.  
 
There were some interesting differences when the results were explored by sector (see 
Figure xv).  Whilst they all said SCRs carried most weight, those in Education placed 
greater importance than other professionals on the views of the policy lead and 
practitioner voices. They placed messages from research and the Government as the 
least important. This could be explained by the fact that safeguarding (and child 
protection) is not 100% of the job role for those in Education, who also need to keep up 
to date with other material too. Therefore, having a dedicated policy lead for which the 
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role is to keep up to date with such policy changes and inform the strategic decisions 
makers might be a key source of safeguarding and child protection information for 
those in Education.  
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Participants were specifically asked if they felt that the government initiative on neglect 
and abuse - which culminated in the Davies and Ward (2012) report - was an influence 
in child neglect policy making. There were mixed reactions. Participants felt that 
research at a strategic level seems to be quite influential but there were disparaging 
views on what research filters through the layers and who it influences. The Education 
representatives and the Independent Chairs placed less importance on research than 
others. As indicated earlier, both Independent Chairs had professional backgrounds in 
policing and, as with the Education representatives, safeguarding and child protection is 
only one part of the job role.  In particular, one Assistant Director noted:  
 
 “the last time I can remember where a lot of effort was put into that, was in the 80s 
when Messages from Research was, you know, there was quite a strong research-
based development, practice development from those Messages from Research … I 
don’t think any Government since then has really taken that approach, they very 
much – and this Government particularly but the last few – have been very much 
Page 91 of 168 
 
into ‘this is what’s wrong, this is the political response to this, you know, do it!’ and 
if you don’t do it, Ofsted’ll come and catch you for not doing it”  
[Area A, Assistant Director of Children’s Services] 
 
The media (whilst they were deemed to “shout the loudest” [Area B, Independent Chair]) 
were given less priority by most LSCB representatives, with some acknowledging that 
they do not have a good relationship with the media. There is clearly a tension here, 
given that participants said they were influenced by the national perspective on high 
profile cases and SCRs, which are usually deemed high profile because they have 
generated a media interest. Therefore, it might be argued that unknowingly or 
unwittingly, participants were influenced by the media as a driver for policy. Whilst 
most participants attributed less importance to the media as a local policy driver (with 
the exception of the ADCS), it was deemed to be one that practitioners needed to be 
cautious of, because it has its own agenda. 
 
The two Assistant Directors of Children’s Services placed a heavier emphasis on the 
media than other members of the LSCB, placing it as joint first, with SCRs. This might be 
because, given the senior nature of the job role, they need to keep a closer watch on 
media reporting of such issues, especially in such a culture of blame, ‘moral panics’ and 
practitioner witch hunts which the media seems to drive (Klijn, 2016; Peters, 2016; 
Jacobs and Schillemans, 2016) Take for example, Gunn Wahlstrom and Dianne 
Dietmann following the death of Jasmine Beckford in 1984 (Franklin and Parton, 1991); 
Martin Ruddock following the death of Kimberley Carlile in 1986 (Aldridge, 1999); Lisa 
Arthurworrey following the death of Victoria Climbié in 2000 (Butler and Drakeford, 
2005; Davies, 2014), and Sharon Shoesmith following the death of Peter Connolly in 
2007 (Jones, 2014; Parton, 2014; Warner, 2015). 
 
What this demonstrates, albeit in a rather simplistic fashion, is the different 
perspectives which Board members have on what should be influencing local policy. 
There was a problem with my question in that I had structured it in such a way to give a 
linear response (because that is how I viewed it) (see Figure xi, under section 4.4, p74).  
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⧠ Government 
⧠ Messages from research 
⧠ Serious Case Reviews 
⧠ Views of your policy lead 
⧠ Frontline practitioner voices 
⧠ Media 
⧠ other (please state) 
 
However, this did not allow for participants who do not view such things in such a linear 
manner. One Independent Chair [Area A] said that laying the options out in the form of a 
list made it seem as though there was a large gap between “government” and “media”, 
whereas in his mind it was more of a cluster of interacting influences. 
 
The next section considers managing conflict management, power and influence within 
the LSCB in order to examine how those different professionals work through their 
multiple perspectives in order to produce a clear and well-informed understanding of the 
policy problem.   
 
5.2.2 Managing conflict, power and influence 
- An example of disagreement / a conflict of opinion 
As part of each case study I explored the implementation of a local policy document on 
child neglect: the ‘Threshold for Services’ document (Area A) and the Failure to Thrive 
policy (Area B) (see Chapter 4).  
 
I also sought to explore how disagreements (if any) around child neglect were resolved 
among Board members. Participants in Area A alluded to the fact that the Threshold 
Services document caused some difficulties and controversy when being drawn up, 
which provided a useful example to examine how conflict and disagreement could be 
managed at the strategic level, and how multiple views on a given issue or policy can be 
worked through. Such an example did not occur in Area B.  
 
Discussing the Thresholds for Services policy generated some disagreement between 
the Board members, with one participant stating “these Thresholds are agreed by the 
LSCB, although we’ve had some to-ing and fro-ing with our one here,” and going on to say 
that it “took over a year to develop” [Area A, Assistant Director of Children’s Social 
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Services]. Another participant was also aware of its problematic implementation. She 
said “from what I understand that was a particularly difficult implementation” [Area A, 
non-LSCB Designated Safeguarding Lead, CSC]. Part of the problem in relation to this 
policy document was the fact that the LSCB had not followed its own governance 
procedures for implementation and this caused some controversy in terms of the fact 
that it had not been properly challenged. The following quotation provides a summary: 
 
“We had the Threshold for Services document which I think some agencies, some 
representatives were unhappy about the process it had followed and it ended up 
being approved, and what hadn’t happened, we hadn’t followed our own 
Governance so it hadn’t gone through the procedures of the subcommittee so I 
think people felt that actually some of those areas to challenge hadn’t been 
properly gone through. So, we are now in the stage whereby we’re going back to it”.                                                     
[Area A, LSCB member, Children’s Social Care] 
 
It was further noted by the same participant that many of the concerns raised in 
relation to this document derived from Education, as one participant stated “I think it’s 
fair to say he wasn’t silenced” [Area A, LSCB member CSC], highlighting the fact that 
there is a forum for open discussion and debate on matters concerning LSCB members. 
The Education member himself stated that “there are plenty of people [who sit on the 
Board] who are confident and able to say they don’t agree” [Area A, LSCB member, 
Education]. This was attributed to the role of the Independent Chair who balanced the 
discussion, as discussed in the next section.   
 
- Managing power and influence, and the role of the Independent Chair 
What was identified was that the role of the Independent Chair was quite crucial in 
balancing the views and reducing the power and dominance that certain organisations 
have traditionally held over the Board. This was evident in this particular discussion 
around working through the Threshold for Services policy.   
“I mean, there’ll always be dissenters saying that the Threshold Document is wrong, 
so in a way you don’t… but you have to, you’ve got to go with the majority. We have 
to take a vote on things like that, and we try and negotiate our way through”     
[Area A, Independent Chair]. 
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It was noted by both Independent Chairs that prior to the installation of an Independent 
Chair (following the Laming Review, 2009) both Boards were heavily weighted in 
favour of the local authority and children’s social services. The one went so far as to call 
the Board “a bit of a sham” [Area B, Independent Chair] whilst the other stated “so Social 
Care will often feel they’ve got the biggest voice, they’re routinely the biggest financial 
contributor” [Area A, Independent Chair]. As a result, decisions had been seen to be 
made in favour of the local authority. Since the establishment of Independent Chairs 
(Laming, 2009), however, the Chairs felt this focus had shifted a little and created a 
more equal power balance on the Board.  
“So, we don’t have such a pronounced dominant agency effect as we used to have. 
Still working on it though.” [Area B, Independent Chair]. 
 
The Independent Chairs clearly saw their role as being to “scrutinise” and “challenge” 
[Area A, Independent Chair] and “holding to account” [Area B, Independent Chair]. In 
relation to managing conflict or disagreement, managing power and ‘haggling’ through 
the multiple perspectives, the Independent Chairs’ strategies seemed to revolve around 
honesty and openness, facilitating discussion and negotiation.   
“It’s a case of having an open and honest environment and working, and just 
getting the right result” [Area B Independent Chair] 
 
“It’s about facilitation and negotiation and compromise, but that compromise 
mustn’t dilute, that’s the important thing, we can compromise but not dilute” [Area 
A, Independent Chair].  
 
The role of the Independent Chair is neither linked to an organisation sitting on the 
Board, nor are they connected to Government. Therefore, they are not leaders in the 
traditional sense of ‘power, status and hierarchy’ (Williams, 2012, p133), but have a 
facilitation or mediator role (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). They could, therefore, be in a 
position to challenge and scrutinise the government on their proposed child neglect 
guidance, or lack thereof. That said, however, the Independent Chairs used to be “hired 
and fired” [Area A, Independent Chair] by the Chief Executive of the local authority, 
which meant they could choose someone who they thought would be “malleable” [Area 
A, Independent Chair] and not give the local authority a hard time.  
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In order to add to their independence and autonomy, the Association of Independent 
LSCB Chairs (AILC) was established in 2012. The Independent Chairs said that prior to 
the establishment of the AILC, information from government would have been sent to 
the Director of Children’s Services to be cascaded to the Independent Chair. This caused 
problems because it reduced the independence of the chair (who needs to be seen to be 
detached from the local authority), created a hierarchy between the Director of 
Children’s Services and the Independent Chair, and erected a potential barrier in the 
dissemination of information from central government to front-line practice.  
“You cannot use DCS’s as a conduit for information because that then puts us in bed 
together and we’re separate. You’d no more send the information to the Chief 
Constable” [Area A, Independent Chair].  
 
The AILC was identified by participants to be a better route for government to 
communicate with Independent Chairs without embroiling them with the local 
authority. Both Independent Chairs in this study said that this had improved routes of 
communication between government and LSCBs.  
 
The Chairs differed about their role in terms of being independent from the Board and 
the Government. The Chair in Area A seemed quite clear on the independence of his 
role. In response to the question about the Board’s role, the Chair in Area A stated “to 
challenge, coordinate and scrutinise” and went further to emphasise “that’s the Board 
doing that, that’s not me as an individual” [Area A, Independent Chair]. In response to 
another question, he stated “can’t speak for the Authority, you’ll have to ask the Authority 
that question”. The chair in Area B seemed to consider himself as part of the Board, 
rather than as mediator or facilitator. In his responses he used words such as “we” and 
“us” which suggests a more allied approach to mediation. 
“…between what the government wants us to do …” [Area B, Independent Chair] 
 
“We certainly get held to account, if through the Ofsted process, we haven’t done it” 
[Area B, Independent Chair] 
 
Considering the need to produce a clear and well informed understanding of the policy 
problem of neglect, the key message here is that an Independent Chair was seen to 
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result in rebalancing the focus on child neglect (and safeguarding children more 
generally) as the responsibility of everyone involved with providing services for 
children, and not just a wicked issue for the local authority and Children’s Social Care to 
deal with.   
 
5.2.3 EC 1 summary 
According to Torfing et al. (2012, p173) an effective governance network ‘produces a 
clear and well-informed understanding of the policy problems and policy opportunities 
at hand’. LSCBs, therefore, need to grasp the complexities of the policy problem in order 
to provide the solutions. But within this criterion, under child neglect and the political 
agenda, I found that participants did not perceive child neglect to be a political issue at 
the moment and was lost to other issues such as CSE. Guidance from government was 
felt to be confusing because of the differing responsibilities and perspectives 
underpinning the range of departments disseminating them (DoH, DfE, Home Office) 
which was detrimental to being able to produce a clear and well-informed 
understanding of the policy problem. In terms of identifying the policy drivers, however, 
LSCB members from different professional backgrounds were variously influenced by 
different sources and placed different weight on certain sources than others (see figure 
xv above). 
 
In terms of managing power, conflict and influence, I found that the shift to an 
Independent Chair has realigned the balance of the LSCB to some extent, but this might 
need to go further. The establishment of the AILC might have improved this balance in 
terms of government communicating with the Chair rather than with the DCS.  
 
5.3 EC 2: Generate innovative, proactive and yet feasible policy options that match 
the perception of the problems and challenges facing the network actors 
The themes that emerged from the findings were:  
The government as metagovernor or systems architect,  
Monitor and controlling mechanisms stifling responses to innovative, creative policy 
making 
Power and influence of the LSCB in terms of professional sway 
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5.3.1 The government as metagovernor / systems architect 
All of the participants thought that the government placed little priority on child neglect 
as an issue. They said that it seems to be focusing instead on Child Sexual Exploitation 
(CSE) as a priority. I assume this to be in light of several high-profile cases which have 
attracted media attention (for example, cases in Rotherham and Oxford).  Yet it was said 
by all participants that CSE was perhaps not the most significant issue and detracted 
from the other categories of abuse, such as neglect. But as the government monitors and 
inspects LSCBs they have to be seen to be responding to the government agenda, even if 
the members of the LSCB think that the priorities are somewhat misplaced. Therefore, 
there is a mismatch between central and local priorities which should be a concern. 
 
With the exception of Education and Health, participants stated that the government 
agenda was more of a hindrance than a help. Education thought it provided “direction” 
[Area B, LSCB member, Education] and one participant from Health stated “I definitely 
think all government legislations and procedures actually help us formulate what we need 
to do locally” [Area A, LSCB member, Health]. Children’s Social Care, however, thought 
that guidance from government was disorganised, numerous, difficult to follow, had a 
short shelf-life and was difficult to keep up to date with.  This takes me back to the 
premise of this study in which Children’s Social Care seems to have been the focus of 
several public inquiries (for example, Laming, 2003, 2009; Munro, 2010a, 2010b, 2011)  
and has received many recommendations for changes to practice which it was difficult 
to put into practice, or have been changed between governments (for example, Labour’s 
establishment of Contact Point, and Sure Start Children’s Centres, and their subsequent 
closure and demise at the hands of the Coalition government). Such constant, but 
negative, changes in short time frames lead to disaffected perspectives of the working 
environment. It might be argued that Health and Education were also part of those 
inquiries, because of the multi-disciplinary approach to safeguarding children, therefore 
if this were the case they would not have had the slightly more open view on 
government legislation, but Children’s Social Care and child protection were the focal 
point of the inquiries, and perhaps bore the brunt of the changes and their 
consequences. This brings me to the next point on government monitoring and 
controlling mechanisms.  
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5.3.2 Monitor and controlling mechanisms stifling innovative / creative policy 
making. 
This section considers how monitoring, evaluation and inspection regimes further stifle 
innovative and creative policy making and control the policy agenda of governance 
networks. As well as inspecting the LSCBs (via Ofsted), the Government also carries out 
single assessments of some of the bodies that make up the LSCB: schools, social services, 
and in turn the LSCB audits and monitors the policy implementation of the 
organisations under its jurisdictions.  
 
Whilst one Education representative said that the Ofsted monitoring of LSCBs was 
effective because “it provides rigour and accountability in much the same ways schools 
do” [Area B, LSCB member, Education], others were less positive about its impact. One 
participant described it as “bizarre” [Area A, ADCS], and something that undermined 
professional decision-making; another noted that “it was clear that inspectors were very 
variable in their knowledge of Boards” [Area A, Independent Chair]. Other comments 
concerned it being “prescriptive” [Area A, Designated Safeguarding Lead, Health2]. Such 
views were echoed by frontline participants, who were sceptical because they felt it 
drove practice for the sake of ticking a box rather than driving practice to improve 
quality and performance. Many of the participants noted similar points evident in 
current practice.  
“the guidelines, well they’re not even guidelines, the requirements and the 
documents that have come from the DfE are you need to have this in place, and if 
you don't, when Ofsted come in you’ll be in breach of your safeguarding 
expectations so … there’s not much wriggle room, you couldn't opt to have certain 
paperwork in place, you couldn’t” [Area A, Designated Safeguarding Lead, 
Education] 
 
“If everything is too regulated and you know staff become more concentrated on 
the procedures and getting things done to timescales and less focused on the 
children and the families which isn't good” [Area A, Designated Safeguarding Lead, 
Health 2] 
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“We’re absolutely hide-bound with that kind of, you know, we-have-to-do-it-this-
way-because…and we-have-to-be-able-to-justify-it-because ….” [Area B, 
Designated Safeguarding Lead, Children’s Social Care]. 
 
All of this contradicts the findings of Ofsted (2011, noted in Chapter 2) that there had 
been a shift from a compliance culture to a learning culture. These findings emphasise 
that the compliance culture still exists, and such compliance limits the ability of 
governance networks (such as the LSCB) to come up with innovative and creative policy 
making, in this case for fear of being negatively judged by either the media, or in an 
Ofsted inspection.  
 
Taking this argument further, it might seem that the answer to these issues is to abolish 
the inspection mechanisms and prescription, and to give autonomy to the governance 
network so that they can be innovative and proactive in policy making. Yet this was not 
what I discovered. It would seem that it is not that simple in practice to abolish targets 
and data collection; for instance, for LSCBs there would still be “a requirement to 
measure” [Area B, Independent Chair]. Therefore, some of the bureaucratic measures 
(for example, data collection, targets) that are required for inspection and monitoring 
purposes, LSCBs would still need to collate in order to measure benchmarks and 
evaluate the effectivity of their own practice in dealing with wicked issues. For some 
participants, a certain amount of prescription and auditing was deemed necessary in 
order to ensure the quality of safeguarding practice across the area.   
“they have an important role to play, you know, at the end of the day we’re talking 
about children’s lives aren’t we, the stuff that we’re dealing with and keeping 
children safe, so …” [Area B, Designated Safeguarding Lead, Children’s Social 
Care].  
 
It is not so much the fact that LSCBs are monitored that is the issue, but how they are 
monitored that was felt to create the tensions. One participant in the study noted that 
under the Labour government “there was a genuine kind of feeling from external 
inspection that they were inspecting you, but also trying to be helpful in terms of looking 
to the future” [Area B, Assistant Director of Children’s Services]. But since 2010, with the 
change in government, monitoring and inspection has felt more hostile, pressured and 
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“punitive”, [Area A, Assistant Director of Children’s Services].  This is important to 
highlight because it is not necessarily that practitioners would want to completely 
remove monitoring and inspection in child neglect and have complete reign over their 
own policy agenda.  Rather than being a critical friend of current practice and policy 
making, participants felt that inspections are focused on the negative and were just 
trying to catch out agencies, and lay blame. 
  
5.3.3 Power and influence of the LSCB  in terms of professional sway 
Whilst participants in both areas highlighted that the working relationship between the 
LSCB members was positive, seemingly effective, and everyone had a voice on the 
Board, they did not perceive that the LSCB itself was effective or influential. Such views 
were particularly strong in Area A.  
 
In short, within Area A the LCSB was seen as having “no authority to make things 
happen” [Area A, LSCB member, Education] and not being “challenging enough” [Area A, 
non-LSCB Designated Safeguarding Lead, Children’s Social Care]. One participant 
described it as being “pretty toothless” [Area A, LSCB member, Education] and another 
stated “it hasn’t any teeth” [Area A, LSCB member, Health]. Whilst LSCBs were an 
initiative of the Government, participants alluded to the fact that the Government had 
not granted it sufficient authority to actually be able to satisfactorily achieve anything. It 
was seen as having no power to compel any organisation to adopt its policies and 
procedures. The only tool it had was “persuasion” [Area A, LSCB member, Education], 
and it was stated by one participant from Education that key senior bodies in partner 
organisations could easily block any policy or guidance.   
 
Whilst the LSCBs seem to lack any power, they were still viewed by participants from all 
sectors as being essential, with a major role in preventing the current system from 
falling into chaos and disarray. As one participant from Area A stated; 
“I am frustrated by the lack of teeth and authority that the safeguarding board has 
but I wouldn’t want us not to have it ….Because I think things would be worse if we 
didn’t have it” [Area A, LSCB member, Education]. 
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5.3.4 EC 2 summary 
It seems that the government agenda, and monitoring and control mechanisms, prevent 
LSCBs from ‘generating innovative, proactive and yet feasible policy options’. In terms 
of the government as metagovernor or systems architect, the case studies identified that 
the level of control that central government  retains over such a state driven activity as 
safeguarding children, and child neglect prevents LSCBs from generating innovate and 
proactive policy.  
 
Furthermore, when considering the power and influence of the LSCB in terms of 
generating innovative and proactive policy that matched the perceptions of the 
problems facing the network actors, these two case studies found that whilst on the one 
hand, the government has seemingly devolved power and authority to governance 
networks (for example, the LSCB), at the same time it has not given it sufficient 
authority, or teeth, with which to compel any changes. It was seen to be a tokenistic 
gesture of government to put something in place and give it all of the responsibility but 
at the same time, it has not given it sufficient power and influence to be able to enforce 
or compel any changes. Whilst it has responsibility to make and implement policy and 
to monitor practice, it cannot authorise any sanctions to compel organisations to adhere 
to a local policy. Wicked issues such as child neglect remain entwined in a mesh of 
government bureaucracy and inspection regimes, which disengage creativity and 
innovation in policy-making.  
 
5.4 EC 3: Reach joint policy decisions  
The theme that emerged from the findings was: 
 joined-up, horizontal government. 
 
5.4.1 Joined up government / horizontal government 
In relation to local child neglect policy, one Independent Chair identified that their 
current child neglect policy was “quite old” and “in need of a refresh” [Area B, 
Independent Chair]. He said that participating in this study had prompted him to think 
about the policy and suggested that there could be potential to develop regional child 
neglect policy rather than just an LSCB-wide one.  
Page 102 of 168 
 
“there is potential for joint working particularly in these austere times around a 
bigger regional policy group for that and that’s where I’d see that in one fell swoop 
you would get a refreshed and up-to-date policy across a region that covers many 
millions of people as opposed to 300 thousand” [Area B, Independent Chair] 
This notion followed on from a joint SCR which this LSCB had carried out in partnership 
with another LSCB in the same region (which ultimately lead to the Failure to Thrive 
guidance in Area B).  
 
Also in Area B, it was noted that another weakness of the LSCB is the continued lack of 
joined up working. Prior to having LSCBs there was an argument that organisations 
worked in silos, but even with the multi-agency approach of LSCBs there is a further 
argument that LSCBs remain siloed and do not share good practice between them.  
“what I do think is that as safeguarding boards we tend to work very much in silos 
whereas actually there could be more cohesive working, you know that 
safeguarding boards share good practice, we’ve all got a limited budget we’ve all 
got limited time, so actually taking good practice from other areas … but some 
areas are quite reluctant to share” [Area B, LSCB member, Health] 
 
This, however, links back to my argument on issues of policy interpretation and needs 
of local areas. If there are calls for regional child neglect policy to be made, and there are 
a number of varying LSCBs within any given region with varying issues such as social 
and economic factors, how each LSCB interpreted the needs for their own area in order 
to factor this into a regional policy would need to be considered. There would need to 
be a network governance of representatives from each LSCB, or strong influence from 
the government’s role as metagovernor (Newman, 2005; Rhodes, 2017). Depending on 
how the LSCB viewed the issue of child neglect (social care? health? education?)  might 
depend on which representatives were put forward for the regional network. These 
again would need to be independently chaired (in line with Koppenjan and Klijn’s 
(2004) view of chairs as mediator or facilitator and not director) in order to detract 
from one LSCB being given the power to see itself as the lead organisation. But 
ultimately, again, the first argument needs to come back to how they define child 
neglect, which link back to the issues around multiple perspectives and conflict 
management.  
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5.4.2 EC 3 summary 
This criterion enabled an analysis of the joined-up decision making horizontally across 
the governance network. It was useful to explore how much weight or authority does 
the LSCB convey in the policy making and policy implementation arena; is it a strategic 
force to be reckoned with or is it one that no one really pays any attention to. As part of 
this examination, this was a useful section under which to explore the value attributed 
to the joint policy decisions made within the LSCB around child neglect.  
 
5.5 EC 4: Ensure a smooth policy implementation based on continuous 
coordination and a high degree of legitimacy and program responsibility among 
the actors involved. 
The themes that emerged from the research findings were:  
Policy implementation and coordination linked to accountability,  
The dual role of network actors and accountability,  
 
5.5.1 Policy implementation and coordination linked to accountability  
As highlighted above, government guidance on child neglect can be very disjointed, and 
it is difficult to know what guidance is coming from which department.  There seemed 
to be a high level of responsibility expected of strategic level practitioners to search out 
child neglect guidance for themselves. This guidance should be informing local level 
child neglect policy design and implementation, but if those in strategic-level positions 
with the power to be making organisational policy decisions are unaware of the most 
relevant child neglect research and policy guidance, then it cannot be expected or 
assumed that front-line practitioners are accessing this guidance either. There needs to 
be improved coordination and accountability for dissemination of the child neglect 
research and policy guidance from the top down in order to ensure continuous 
coordination.   
 
It can be difficult for professionals to grasp how far, or to whom they might need to 
disseminate information, both horizontally and vertically. A good example of this 
complexity and lack of clarity was given by one participant who said: “what you tend to 
find is you get information time and time again to be honest, but I would rather have that 
than not know about it at all” [Area B, LSCB member, Health]. As one participant in this 
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study suggested that once the “send” button of an email has been pressed it almost 
seems that all sense of responsibility has been discharged.  
“They [the LSCB] tend to assume that the person who is receiving it will 
disseminate it out” [Area B, LSCB member, Health].  
She went further to highlight the difficulty in tracing the dissemination trail. She said: 
“but again how do you know if it’s read, that’s the big thing for me and the only 
way is to go round and ask the staff but when you’ve got 50 practices and there’s 
one of me, do you know what I mean, it is really hard, and if you send them a survey 
via electronically are they going to fill it in? so it’s a real challenge, it is a real 
challenge” [Area B, LSCB member, Health].  
 
This becomes more complicated when the multifaceted nature of job roles is taken into 
account. This particular participant from Health held a designated safeguarding role for 
many other members of the LSCB (Education members for example) their 
responsibilities to the LSCB and disseminating particular guidance (for example, around 
child neglect), is just one part (in some cases, a minor part) of their full professional 
role.  
 
5.5.2 The dual role of network actors and accountability 
In terms of accountability, representatives on the LSCB were also strategic leaders 
within their employing organisation, and many also sat on other networks (for example, 
Health and Well-Being Board, Boards for Head teachers, or Adoption and Fostering 
Board and so on). Two participants said: 
“I know safeguarding is hugely important but when you consider that’s a tiny 
amount of the day job” [Area B, LSCB member, Education] 
“you can have a Board member whose role is purely safeguarding and nothing else 
… or somebody that has got a million other things to do and you can’t expect that 
Board member to be as conversant and as knowledgeable with safeguarding issues 
as the counterpart who does it all the time”  [Area A, Independent Chair] 
 
“The problem is we all work within lots of organisations, and they’ve all got lots of 
different priorities” [Area A, LSCB member, Health] 
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“Because this is not my sole job, we are teachers and I’ve got other leadership 
responsibilities” [Area A, Designated Safeguarding Lead, Education] 
 
To give a specific example of such juggling, when discussing the development of a new 
local child neglect policy in Area A, one participant noted significant delays in the 
policy’s development because of the multi-professional nature of those Board members 
who were designated to draft it.  
“There’s a subgroup supposed to be working on it [the new child neglect policy] 
but these are people with other jobs, and, so, she’s [the Board manager] not sure 
it’s progressing as it should do” [Area A, Independent Chair] 
 
There was a difficulty around collaboration across organisations for a collective purpose 
(that is to say, safeguarding children) whilst at the same time maintaining the integrity 
of the home organisation (Williams, 2012). This is important for LSCBs to understand 
when considering how they might best – or more effectively – disseminate child neglect 
policy guidance beyond the LSCB.  
 
5.5.3 EC 4 summary 
A major role of the LCSB is to disseminate information (implementation) with the aim of 
improving safeguarding. Effective networks are those that have recognised legitimacy 
and whose members have a sense of shared responsibility.  The LCSBs examined in this 
study appeared to fall short of this criterion in a number of respects. In terms of policy 
implementation and coordination linked to accountability, there seems to be little 
accountability in order to ensure coordination of the policy guidance. It would seem that 
filtering guidance through email discharges responsibility for that guidance once the 
email is sent. Of course, this all needs to be balanced with the fact that often the LSCB is 
not the only network that people attend. In terms of dual roles and accountability, LSCB 
members have to balance the accountabilities and priorities of the LSCB with their own 
organisations and any other networks to which they belong. This, therefore, examined 
not only the complexities, but also the magnitude of accountability that governance 
network actors often have to balance in the face of multifaceted nature of their role. 
This has been very important in relation to this study to explore why and how certain 
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child neglect guidance may get through some parts of the governance web, but not 
necessarily to all parts.  
 
5.6 EC 5: Provide a flexible adjustment of policy solutions and public services in 
the face of positive and negative policy feedback and changing conditions, 
demands, and preferences 
This section considers how guidance is communicated from top-down, in order to 
examine whether or not the governance network is able to, firstly, get feedback on 
policy, and secondly, whether or not it responds to positive or negative feedback to 
change a policy.  The themes that emerged from the research findings were: 
Communication 
 From government to LSCB  
 Within the LSCB 
 From LSCB to non-LSCB designated safeguarding leads 
 To front-line practitioners 
Information dissemination.  
 
5.6.1 Communication 
- Communication from government to LSCB 
Findings highlighted that, across all sectors, communication from central government 
has become less direct in recent years. One participant from Children’s Social Care 
noted that there was less communication from the Coalition-created DfE than its labour-
established predecessor, the Department for Children, Schools and Families DCFS). 
Furthermore, it was also noted that there was no consistency in which department 
disseminates the guidance on child neglect. 
“I think one of the really interesting things is the number of different government 
departments that can be involved in disseminating policy” [Area B, LSCB member, 
Children’s Social Care] 
 
In addition, a key problem in terms of communication from government to LSCBs was 
that there was little or no structure in terms of how guidance from central government 
emerges. One participant noted that there were “not particular ways” [Area A, LSCB 
member, ADCS] in terms of top-down communication, and another said “there’s been no 
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structure I think, yeah, that’s the summary isn’t it, there’s been no structure” [Area A, 
Independent Chair]. Guidance was described as “disjointed” [Area B, Independent Chair] 
with some coming from DfE, others from DoH or even the Home Office, and this created 
confusion among professionals (see also Criterion 1).  
“They [government] do get criticisms levelled at them, do they not, for failure to 
coordinate at national level” [Area B, LSCB member, Children’s Social Care]. 
 
“The other thing that was very apparent …is that people like DfE and Ofsted don’t 
talk to each other” [Area A, LSCB member, Education]. 
 
“I think nationally when these kinds of things happen Government is very disjointed 
and disorganised in the way it disseminates the messages which isn’t helpful to 
local authorities I don’t think” [Area B, Assistant Director Children’s Social Care]. 
 
Furthermore, participants from Health and Education noted that key guidance seems 
quite often to creep out from Government, with “no lead in, no fanfare” [Area A, LSCB 
member, Education]. This means that professionals may not be aware of certain policy, 
guidance or government-funded research, even though it may be pertinent for their 
roles. 
“I think this is what we all struggle with, the fact that sometimes you just, you come 
across stuff and you go flipping ‘eck where’s this been, you know, because you have 
fanfares for the Rotherham enquiry and fanfares for this that and the other inquiry 
and then actually something as important as that [Davies and Ward (2012) 
Safeguarding Children Across Services] because I mean it is quite a comprehensive 
piece of work that is isn’t it? That’s a lot of work gone into that and no I don’t think 
it was well distributed at all” [Area B, LSCB member, Health].  
 
In short, I would infer that as communication from government to LSCB has reduced in 
recent years, and is also poorly joined-up, it must be quite difficult for the LSCB to know 
what to feedback on to be able to make any change to policy at a national level, unless 
asked explicitly as part of a consultation.  
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- Communication within the LSCB  
In spite of the positive working relationship among the LSCB representatives (as 
perceived by the participants), the LSCB was deemed to be equally poor at 
communicating guidance either to, or from, their own organisations, or to front-line 
practitioners generally. There is somewhat of a blind faith, or trust, placed in LSCB 
representatives to successfully cascade guidance within their home organisations and to 
report back on the views from within their organisation. 
“As a Board we’re reliant on those same people, so the people we task to do it are 
then reporting back to us that it’s all done, all fine and dandy” [Area B, 
Independent Chair]. 
 
“Then we will ask people to make sure they disseminate it through their 
organisations. Do I have confidence that that happens all the time? Probably not” 
[Area B, ADCS]. 
 
In relation to the Threshold for Services document (Area A) participants noted that 
whilst the document was debated a lot at the Board, the Board relied on its 
representatives to communicate it within their agencies, yet the Board did not have a 
“standard fixed process” or “defined implementation strategy” [Area A, ADCS] for 
dissemination. This highlights that it is indeed one thing for the Board representative to 
disseminate the guidance to their list of contacts, and another to ensure that the 
recipients receive, read and disseminate it further or implement it. Variations in how 
information is communicated, what information is communicated, and how that is 
interpreted and translated into practice, will all lead to variations in practice.  
 
-  Communication from LSCB to non-LSCB Designated Safeguarding Leads 
In relation to LSCB members communicating to non-LSCB Designated Safeguarding 
Leads, responses in phases two and three were mixed in terms of how well this was 
done. Participants in phase two seemed confident of how the guidance was being 
disseminated. In relation to the Failure to Thrive guidance (Area B) they felt it was 
clearly practitioners’ responsibility to pass down the line.   
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“certainly, with the Faltering Growth policy, and I know this because I’ve spoken to 
the staff members, they actually brought it up in their team meetings, to say read it 
and have a look” [Area B, LSCB member, Health] 
In Area A, for the Thresholds for Services document one participant said “we put a whole 
thing in place you know about people’s various responsibilities and making sure old ones 
[documents] are withdrawn” [Area A, Independent Chair]. But then went on to say: 
“do you know I’m not clear that we have got a defined implementation strategy so 
the new Threshold came out and there was quite a lot of debate at Board and then 
at subgroup about how the Threshold document would be promulgated so I don’t 
think that this Board has got a standard fixed process for doing that” [Area A, 
Independent Chair]. 
 
In phase three, schools felt the relationship between themselves and the Board’s 
Education representative was good, insofar as the representative ensured that the 
schools received what they needed in order to be able to put in place relevant 
safeguarding guidance in their setting. Views from Health, and Children’s Social Care 
participants were, however, less positive, with participants claiming that both LSCBs 
were ineffective at communicating their priorities to operational teams and frontline 
practitioners.  
 
Tracing the through flow of the guidance in each area, one non-LSCB Designated 
Safeguarding manager said that she had never heard of the local authority’s Thresholds 
for Services document [Area A, non-LSCB Designated Safeguarding Lead, Health 1].  
Another participant from Children’s Social Care felt that this lack of communication was 
a reflection of the turmoil that Local Authority A had been in for the previous few years. 
Another Health participant within Area A felt that communication from the LSCB was “a 
little bit ad hoc” [Area A, non LSCB Designated Safeguarding Lead, Health 2] and went on 
to explain; 
“Sometimes things will come out and you think well it would have been nice to have 
had it sooner. We get it eventually, but you know…” [Area A, non LSCB Designated 
Safeguarding Lead, Health 2]. 
 
In relation to the Thresholds for Services document (Area A) and the Failure to Thrive 
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policy (Area B), the communication might be deemed to be moderately effective. As 
already highlighted, the Failure to Thrive policy in Area B was a clinically-led policy 
aimed at health practitioners and had not been circulated for wider consultation. 
Therefore, the fact that those in Education and Children’s Social Care had not heard of it 
and do not use it should not necessarily be a note for concern, because it was not aimed 
at these practitioners. By contrast the non-LSCB Designated Safeguarding Lead 
confirmed that she knew of the guidance, claiming “yes. It’s a community policy, it’s not a 
hospital policy but yes I’m aware of it” [Area B, non-LSCB Designated Safeguarding Lead, 
Health].  In Area A, however, the Thresholds for Services guidance had reached some 
Designated Safeguarding Leads but not all. One representative from Health (a 
Designated Safeguarding Nurse within a hospital) and one within Children’s Social Care 
were aware of the Threshold for Services documents but the Designated Safeguarding 
Lead in Education and the other Designated Safeguarding Lead in Health (a GP) had not 
heard of it.  
 
France et al. (2010) raised the concern that LSCBs were uncertain of whether or not 
they were informing and affecting practice. Building on this concern, the findings here 
suggest that it actually depends on the sector, and there are still challenges to be 
overcome in terms of improving communication. 
“I would have to say one of the biggest frustrations in [Area B], the Safeguarding 
Board do recognise this, is still communication between the departments whether it 
be health, social care, education, they are the challenges to overcome” [Area B, 
LSCB member, Education]. 
 
In relation to responding to policy feedback and adjusting policy, therefore, in phase 
three, the operational teams within Education perceived that they received enough 
information for them to be able to implement appropriate safeguarding policies within 
their school. On the other hand, Health and Children’s Social Care did not feel that 
information was forthcoming from the government or the LSCB. They claimed that there 
was no clear strategy for disseminating information to them. This might be a reflection 
of the multitude of layers within both the Health sector and Children’s Social Care sector 
that need to be permeated (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984), in comparison with schools. The 
larger and more complex an organisation’s structure the less straightforward will be the 
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lines of communication (Goggin et al., 1990; Bowe et al., 1992; Lupton et al., 2001; 
Crozier, 2008). School structures are fairly straightforward, and all will have a Head 
teacher and Designated Safeguarding Lead. The Health sector nationally is particularly 
complicated with variations by NHS, Clinical Commissioning Groups, or Primary Care 
Trusts and so on, not to mention deliverance between public and private (contracted) 
sector. In addition, the sector has undergone a period of change triggered by the Health 
and Social Care Act 2012. This is useful to understand in order to acknowledge the 
impact that organisational (or even network) restructuring can have on sharing policy 
guidance and dissemination through the network.  
 
- Communication to front-line practitioners 
LSCB representatives and non-LSCB Designated Safeguarding Managers were asked 
about the methods of dissemination that they used to communicate policy from 
themselves to front-line staff. The main methods were through training or workshops, 
email and staff meetings. Websites and screen savers were other noted routes for 
disseminating policy guidance, but these were deemed less useful routes. LSCB websites 
in particular generated negative responses, from designated safeguarding leads and 
front-line practitioners, with them being described as complex, and “not very user 
friendly” [Area A, non-LSCB Designated Safeguarding Lead, Health 2]. 
 
Front-line practitioners in both areas noted that communication to them was 
predominantly by email. This was problematic because of the sheer volume of emails 
that they received, which seems to have created a feeling of desensitisation, and apathy, 
towards messages posted in emails, and any importance the sender placed on it.  
“I rarely read emails, I have to admit, I don’t have time … if it’s an issue I quickly 
look at it and if it says please-look-at-this-link, I just don’t have time” [Area A, 
frontline practitioner A] 
In terms of filtering the emails, front-line practitioners in both areas stated that the ones 
which will help with their current cases will be the emails that are prioritised.  
“if I went back to my desk now and I’ve got ten emails, there was a health visitor 
who wanted a call, a midwife who wanted a call and a policy document off the 
LSCB that policy document would be the least of my priorities” [Area B, front-line 
practitioner, M] 
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Practitioners seemed to prefer face to face communication. Front-line practitioners in 
Area A stated that much of their training (another form of receiving relevant policy and 
practice guidance in relation to child neglect) had now reverted to online training rather 
than classroom based training, which was not a popular format, and described it as a 
“chore” [Area A, frontline practitioner D],  
“and the general attitude by staff is it’s boring because you’re sat at your desk all 
day so for staff to actually absorb this information I don’t think it’s going to be as 
effective as training within the classroom” [Area A, frontline practitioner J]. 
Electronic training, and a reduction in face to face training, or communication, is known 
to reduce the sharing of information, joined-up learning and ‘can severely disrupt the 
flow of information and ideas’ (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004, p94).  
 
One clear message that came through from participants within all phases of the 
fieldwork was that communication was not as good or effective as it used to be. In Area 
A, during phase two of the fieldwork, it was noted that 
“So I don’t think communication is as strong as it used to be and I think it is hard 
for practitioners to kind of really understand the Board because it is quite a strange 
concept in some ways” [Area A, LSCB member, Children’s Social Care]. 
 
This sentiment was echoed in phase three.  One participant stated that she had not been 
confident for a long time that communication with front-line workers was effective: 
“I don’t think they’ve been very good at communicating what they’re doing to 
frontline practitioners for a number of years now” [Area A, non-LSCB Designated 
Safeguarding Lead, Children’s Social Care]. 
 
There was recognition from the LSCBs that more work needed to be done to gain the 
views and input from front-line practitioners.  
“We recognise the need to engage more with frontline practitioners. I’ve long held a 
belief that the more senior you get the less you keep touch with reality and actually 
very often it’s the people at the coalface who know exactly what needs to be done 
and where the best ideas come from …. but, you’re right, it’s a two-way thing, we 
need to deliver a message, but we also need to listen to everyone as well” [Area B, 
LSCB  Independent Chair]. 
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Both areas seemed to have been in a considerable period of flux and turmoil at the time 
of interviewing. Within Area A one participant in phase three stated that she had been 
trying to find previous minutes from an LSCB meeting but noted that she could only find 
some from over twelve months prior. She felt that this was “kind of a reflection about the 
period of turmoil that [Local Authority A] seems to have had in the last couple of years” 
[Area A, non-LSCB Designated Safeguarding Lead, Children’s Social Care]. Two front-line 
practitioners also within Area A noted similar points, with one saying; 
 “I don’t know if this has got anything to do with it but the hierarchy of [Local 
Authority A] … has changed quite a lot recently. It used to be stable, we had a 
continuous Head of Service kind of thing, but that’s all changed over the last 
couple of years, we’ve got like agency people come on board, which is no criticism 
but, it’s not consistent like it used to be and whether that has any impact on what 
filters down to us” [Area A, Social Worker P] 
 
The picture was portrayed as being similar in Area B.  
“I’m just trying to think when we last had a manager for more than a few 
months“…“but the restructuring now has been going on for nearly two years and 
so, you know, we’ve had two three Service Managers that I can think of and our 
team’s had – one, two, three, four, five – five managers [In 2 years]” [Area B, Social 
Worker M]. 
 
It would be very hard for a governance network to be able to adjust a policy in light of 
feedback, if the information is not reaching relevant parties for them to then provide 
feedback. Front-line practitioners working with child neglect on a daily basis have a 
wealth of experience and insight to offer in the policy making process. Communication 
is key to adjusting services in the face of policy feedback and changing conditions, 
therefore, it is crucial to ensure that guidance is reaching such people and that policy 
making is as much bottom-up as it is top-down.  
 
5.6.2 Information dissemination 
As well as exploring communication in order to assess how well the governance 
network provides flexible adjustment of policy and services in light of feedback, it is 
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important also to examine information dissemination methods, and whether or not 
these change in light of conditions and preferences.   
 
In phases one and two, when asked about receiving guidance about Government 
priorities, one participant laughed “ooh, we’re bombarded with them, usually in the form 
of instructions from the DfE” [Area A, ADCS]. She went further to note that government 
generally “does it in terms of putting forward guidance” and also noted “there are 
conferences and things like that but they’re not particularly well sponsored or set up”. 
Another participant noted “regional briefings” [Area B, ADCS] run by the DfE, and 
another said “invitations to conferences” [Area A, LSCB member, Children’s Social Care] 
which then have to be funded, and had in any case become less frequent.   
 
During the first two phases of the fieldwork, participants also cited networks such as 
‘Research in Practice’ or NHS England as key sources of information on child neglect. 
Other responses from Board representatives included scanning websites, invitations to 
participate in policy consultations, DfE, NSPCC or other mailshots (for example, 
CASPAR) and similar newsletters, the Board manager and internal safeguarding 
meetings. Very few mentioned Government research publications as a source of 
learning about child neglect guidance. Only one participant from Children’s Social Care 
made an unprompted reference to the recent research publications on child neglect 
(Davies and Ward, 2012) that the Government had published in light of the fact neglect 
and emotional neglect are the single biggest categories for children being placed on a 
Child Protection Plan (CPP).  
 
When asked about the Davies and Ward (2012) research overview of Government-
funded safeguarding initiative much of which covered neglect as a policy driver for child 
neglect, this was much less well known although many felt that actually they should 
have been made aware of it because it sounded useful. There is a connection between 
the receptivity of senior managers to research and the likelihood of research knowledge 
being put into practice by their organisation (Chagnon et al., 2010). However, my 
findings do not indicate a similar pattern. Figure xv (page 90) shows that LSCB 
representatives from Children’s Social Care placed research second, and ADCS placed in 
Page 115 of 168 
 
third. Yet, front-line practitioners seem to be unaware of guidance coming from key 
research.  
 
As one might expect guidance to be filtered down to front-line and operational practice, 
the fact that many strategic level people had not heard of the government’s research 
initiative, it is perhaps unsurprising that operational and front-line staff were not 
familiar with it. When asked about messages from research, one replied “I don’t think we 
get much from that, no” [Area A, non-LSCB Designated Safeguarding Lead, Health]. 
 
None of the front-line practitioners in Area A had heard of the government’s research 
initiative which culminated in the report by Davies and Ward (2012). In Area B, the 
picture was fairly similar. Two non-LSCB Designated Safeguarding Leads from Health, 
and Education were unaware of Davies and Ward’s report.  Despite not having heard of 
the government’s research initiative many front-line practitioners stated that they had 
to use research in reports such as case files, assessments and court reports, and made 
use of Research in Practice resources.  
 
Building on from these findings, I made enquiries to the DfE regarding the 
dissemination of the Davies and Ward report. A respondent from the DfE noted that: 
“The Safeguarding Children research initiative was an important element in the 
government response to the Laming inquiry following the death of Victoria 
Climbié”. (Miller, 2017) 
 
In response then to enquiring about how such an “important element” of the 
government’s response to improve the protection of children in England was 
disseminated, it was stated that: 
“As is standard practice for all DfE commissioned research, the report was 
published on the department’s website.  Safeguarding is a multi-disciplinary area of 
practice with multiple audiences and a number of targeted summaries were 
produced (for health professionals, professionals in Children’s Social Care and 
Adult Services professional working with parents).” (Miller, 2017)  
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Furthermore:  
“The findings were distilled to meet the needs of those professionals in order that 
they could use the research findings to shape their day-to-day work. These 
summaries were also published on the department’s website.” (Miller, 2017) 
 
The purpose of this overview was to summarise the 15 studies and make it clear how 
strategic and operational managers and policy makers can apply the findings on child 
neglect (and other forms of abuse) to shape the safeguarding practice within their 
service provision. This clearly is not being done if operational and strategic managers 
have either not heard of it or are vague as to whether or not they have heard of it and 
cannot remember what the main messages were. The communication method from the 
DfE of simply publishing it “on the department’s website”, along with summaries for 
professional groups, is not an effective method of dissemination. Poor communication 
and poor electronic communication are the primary reason that front-line practice may 
not deliver as anticipated (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004).  
 
As policy is continually and rapidly changing, there is a question as to whether or not 
practitioners are able to keep up to date with the policy guidance. The majority of 
participants said that they kept up to date, but never in the working day, it was always 
something that needed to be done out of normal office hours. Sometimes this was to do 
with simply not having enough time at work, but some also felt they could concentrate 
more at home. This research evidence was echoed across each of the participating 
sectors.  
 
As indicated above, for many LSCB representatives, safeguarding children is only one 
part of their job and keeping up to date with the large number of documents around 
safeguarding generally – in addition to the rest of their responsibilities – was difficult. 
“I know safeguarding is hugely important but when you consider that’s a tiny 
amount of the day job, there’s too much to actually find out what you need to know 
and find out what you need to do about it” [Area B, LSCB member, Education].” 
 
“the only problem is we are GPs, and there’s so many things we need updating on, 
you would end up never going to work if you went to everything” [Area A, non-
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Board, Designated Safeguarding Lead, Health] 
 
In short, Government-funded research did not seem to be first and foremost in minds as 
a resource. Furthermore, given the lack of awareness around the major safeguarding 
research initiative funded by Government and intended to be a factor in shaping 
practice, it is fair to say that their dissemination methods need considerable 
development. Uploading summaries to a website which were intended to “shape their 
day-to-day work” (Miller, 2017) is clearly not effective and is not having much effect on 
shaping practice if practitioners are not aware of it.  
 
5.6.3 EC 5 summary 
From these findings, I would infer that the governance network does not provide a 
flexible adjustment of policy solutions and services in the face of any feedback or in light 
of changing conditions and preferences. In short, the communication from government 
was poor and this was a trend that trickled through the knowledge transfer process, 
with information seemingly being disjointed at every phase. Education perceived 
communication routes to be satisfactory, but Health and Children’s Social Care 
suggesting that communication generally was not done well. This in turn means that the 
bottom up process, and getting views heard on policies and guidance was fairly non-
existent. Furthermore, persistent and prolonged organisational restructure was deemed 
to be a major factor in terms of lack of communication and not seeking front-line 
practitioner views. 
 
Equally changing conditions and preferences in terms of giving such feedback or 
learning about new guidance was not considered. Electronic forms of communication 
were not well received with many participants – particularly front-line participants - 
preferring face to face forms of communication.  
 
In short, these findings demonstrate a lack of confidence in current policy dissemination 
and communication processes. Part of the problem comes back to the fact that the LSCB 
does not have a policy dissemination strategy or any kind of mechanism for both 
ensuring the guidance is communicated and that it is read, interpreted and 
implemented appropriately. 
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5.7 EC 6: Create favourable conditions for future cooperation through cognitive, 
strategic, and institutional learning that construct common frameworks, spur 
development interdependency, and build mutual trust.  
The theme that emerged from the research findings was the notion of trust as a 
favourable condition for future cooperation. 
 
5.7.1 Trust  
Firstly, there is an element of trust in terms of filtering guidance through to front-line 
practitioners. The LSCB is reliant on its members to take the guidance back to their 
organisations and cascade them through their network or email trees. This is not 
monitored or followed up in any way by the Chair or Board manager. There is a strong 
element of trust that this will be done. In terms of ensuring that the members could be 
relied on to do this, one Independent Chair identified that it was about ensuring that 
you “get the right people on the Board” [Area B, Independent Chair] in the first place, and 
that those people were aware of and fully understood what they were signing up to.   
 
Secondly trust was also touched upon in the notion of conflict management under the 
first criteria. Such challenge and scrutiny can further foster the element of trust 
between the network actors. Governance networks which can foster an atmosphere of 
positive conflict, in terms of open debate and discussion, will build a trusting 
environment in which actors feel safe and valued enough to openly air their views, 
concerns and ideas about wicked issues (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Klijn and 
Edelenbos, 2007). Trust within governance networks is the notion of working together 
perceiving that the other network actors will respect the views of each other (even in 
disagreement), will refrain from opportunistic behaviour and will carry out their 
responsibilities as a member of the network as required. Trust within the network takes 
time to develop but will also begin to break down when one of the network actors fails 
to meet the unwritten rules of trust within the network (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). 
 
It might be concluded that trust exists within the strategic level of the governance 
network – the LSCB. As noted in Chapter 1, joined-up working in the field of child 
protection as a long history, starting with the development of the ARC in 1975, 
becoming the ACPCs, under the Children Act 1989 and subsequently the LSCBs under 
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the Children Act 2004. Some of the organisations represented within such multi-agency 
arrangements, have had a long trajectory in developing trust among the partner 
organisations. Outside of this strategic level arrangement, however, exploring the 
findings from this study, it might be concluded that the notion of trust seems to have 
waned in a bottom up direction; between the front-line practice level and the strategic 
level LSCB, and then between the strategic level (the LSCB) and the government. Trust, 
however, can be broken when partners do not deliver as promised or do not 
communicate effectively. Such incidences of poor delivery or lack of communication – 
whether deliberate or not – reduces the level of trust (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004; 
France et al., 2010) professionals have with the communicating body. This ultimately 
results in the governance network actors having a sense of mistrust of central 
government departments or strategic level bodies, and lack of confidence in their 
leadership. One participant described government actions as “rhetoric” [Area B, LSCB 
member, Health], whilst another expressed it as “very worn words” [Area A, non-Board, 
Designated Safeguarding Lead, Children’s Social Care”. Another referring to government 
policies said “forgive me for being somewhat sceptical” [Area A, LSCB member, 
Education]. Such expressions highlight a lack of, or waning, trust in central bodies.   
 
This might be explained by drawing on the poor communication practices highlighted 
under criterion five, and the lack of a policy dissemination strategy from government to 
the LSCB, and equally from the LSCB to operational and frontline practices. 
Furthermore, if network actors are not consulted about policy development, they may 
feel that policy is simply being done to them, which makes them mistrustful of the 
bodies implementing the policy.  
 
5.7.2 EC 6 summary 
This last criterion was almost a secondary theme underlining some of the other core 
themes that emerged from the data. That said trust is an important issue to understand 
in the context of governance networks, but also in understanding effectiveness of 
communication through the LSCB in relation to child neglect guidance. 
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5.8 SUMMARY 
In terms of child neglect, participants in both areas perceived that child neglect was not 
on the government agenda at the moment. Instead it had been superseded by other 
national priorities such as CSE. This was felt to be to the detriment of local needs and 
local policy. That said, the study raised awareness of how variously influenced 
participants in phases one and two were by external factors driving local policy. Such 
differences in policy drivers lead to multiple perspectives needing to be balanced by the 
Independent Chair.  
 
The shift to Independent Chair had refocused and rebalanced the Board from being less 
local authority led. I found, however, that the participating Chairs seemed to view their 
levels of impartiality quite differently with the chair in Area A keeping an arm’s length 
from the business of the Board, and the chair in Area B working in much closer 
allegiance with partners on the Board.  
 
Government is viewed as being the metagovernor and very much controlling the local 
agenda. Such control-led to monitoring of policy implementation practice which met 
with varied views. Education participants placed more value on Ofsted procedures than 
participants from Health and Children’s Social Care.  
 
In terms of knowledge transfer, it was deemed that the LSCB was not effective as a 
mechanism for transferring information beyond the Board, and certainly not to front-
line practitioners. Participants within Education believed that they received enough 
information to help them do their job, but those from Health and Children’s Social Care 
were more disparaging about the lack of information being disseminated (or not). In 
part, some of the difficulties in knowledge transfer were attributed to long periods of 
organisational restructuring (taking years in the case of Area B). The LSCBs in neither 
area had a dissemination strategy. There was also a heavy reliance on electronic 
distribution of messages and a loss of face to face communication, and this was not met 
favourably with front-line practitioners.  
 
This can all be summed up by looking at the dissemination of the selected national and 
local policies. I think it is fair to say that the Government’s Safeguarding Children 
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initiative (Davies and Ward, 2012) has not been effectively disseminated. Only one 
participant made an unprompted reference to the research, no one else had heard of it. 
In Area A, the Threshold Services document had a problematic implementation as was 
acknowledged by the research participants in phase two. In turn this was then not 
acknowledged in phases three or four, so it is questionable as to whether or not this 
policy document had reached its intended audience. I could argue that Area B has fared 
better in terms of its policy dissemination. Being a clinically-led guidance document, it 
would not necessarily be surprising that those in Education and Children’s Social Care 
had not heard of it.  
  
The discussion chapter discusses these findings in relation to the four research 
questions which have guided this study, in order to give a more conclusive response to 
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Chapter Six: Discussion.  
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
This study was guided by four research questions: 
1. How does the Government interact with LSCBs to disseminate and drive forward 
its child protection guidance?  
2. How does the LSCB identify or learn about the child protection (neglect) guidance 
from Government? 
3. How does the LSCB, communicate child protection (neglect) guidance to 
operational teams within statutory service?  
4. When developing local child neglect policy, what factors help or hinder policy 
implementation from LSCB strategic level to operational practice?   
This chapter revisits these questions, drawing out new findings from the study, 
contributing to the social work literature on child neglect and LSCBs.  
 
6.1 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS: DISCUSSION  
1. How does the Government interact with LSCBs to disseminate and drive 
forward its child protection guidance?  
As discussed in Chapter 2, France et al. (2010) explored communication at Board level 
to examine whether communication within LSCBs was better than the former Area 
Child Protection Committees (ACPCs). This study goes further, making an original 
contribution in examining communication from the Government to the LSCB and 
beyond, throughout the wider governance network. In answer to this first question, the 
findings suggest that the government retains ultimate control and influence over the 
LSCB and the media is a key driver of policy.  
 
- Interacting with LSCBs: The government as metagovernor  
I found that, as metagovernor and systems’ architect, the government still holds the 
power, despite decentralisation, and controls the agenda of the LSCBs and those 
organisations working under its jurisdiction to prevent child neglect. My findings 
suggest that contrary to Torfing et al.’s first effectivity criterion, participants did not feel 
that LSCB or government produced clear and well-informed understanding of neglect or 
the opportunities to address it, despite the existence of policy guidance. Considering 
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how the two participating LSCBs interpret and decide on which guidance to take 
forward, one participant noted finding and acting on “stuff that’s going to come back and 
bite the Board, if we don’t do it” [Area A, Independent Chair]. Another referred to Ofsted 
“catching you for not doing it” [Area A, Assistant Director] if certain measures were not 
put in place.   
 
Torfing and Sørensen (2014) argue that, as metagovernor of the governance network, 
government’s power and authority has shifted, rather than diminished. The government 
becomes the inspector rather than the deliverer of services (Rhodes, 1994; Bell and 
Hindmoor, 2009). Through being the inspector, it essentially remains as the director 
too, because it exerts power over the network by controlling the agenda, which LSCBs 
have to follow (Torfing et al., 2012; Rhodes, 2017).  This however has negative 
connotations. Such controlling mechanisms prevent LSCBs from responding in 
innovative and creative ways which reduces its power to ascertain its own agenda. This 
was further driven by such mechanisms as Ofsted inspections, whereby LSCBs were 
evaluated as failing if not implementing the government agenda, rather than failing to 
fulfil local requirements.  
 
Furthermore, LSCBs were charged with steering child neglect policy, but without the 
‘teeth’ (Horwath, 2010) to significantly impact on practice. Sørensen and Torfing 
(2007b, p96) note that it is not difficult to find examples of governance networks which 
are, established by politicians, directed by public administrators, and which have not 
facilitated public governance. Similarly, Flinders (2005, p86) questioned how a 
government could be committed to devolving power yet still have ‘a strong centralising 
and controlling approach to governing’.  
 
This helps to identify and understand the limitations in place when LSCBs try to 
respond to wicked issues and, specifically, to implement the innovative and proactive 
local child neglect policies that Torfing et al. argue are one of the criteria of effective 
governance networks (see EC2).  It helps to understand what the LSCBs have to balance 
in terms of their own professional judgements, in line with the limitations to the 
autonomy given to the governance network.  
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- Driving forward the government’s child neglect agenda through fuzzy 
governance and the media 
Fuzzy governance (Bache et al., 2015) is the idea that government might favour complex 
governance structures with multiple organisations because the government can push 
down accountability and blame someone else for unpopular actions or decisions.  
Within such complex governance architecture lines of accountability might become lost 
or blurred because of the lack of clarity in leadership and ‘fuzzy accountability’ in 
central government. This has created a system that is rife with blame games and blame 
avoidance. Esmark (2007) suggested that there is a close alignment between 
accountability and being scapegoated when something goes wrong. In my opinion, 
nowhere is this more evident than in a high-profile child death when practitioners 
suddenly find themselves subject to scrutiny by the government and the media (for 
example, the public sacking of Sharon Shoesmith, Head of Haringey Children’s Services, 
in 2008 by the Secretary of State, following the death of Peter Connolly in 2007) (Jacobs 
and Schillemans, 2016).  
 
Therefore the existence of fuzzy governance is evidenced by participants’ views on 
whether child neglect was on the government’s current agenda. Fuzzy governance can 
explain such confusion and lack of clarity on the part of participants because they were 
uncertain which department should be leading on the child neglect agenda. Therefore, 
the responsibility and accountability for a particular problem might be spread across 
the complex structures of governance.  
 
This might be strengthened by a further argument that the media now also promotes its 
own agenda by framing issues in such a way to sell newspapers, and drive a political 
agenda (Jacobs and Schillemans, 2016). Whilst, therefore, the evidence from this study 
suggests that the LSCB does not want to be guided by the media, and it places less 
importance on this in comparison with other factors (such as SCRs, and research), the 
media can control the agenda and will be quick to put the abuse and neglect of children 
under the public microscope (Schillemans and Pierre, 2016). Fuzzy governance 
therefore is a useful notion for trying to understand and explain the government’s 
incomprehensible structure or architecture in terms of leadership and strategy in 
relation to wicked issues such as, child neglect policy. 
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Drawing together the discussion, the evidence from my two cases studies suggest that 
the government may not interact positively with LSCBs. It has created a knowledge 
transfer and policy making mechanism, but it has not given it sufficient authority to 
make anything happen. Instead it has devolved the workload but not the power. 
Furthermore, the LSCBs also seem to find themselves unwittingly accountable to the 
media as well as Ofsted (which will be discussed further under question four) which 
further exacerbates the negative working relationship between the government and 
LSCB. This is useful for LSCBS to understand because it gives a clearer idea of the 
tensions between the LSCB and the government. 
 
2. How does the LSCB identify or learn about child protection (neglect) guidance 
from Government? 
Whilst previous research has explored the role of the LSCB, and the effects of child 
neglect (see Chapter 2), this study is the first to examine this issue in particular 
guidance on child neglect.  The findings point to: the lack of a clear child neglect agenda, 
and the disjointed and voluminous information from government.  
 
- Communication from Government to LSCB 
From the findings it is clear that top-down communication from Government to both 
participating LSCBs is disjointed, inconsistent and unclear. It is also voluminous and 
difficult for many child neglect practitioners to keep up with. This runs counter to 
Torfing et al.’s effectivity criteria that effective governance networks provide a flexible 
adjustment of policy solutions and public services (see EC5).  Guidance from central 
government to LSCBs has reduced with decentralisation, but power and authority are 
asymmetrical because the power rolled out to the LSCBs is limited by managerialism 
and bureaucracy, with government retaining ultimate power and authority over child 
protective services (Newman, 2005; Torfing et al., 2012; Torfing and Sørensen, 2014), 
as per EC 2.   
 
- Learning about  child neglect guidance 
The findings from this study suggest that contrary to Torfing et al.’s first effectivity 
criterion, the government’s agenda on tackling child neglect is not reaching relevant 
network actors and practitioners. Participants in this research felt that the 
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government’s agenda on tackling child neglect was not clear. They said that it was more 
often than not tied up as a secondary issue when dealing with issues such as child 
poverty or Early Help (see Burgess et al., 2013). Therefore the government is failing to 
ensure that its safeguarding research initiative (Davies and Ward, 2012) was 
disseminated and transferred appropriately. In addition, it was felt that government 
policy was currently focused on child sexual exploitation, to the detriment of other core 
safeguarding guidance because “the squeaking wheel always gets the grease” [Area B, 
Independent Chair]. 
 
Participants cited a variety of sources of information, but few acknowledged, 
unprompted, the use of government funded research (for example, Davies and Ward, 
2012) as a source. This links to the issue of poor communication and disjointed 
guidance from government on key guidance on child neglect (see Chapter 2). Disparities 
in dissemination practice by government were also raised, with participants stating that 
there were “fanfares” for some guidance, yet others (just as important in their view) just 
seemed to creep out with little or no notification. Furthermore, all participants said they 
were unable to keep up to date with policy guidance during the working day, it was, 
instead, “always a take-home-bedtime-read, always” [Area A, LSCB member, Health] 
because there was too much disjointed guidance which was too voluminous to wade 
through. Rather, therefore, than research enhancing learning and shared knowledge in 
such instances, it simply leads to ‘information overload’ (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016, 
p247). This does not resolve the wicked issue, and just adds to complexity and 
‘superfluous knowledge’ (ibid) in which new or further knowledge does not help the 
LSCB to resolve the issue. The solution to issues of complexity, therefore, is not more 
information which simply increases ambiguity. What is required instead is strategic 
problem solving informed by the right information at the right time.   
 
What is seemingly missing here too is any link to or use of Dissemination and 
Implementation (D.I) science and theory, both at a government level, and at the LSCB 
level. In the Health sector, there has been a realisation that Health professionals were 
not necessarily always using the most up to date research to inform their treatment of 
patients (Chagnon et al., 2010), because they were unaware of it, or unable to access it. 
In addition within Health, it takes 17 years for 14% of research to make its way into 
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practice (Estabrooks et al., 2018). Therefore, within Health, D.I science examines the 
processes through which Health professionals are made aware of new scientific 
evidence within their field and how they adopt and implement the findings for the 
benefit of their patients.  In Chapter 3, I stated that I discounted D.I theory because for 
me, in this study, before devising an implementation strategy, it was important to 
understand the governance structures through which the strategy will be adopted 
(Powell et al., 2013). I have now completed this so DI science and theory could now be a 
useful next step to examine more closely the impact of the evidence into practice gap. 
This, further, connects back to the argument raised by France et al., 2010, that LSCBs do 
not know how, or even if, their policies are changing practice.   
 
In short, therefore, drawing together the discussion from question two, I deduce from 
my findings that the government needs a streamlined dissemination strategy which can 
communicate synthesised, consistent and accessible guidance to LSCBs in order to 
enhance the cognitive learning of the LSCB, rather than throwing further information 
into the domain in an ad hoc fashion. D.I science might be a useful next step to examine 
how this might be established in a multi-disciplinary environment. 
 
3. How does the LSCB, communicate  child protection (neglect) guidance to 
operational teams within statutory services?  
Prior to this study, research had been undertaken on managerialist systems within 
children’s services and the effects of these on practitioners (White et al., 2009; Munro, 
2010; Preston-Shoot, 2012). As indicated above, France et al. (2010) examined 
communication within the LSCB but I explored how the LSCB decides what to take 
forward as a priority, how this is communicated to operational teams, and then how (or 
if) that is monitored in any way, and with what outcome.  This both sheds light on the 
reach of the LSCB beyond its board members, and on how operational teams view the 
board. The key findings in relation to this question are: the importance of independence 
for the Independent Chair; the variances in views by sector of LSCB communication; the 
lack of policy monitoring to ensure information is reaching relevant parties; and the 
preference of face-to-face communication methods. 
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- Interpreting the guidance, managing conflict in decision-making and the role of 
the Independent Chair 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are many members on any LSCB, each with variable 
professional backgrounds. Therefore, each has varying perspectives on a particular 
complex issue, such as child neglect, and how the LSCB should respond. I drew on an 
example that arose in Area A in which participants acknowledged disagreement and 
implementation difficulties in relation to agreeing, writing and disseminating its 
Thresholds for Services guidance (see EC 1).  This, however, should not be viewed 
negatively. Koppenjan (2007) argued that a lack of consensus may mean that issues are 
looked at from more angles, that is to say, an opportunity for debate, disagreement and 
dialogue is a good thing. Similarly, consensus can be viewed as apathy towards a topic. If 
network actors are dissenting, then it might emphasise a strong position on an issue or 
being particularly passionate about an issue and refusing to be simply compliant. Once 
the dissenters stop, it might be time to refresh or renew the actors. On this basis 
therefore, whilst the development of the Threshold for Services document caused some 
difficulties for Area A, I think that this should be viewed positively, and front-line 
practitioners could take this to mean that the policy was developed with a no-stone-left-
unturned approach, therefore preventing opportunistic behaviour of individuals and 
domination of the process by a single agency. But whilst conflict is not necessarily a bad 
thing it can be resource intensive and lead to implementation problems and delays – 
striking the right balance is critical.  
 
In previous studies (Laming, 2009; France et al., 2010; HM Government, 2015) the role 
of the Independent Chair has been viewed from the notion of needing to be independent 
from the Local Authority. Using governance network theory, the evidence in this study 
suggests that the role of the Independent Chair was crucial in the policy 
communication/implementation chain.  The Chair - and more importantly – an 
Independent Chair is central to: 
- maintaining a horizontal, joined up approach to implementing child neglect 
policy 
- Enabling the network actors to reach joint policy decisions.  
- Enabling the government to pass along its child neglect guidance via the AILC, 
into the network.  
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- Assisting, or facilitating, the Board in interpreting that guidance for 
translation into local policy.  
 
Of course, as the findings highlight, the role of the Independent Chair within the LSCB is 
crucial in terms of interpreting guidance and managing conflict that may arise when the 
Board is making local policy.  Koppenjan and Klijn (2004, p11) describe the Chair of 
such networks as being a ‘mediator and stimulator of interaction and not one of central 
director’, someone who is not drawn into the conflicts between the network actors and 
remains impartial. The Independent Chairs participating in this study clearly saw their 
role as being in post to “scrutinise” and “challenge” [Area A, Independent Chair] and 
“holding to account” [Area B, Independent Chair], in an unbiased and impartial manner. 
 
All things considered, the role of the Independent Chair within the LSCB is to maintain a 
horizontal balance in the joined-up approach to addressing wicked issues and to reduce 
power games and hierarchies within the governance network. Laming (2009) found 
that the Chairs were still closely linked to the Local Authority and therefore the Local 
Authority dominated the LSCB. He recommended that Chairs should be independent of 
any organisation represented on the Board. When first implementing the Independent 
Chairs’ role however, they found themselves still being linked to the local authority. This 
had been the view of the Independent Chair in Area A, too.  In 2012 the Association of 
Independent LSCB Chairs (AILC) was established to further separate the Independent 
Chair from being viewed as connected to the local authority – or any other agency 
represented at the Board in anyway. It increased the independence of the Chair from 
the local authority. The chair in Area A was also of this opinion. That said, however, I 
think that the balance between the government as metagovernor and the AILC / 
Independent Chair is a difficult one to ascertain within this particular governance 
network structure. Rather than the Chair being viewed as connected to the Board in a 
dichotomy (of Government and LSCB/Independent Chair), the power balance should be 
viewed as a trichotomy (see Figure xvi), in order to view the Independent Chair as 
unconnected to either party, and truly independent. I thought that the two Chairs within 
my study were at odds in relation to this. The Chair in Area A clearly saw his role as 
being independent from any agency connected to the Board and from Government. The 
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Chair in Area B, however, seemed to closely align himself within, and a part of, the 
Board, more so than being independent from it.  
 
Figure xvi: The trichotomy: the government, the Independent Chair, and the LSCB 
 
 
It is fair to say that both Independent Chairs were held in regard and trust by Board 
members, when it came to interpreting information. Klijn and Koppenjan (2016) liken 
this role of mediator, or in the case of LSCBs, Independent Chair to that of a contractor, 
jointly commissioned by the network actors, which then forces them ‘to interact and 
coordinate their demands’ (ibid, p141). Koppenjan and Klijn (2016) highlight that the 
role of ‘process manager’ (ibid, p173) or Chairperson, is mostly that of being a 
facilitator, but who is authoritative and trusted by the network actors. They may have 
‘hidden power’ (ibid) in terms of their influence, the direction in which they take a 
discussion, or in including certain network actor’s voices but excluding others. But such 
actions would draw into question their independence and ‘impartiality’ (ibid). 
Therefore, I think that Klijn and Koppenjan’s (2016) views of the chairperson in 
governance networks helps to explain the difficult situation that LSCB Independent 
Chairs can find themselves in, and the balancing act they may find themselves in 
between the government and the LSCB. In my opinion, the role might almost be viewed 
as that of referee or umpire in a sports match, in which they should not favour one 
player over the other. That said, however, this would assume that the Independent 
Chairs, whilst being independent from government or any agency on the LSCB, are also 
apolitical in order to be completely impartial in facilitating a discussion. Both 
Government 
Independent 
Chair / AILC 
LSCB 
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Independent Chairs were clearly not apolitical, and one described himself as being 
“sceptical” of government [Area A, Independent Chair]. Given their background in public 
sector work it is difficult to see how they could be completely apolitical and hold 
unbiased views when interpreting information from government, particularly in 
relation to something as highly emotive as safeguarding children.  
 
- Communicating strategy from LSCB to operational teams within statutory 
services 
As France et al. (2010) found, the working relationship between LSCB members was 
deemed (by the members) to be positive. My participants said the same, but I also 
found, however, that they did not consider that the LSCB communicated effectively to 
statutory services, although this varied by sector (see EC 5). Participants from Health 
and Children’s Social Care were quite disparaging about communication, but 
participants within Education were satisfied with the information that they received. 
Insofar as there was no mechanism for communicating any policy or strategy, the 
conditions were not favourable to cooperation or institutional learning (see EC 6).  
 
The research evidence indicates that preferences of knowledge transfer methods had 
not been considered. With the growth of electronic medium (for example, email, 
internets and intranets), it seemed to be assumed that this was the preferential method 
of communication. In actual fact, whilst this might be the cheapest, quickest and easiest, 
it was not necessarily the most effective. The data identifies that a face-to-face approach 
for knowledge transfer was the preferred form of communication, yet this was being 
replaced with online forums which were deemed to be a chore (see EC 5).  Klijn and 
Koppenjan (2016) provide a useful analysis in relation to email and information 
overload in front-line practice which can be applied here. They argue that parties within 
the governance network often use research and its findings as they vie for power. Those 
disseminating information may cherry pick which information to send or send all of it. 
But on the front-line sometimes conflicting arguments, or lack of a synthesised 
argument, causes confusion and leads to apathy towards policy guidance. Practitioners 
simply keep on doing something the way they have always done, with little regard for 
the policy guidance, because they have become inundated with (sometimes conflicting) 
guidance (Crozier, 2008; Morrison, 2010). Whilst face to face knowledge transfer may 
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be costly and time consuming, actually it might be more worthwhile and beneficial for 
ensuring that the more important or crucial messages are reaching the relevant 
practitioners, and this is being understood and taken on board. Equally there may also 
be more buy-in to a policy if those practitioners are then able to ask questions about it 
in an open forum.       
 
- Monitoring child neglect strategy to operational teams within statutory 
service?  
What also needs to be considered here is policy resistance. The analysis thus far has 
been based on an understanding of compliance (that is to say, that guidance is received 
and passed on), but guidance can equally be ignored in an act of resistance; of not 
wanting to comply, resistance because of information overload, or resistance simply 
because email is not a personal or effective means of communication. This is important 
for LSCBs to understand in order to examine their own communication practices. It 
needs to be understood that in terms of methods of communication, a one-size-fits-all 
approach may not be appropriate, and perhaps indicates the need for a different 
dissemination strategy for the different sectors represented within it.  
 
Examining accountability in the policy implementation process (see EC 4), certain 
Board members said that they were not particularly confident that such guidance was 
always being passed on. It was evident that there was a strong element of trust placed in 
LSCB representatives to take back guidance from the Board and filter them through 
their organisations, and this was not monitored in any way. This can equally explain the 
idea of passing on guidance and once the “send” button is pressed, all responsibility of 
the sender is seemingly transmitted to the recipient, with no follow up of what the 
recipient does with that information. Drawing on Esmark’s (2007) and Klijn and 
Koppenjan’s (2016) idea of people being accountable for their actions, it poses the 
question of what is the responsibility and accountability of the sender of the information 
in terms of following up what happens to the information that they have disseminated 
(that is to say, has it been read? Understood? Digested? Implemented into practice?). 
Williams (2012, p39) has argued those who, like LSCB representatives, operate across 
organisational boundaries, have ‘very powerful and often discretionary roles in 
circulating information’. They can decide what information is disseminated, to whom 
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and when.  Of course, the disadvantage to this is that there is no mechanism for 
checking how the policy or guidance is affecting practice (if at all).   
 
Whilst it seems that LSCBs are cognisant of this, they need a more robust system 
through which to monitor the dissemination of child neglect guidance to ensure that it is 
reaching all relevant parties. The difficulty is that for some Board members, 
safeguarding and child neglect is not the sole element to their job, and they may be 
balancing (and being held accountable for) several other, equally important, matters. It 
was noted that Area B had a policy lead, whilst Area A did not. Perhaps there is an 
argument for mandating a policy lead within safeguarding arrangements, whose 
responsibility it would be to disseminate the policy, and establish a feedback loop to 
ensure that child neglect (or other) policy guidance is being disseminated and 
implemented. In line with proposals suggested here for guidance from government to 
be streamlined this would further streamline the policy dissemination process between 
strategic and operational levels.  
 
Drawing together the discussion from question three multiple perspectives on child 
neglect lead to discussion on guidance and conflicting ideas on how to take this forward. 
The role of the Independent Chair is important in balancing out the varying professional 
views and driving forward the local guidance. However, problems seem to arise when it 
comes to transferring that guidance beyond the LSCB members. There is no 
dissemination strategy for filtering the guidance through various networks and the onus 
is simply placed on members to do it. Equally, there is no feedback loop in terms of 
being able to find out to where the guidance has transcended and whether or not it is 
being implemented. The research evidence indicates that there is a question over 
whether the reversion from face to face to email transfer processes is effective (whilst 
being more cost and time effective). There is also a question over the role of the policy 
lead on LSCBs and whether or not this role could be strengthened in terms of enabling 
and monitoring policy and knowledge transfer. 
 
4.  When developing local child neglect policy, what factors help or hinder policy 
implementation from LSCB strategic level to operational practice?   
Page 134 of 168 
 
Research has previously identified some resource hindrances to policy implementation 
in children’s protective services for example bureaucracy, duplicate roles, expensive 
staff, and finances (see, for example, Preston-Shoot, 2012), and financial barriers 
(Green, 2012). This study though offers an in-depth analysis of the tacit hindrances such 
as power games, and accountability. The research evidence in relation to this question 
identifies that board members have to juggle several roles; there may be a potential for 
regional rather than local policy-making among the LSCBs; organisational restructuring 
impacts on LSCBs, and there are varied responses to Ofsted.  
 
- Multiple layers in the communication process. 
The views of participants were that government guidance and research on child neglect 
is viewed as a hindrance because it is lengthy and emerges through an uncoordinated 
dissemination approach. The LCSB was therefore not in a position to ‘produce a clear 
and well-informed understanding’ of what it expected of agencies’ (EC1). 
 
Furthermore, hindrances to the policy implementation process between the LSCB and 
operational practice can be driven by a fragmentation of service delivery in local areas, 
which leads to unclear lines of accountability, meaning that LCSBs also fell short of EC3, 
reaching joint policy decisions. Whilst members of the LSCB are committed to joined-up 
working and multi-agency solutions to complex problems, it is ultimately ineffective in 
communicating its intentions to operational practice which therefore hinders policy 
implementation. Evidence indicates that this creates despondency towards its efforts 
from operational and front-line practitioners.  Wood raised a similar point in his report 
(Wood, 2016) highlighting that lack of joined up working between national Government 
departments, did not model effective partnership working and created a lack of 
commitment to multi-agency working at local level.   
 
In my opinion, consideration needs also to be given to the dual role of LSCB members, 
juggling Board membership (in some cases, more than one multi-agency network) with 
their home organisation.  This connects to Sørenson and Torfing’s (2007a) argument 
that the ideals of the network often do not sit neatly with those of the ‘home’ 
organisation. This suggests that those involved on the LSCB have an equal knowledge or 
weighting given to the collaborative task (in this case child neglect). But this is not the 
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case, and this affects levels of responsibility and accountability when dealing with a 
particular complex issue, as some less knowledgeable members might pass the buck in 
terms of taking on joint responsibility for a problem. But equally it can explain the 
blurred lines between LSCB members wearing more than one hat (several in some 
cases), and the magnitude not only of the accountability and responsibility but of 
balancing the accountability and responsibility among more than one agency.  
 
All that said, the idea of regional policy making in relation to child neglect was 
purported to potentially be a positive policy development. In the face of austerity 
measures facing many public services (for example, Local Authority, schools, Health and 
so on.) more than one LSCB (indeed all those in one region) could develop a single, up-
to-date child neglect policy affecting thousands of neglected children regionally. This 
would involve joined up working across the governance networks (the LSCBs), thereby 
improving their performance against EC3. That is to say that, in the current economic 
climate, there could be scope for a network of LSCBs tasked with knowledge transfer 
and policy communication across the wider piece (for example, regionally) which does 
not currently happen. In light of other findings from this study, however, it would be 
advisable for LSCBs to carefully consider both how they communicate that policy to 
operational teams, and how they gain the views of experienced front-line practitioners 
within such a large-scale policy development on child neglect.  
 
- Organisational restructuring and power 
The empirical data indicated that participants attributed the lack of information sharing 
and policy dissemination to the organisational restructuring that both local authorities 
in Areas A and B had been through in recent times. Lupton et al. (2001) argued that 
communication and information sharing is often not done well when organisations are 
going through periods of restructuring or turmoil. Understanding the consequences of 
restructuring on an organisation is nothing new, but having a grasp of the implications 
on a governance network of which the organisation is part of has not previously been 
explored in relation to LSCBs. Organisational restructuring causes several problems for 
governance networks in disseminating policy guidance. Restructuring can cause job 
insecurities, which can lead to power games (Lupton et al., 2001). This can also lead to 
changes in the person representing the organisation at the strategic level, as job roles 
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are restructured. This causes uncertainty for the governance network, and may lead to a 
lack of accountability, responsibility and continuity in representation (Goldsmith and 
Eggers, 2004; France et al., 2010). I found that such issues were prevalent in the two 
participating local authorities, with concerns raised by participants in research phases 
three (non-LSCB Designated Safeguarding Leads) and four (front-line practitioners). In 
these cases, the members of management hold the power by virtue of the fact that they 
are in receipt of knowledge (policy guidance) which others (operational and front-line 
teams) do not yet have.  They then have the power to decide whether or not, and when, 
to disclose that knowledge (Peters, 2013; Martin and Guarneros-Meza, 2013). Until the 
knowledge holder decides to impart that knowledge, they render themselves as 
superior which might be viewed as a survival tactic in the turbulent times of 
organisational restructuring (Kickert et al., 1997; Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). Such 
tactics affect how guidance is transferred from the LSCB, through local authorities to 
front-line practitioners. This also affects front-line practitioners wanting to feed up the 
policy making chain because they are unclear about to whom they should feedback.  
 
- Monitoring and accountability 
My study found that, in their current format, Ofsted inspections of LSCBs were not met 
favourably, being described as undermining professional decision-making and front-
line practitioners in particular feeling that it was a tick box exercise which was not for 
the sake of improving quality. Such practices limit one’s ability to think from new and 
alternative perspectives, to be creative, proactive and innovative (Torfing et al., 2012). 
These arguments echoed those of Munro (2010a; 2010b) who identified how child 
protection reforms have generated a compliance culture based on a framework of rules 
and regulation to which social workers must adhere rigorously. She argued that such 
strict, and impersonal, regulation detracts from being able to understand the needs of a 
child and family. Similarly, Torfing et al. (2012) highlighted how complex, wicked issues, 
(such as child neglect), do not easily lend themselves to performance targets, 
prescription and tick boxes because such indicators do not capture the complexities of 
the problem which is difficult to benchmark for such auditing and inspection systems, 
like Ofsted. 
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There was an alternative argument from Education participants, however, in that they 
felt that such quality control tasks provided rigour and accountability. Even if Ofsted did 
not exist to inspect LSCBs, they would still need to collate some data and evidence for 
their own monitoring purposes. Instead, what was resented was the oppressive, 
“punitive” [Area A, ADCS] and “negative approach” [Area B, ADCS] by Ofsted. The 
process needs to be developed into one of a critical friend and enabling the sharing of 
good practice, rather than prosecutor and persecutor.  
 
Drawing together the discussion from question 4, whilst government guidance on child 
neglect was seen to provide direction, there seemed to be a number of hindrances in 
being able to disseminate such guidance and deliver in front-line practice. The vast 
array of layers through which guidance needs to transcend and permeate is a minefield, 
not discounting too how this varies by sector, organisation and professional role. It is a 
huge and intricate web. Organisational restructuring provides a further barrier, 
especially when job roles are cut or redeveloped. Of course, all of this assumes that 
policy implementation is carried out in a compliant culture, and it is not. Often there will 
be front-line resistance to policy implementation which also creates challenges to its 
operationalization. One response to this is practitioner voice and practitioner buy-in 
during the development stage of the guidance and ensuring more of a bottom-up 
approach to child neglect policy-making.  
 
6.2  STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF GOVERNANCE NETWORK THEORY IN THIS 
STUDY 
- Reflections on using governance network theory 
On reflection governance theory offered a suitable framework to explore the multi-actor 
policy arena of the LSCBs. It allowed exploring the issue from a multi actor perspective 
in an environment of complexity and uncertainty. This was appropriate to task. 
 
- Reflections on using Torfing et al.’s (2012) effectivity criteria model 
Torfing et al.’s (2012) effectivity criteria was a useful model for framing the findings 
because, it could be tailored to the specifics of the research environment in question. 
The model worked well with the qualitative approach, which was as Torfing et al. had 
intended. It was also helpful in being able to accommodate the multifaceted elements of 
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understanding how child neglect is currently managed. Nonetheless, I did not think it 
was possible to apply the ordinal scale of “weak, moderate, and strong” (ibid, p180) as 
suggested by Torfing et al. Moreover, I did not think it appropriate to label different 
criteria as effective or ineffective because that would underplay the nuances and 
complexities in the research findings, which were more subtle than labelling something 
as simply effective or ineffective. In addition, whilst this study adopted a multiple case 
study method, as noted in Chapter 4, the focus of the case studies was the particular 
phenomenon rather than the two cases studies, per se.  Applying such an ordinal scale 
would, therefore, do an injustice to the complexity of the particular phenomenon. In line 
with Greenwood’s view (2016, p37) the purpose of the research was more about 
discovery and drawing together perceptions, knowledge and experience dispersed 
across the network actors and their varied sectors, job roles (in relation to child 
neglect) and organisations. For this purpose, Torfing et al.’s effectivity criteria model 
provided a useful lens to use.  
 
What was particularly useful in using Torfing et al.’s model was that it enabled an 
examination of knowledge transfer beyond the LSCB to understand the blockages in the 
knowledge transfer process, and to offer solutions for how these might be overcome. 
Furthermore, Torfing et al.’s (2012) model could be applied in the future by LSCBs in 
order to evaluate changes in knowledge transfer processes. The qualitative element of 
the effectivity criteria means that they could be tailored to specific purposes, and 
accommodate changes in the policy environment.  
 
Not all criteria need to be fulfilled within a given study because, as Torfing et al. (2009) 
argue, those governance networks whose function is to formulate policy would not 
deliver on effectivity criteria 4, 5 or 6, and those networks solely focused on service 
delivery would not need effectivity criteria 1, 2 or 3. Furthermore, within my study, I did 
not have an equal emphasis on each of the six criteria because my research questions 
fell under some criteria more clearly than others. For example, EC3 (Reach joint policy 
decisions that go beyond the least common denominator while avoiding excessive costs 
and unwarranted cost shifting) was least relevant within this study because I did not set 
out to examine costs. In a bid to resolve this issue, I decided to abbreviate EC3 to “Reach 
Page 139 of 168 
 
joint policy decisions” (see section 5.4 p103) and exclude the references to costs and I 
this did not result in any conceptual loss within my evaluation of the case studies.  
 
I have been unable to draw on other studies to support my application of Torfing et al.’s 
(2012) Effectivity Criteria model but Torfing et al. (2012) and Sørensen and Torfing 
(2009) acknowledge that governance networks cannot be expected to do well within 
each of the criteria, and that it depends on the role and function of the governance 
network whether they fully meet the criterion. This is further clarified by Greenwood 
(2016) who highlights that there are no studies adopting qualitative approaches to 
evaluating governance networks, and that the few studies that have been carried out 
have adopted a quantitative approach focusing solely on ‘cost efficiency or cost 
effectiveness’ (ibid p32). Instead he praises Torfing et al.’s evaluative approach because 
they ‘leave ‘open significant questions about how these criteria might be defined and 
operationalised’ ibid p37).   
 
- Reflections on using Wicked Issues 
Rittel and Webber’s (1973) ten distinguishing features were useful to map the 
complexities of working with child neglect. There were, however, some similarities 
between the ten features which made Rittel and Webber’s characteristics feel repetitive. 
Peters (2017) argued that the ten features are ambiguous, therefore further definitions 
need to be added to these features to make them more measurable. As indicated earlier, 
further criticisms aimed at Rittel and Webber’s definition of wicked issues, include the 
argument that theirs allows for no variations of wickedness (Alford and Head, 2017; 
Turnbull and Hoppe, 2018).  Such criticisms, however, seem to assume that Rittel and 
Webber developed their ten features as an objective, or scientific, measurement of 
wickedness. That said, I found it useful to map Rittel and Webber’s ten features along 
with Peters (2017) extra 3 features to assess why, in my view, child neglect is a messy, 
complex problem and why such a messy, complex problem requires a multi-actor, social 
and political response.  Once this decision has been made, further tools could be applied, 
if needs be, to assess the variations in wickedness, should that be required. In this study, 
however, the expansion to degrees of wickedness was not needed.  
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6.3 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH METHODS 
-  Selecting a qualitative, multiple case study approach 
Given the aim of the study, a qualitative case study approach was an appropriate 
methodology. Furthermore, a multiple case study approach was more insightful than a 
single case study. Consideration needs to be given to whether or not two case studies in 
one region were sufficient. Two case studies have offered an interesting insight into 
knowledge transfer processes in the LSCB governance network, but further case studies 
over a wider geographical area might offer more conclusive findings. This brings me to 
my next point on sampling.  
 
- Sampling; selecting the LSCBs and research participants 
Using a purposive sampling method to select both the participating LSCBs, and the 
research participants was an appropriate sampling method to use, because it enabled 
me to select areas and people who I knew could offer insight into the phenomenon 
being studied.  
 
Upon reflection, whilst this study focused on the three major funders of the LSCBs and 
the independent Chairs, it would have been pertinent to have included the LSCB Board 
Managers. The role of the Board Manager was referred to by some participants as the 
person who communicated with Board members, and also – in Area A –as the person 
responsible for coordinating members to devise policy. The Board Manager, therefore, 
would have offered useful insight into challenges in communicating the array of 
Government guidance, but also the challenges in forging collaboration and observing 
decision-making in action at the strategic level.   
 
Furthermore, the LSCB training officers could have offered insight into the receptivity, 
or resistance of policy guidance at an operational level, and whether or not - in their 
view – this varied by sector. Therefore, in retrospect, if I were to undertake this study 
again, I would consider including these actors as an alternative source of knowledge 
transfer.  
 
If the study were to be continued, I think it would be imperative to include the police. 
Furthermore, the front-line practitioners within this study were those within Children’s 
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Social Care (that is to say, social workers).  Given the differences identified between 
Health, Education and Children’s Social Care in the study (between LSCB members, and 
the non-LSCB Designated Safeguarding Leads), it would give a more holistic view of the 
knowledge transfer processes through to front-line practice in each of the sectors if 
front-line practitioner views were also gained from Health, Education and Police.  
 
- The semi structured interview  
Semi structured interviews were an appropriate tool to use. They enabled a focused but 
open discussion of the phenomenon. The interviews allowed me to gain the data that I 
needed to be able to answer my research questions. Participants could clearly offer in-
depth responses in an interview (in comparison with a questionnaire, for example).  
 
Equally the group interviews with front-line practitioners –for all the difficulties which I 
had in setting them up – were again an appropriate choice. The group interviews 
allowed me to gain the data that I needed, and also exposed me to insightful data that I 
may not have come across through other methods. Practitioners appreciated being 
asked for their views, but not only that, were asked for their views in person. This gave 
them a sense that their views and experiences were valuable and important to me the 
researcher, in contrast to a faceless researcher simply circulating a questionnaire to 
faceless, nameless social workers. I believe that this gave me more thoughtful, in depth 
data than a questionnaire would have. That said, however, one element for further 
consideration would be the size of the group interview. Two of the group interviews had 
three participants, and the third one had eight participants. The smaller group 
interviews were easier to manage and were possibly more insightful than the larger 
group because the participants had space in which to express their views better than in 
the larger group. In future, therefore, it would be better to do more group interviews 
but with only three or four members in each.  
 
The telephone interviews, I think, were harder to assess for several reasons. Firstly, 
with the exception of schools that include the names of designated safeguarding leads 
on their websites, it was more difficult to identify the relevant participants. It was quite 
time-consuming telephoning various organisations to a) find the relevant person who 
fitted my criteria and b) would be willing to participate in the study (this was especially 
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the case with GPs). That said it is difficult to assess whether or not I would have had a 
better response or not if I had been requesting a face to face interview. From a personal 
perspective, I preferred the face to face and group interviews, because I think I gained 
more data by doing the interviews in person, I gained a connection with the participants 
which I did not get by telephone. Therefore, if I was furthering the study, my preference 
would be to undertake face to face interviews even if that meant taking slightly longer 
to carry out the fieldwork.  
 
6.4 SUMMARY 
The key messages emerging from this chapter is that the relationship between 
government, the LSCB, the AILC, to operational and front-line practitioners is marred by 
inconsistent and disjointed communication which affects the knowledge transfer 
process. The knowledge transfer process is also affected by the lack of authority 
bestowed on the LSCB by the government, because the LSCB has no power to act if any 
organisation is found not to have shared or implemented the guidance. Equally it has no 
power should any member not communicate and share the information and it very 
much relies on the sheer good will of its members. Various other factors such as 
multiple layers in the communication chain, organisational restructuring, and 
monitoring and accountability hindered guidance reaching and affecting front-line 
practice.  
 
Contemporary policy making is often characterised by multi-agency approaches in 
environments of complexity and uncertainty. Within this context, LSCBs need to 
understand their position in the wider network in order to operate effectively. A 
governance network approach has been fruitful in exploring the relationships between 
structure (institutions) and agency (the individual actors) in shaping the work of the 
LSCBs. Torfing et al.’s effectivity criteria has been operationalised to evaluate the 
efficiency of different elements of the network and might be employed again in the 
future to assess if issues have improved or worsened.  
 
Future work might consider if more than two case studies would provide more 
conclusive results. It would also be interesting to incorporate the Police, and expand the 
study so that front-line practitioners in each of the participating sectors were included 
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rather than just social workers. This would gain a wider view of the impact of LSCBs to 
front-line in other sectors, and not just Children’s Social Care.  
 
The last chapter considers the political changes that have occurred since the fieldwork 
for this study was carried out, and it explores how the findings from this study could be 
of benefit to the new safeguarding arrangements. It also makes recommendations for 
further research to build on this study.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion.  
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
This final chapter sets out the pertinent messages from this study and what we can 
learn from it. Taking this forward, as the fieldwork was carried out between 2015 and 
2016, this chapter brings the study up to date with new changes affecting the 
governance of LSCBs and examines how the findings could be useful to the new 
safeguarding arrangements.  
 
7.1 WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THIS?  
In short, the LSCBs in these two case studies were not currently fit for purpose as a 
knowledge transfer mechanism between government and front-line practice in relation 
to child neglect guidance. In particular Health and Children’s Social Care were rather 
disparaging of the LSCB’s communication and dissemination of guidance. Frontline 
practitioners disliked the move to online training, from face to face methods. Therefore, 
there needs to be a conscious reversion towards face to face methods of knowledge 
transfer in order to disseminate policy changes.   
 
What was pertinent in this study was linking the findings from my study to governance 
network theory to explain the (in)effectiveness of the network in terms of joined-up 
working and powerlessness of LSCBs to effect change. With the shift from government 
to governance and the decentralisation of the state, governance networks are seen to be 
the solution to more joined-up working and joint decision making. That said, however, 
Sørensen and Torfing (2009, p236) highlight that this ‘euphoric celebration’ of the 
upsurge and merits of governance networks ignores inherent weaknesses with 
governance networks, and why they often fail. They argue that governance networks 
are often ‘unstable, diffuse, and opaque’ (ibid). In the case of LSCBs, one can argue that 
they are probably unstable and ineffective because they are a mechanism of 
government, rather than being autonomous of government. Equally, these arguments 
once again link back to Bache et al.’s (2015) notion of ‘fuzzy governance’ in that, whilst 
being a mechanism of government, child neglect guidance coming out from government 
is diffuse and unclear, which in turn leads to fuzzy policy making at a local level, and 
undermines the effectiveness of the LSCB.  
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The application of governance network theory and using Torfing et al.’s (2012) 
Effectivity Criteria model, emphasised that knowledge transfer and policy 
implementation across children’s services is not linear. It is neither top down nor 
bottom up. It is messy and complicated across all the sectors involved with safeguarding 
children, at both a strategic level and operational practice. Trying to trace policy 
communication and implementation is like dropping a bag of marbles and trying to keep 
an eye on where they all go; how far they go (some will go further than others, others 
hit barriers in their way); and do they have any effect along the way. In such complex 
multidisciplinary networks, front line practitioners need to be supported to understand 
the complex and relational nature of wicked issues and how they manifest themselves 
in social work practice. For example understanding the relational nature between a 
physically neglected child, parenting skills and a family on benefits, or the relational 
nature between a living in deprivation and neglect, or conversely higher socio economic 
families and emotional neglect. Understanding the relational links can be part of the 
process of managing the issue as best as one can with the resources available. This 
requires more than offering training on a new policy. Rather, it points to the need for 
more transparency in the policy design approaches, in order for practitioners to 
understand where and how decisions have been made, and why. In addition, it requires 
practitioners changing the way they conceptualise working together, joined-up working 
and multi-agency working. Such political mantras do not get to the crux of 
understanding the relational nature of working in partnership within and across 
organisations in order to safeguard children. Applying governance network theory 
offers a deeper approach to understanding the mechanics of relational working. Using 
the Effectivity Criteria goes a step further in assessing how well (or not) a network 
might be working effectively and highlights the relational weaknesses.  
 
In order to transfer this knowledge to practitioners, information could be translated 
into practice papers and published through Research in Practice (a forum to which most 
local authorities subscribe, and social workers use to find supporting evidence for their 
cases). Such practice papers might then form the basis on a work-based seminar in 
order to enable face to face discussion and sharing of ideas. The key points from these 
seminars could feed up to the LSCB in order to have input from front line practitioners 
and reflect everyday practice.  
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In addition, some front-line practitioners within my study highlighted the usefulness of 
working with university students on placement. This is because, whilst the students 
gain practice knowledge from experienced practitioners, those experienced 
practitioners found that university students were more up to date with policy and 
legislation changes including understanding the rationale behind structural changes 
such as the LSCB.   Such exchange of knowledge could be made formal in the design of 
learning exchange conversations within the student CPD process.  
 
7.2 FROM LSCB TO MASA, 2018 
Since carrying out the fieldwork, it was announced in July 2018 that LSCBs would be 
replaced with Multi Agency Safeguarding Arrangements (MASA). This decision followed 
the publication of the Wood Review (2016) which has informed changes to the new 
Working Together to Safeguard Children statutory guidance (HM Government, 2018). 
This new guidance adheres to the fact that under section 11 of the Children Act 2004 
local agencies and organisations have a duty to safeguard the welfare of children in 
their area. This is no different to the core duty of the former LSCB. What is new, 
however, is that 
‘The responsibility for this join-up locally rests with the three safeguarding 
partners who have a shared and equal duty to make arrangements to work 
together to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children in a local area’. (HM 
Government, 2018, p7) 
What was previously a statutory duty of the local authority now becomes a joint 
responsibility between the local authority, the Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) and 
the chief officer of police, whose jurisdictions fall within any part of the local authority. 
In essence this strengthens the argument that governance network theory is both 
applicable and useful in understanding and evaluating the joined-up local safeguarding 
arrangements. 
 
It is yet to be seen how these new Multi-Agency Safeguarding Arrangements will 
operate locally, but the findings from this study are still pertinent to the MASA because 
they will help to find better ways of designing, communicating and implementing local 
safeguarding policy on child neglect, or other forms of abuse, within the wider network.  
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If MASA are to avoid the mistakes or poor practices of its predecessor, the findings from 
this study suggest they should ensure the following; 
- In such austere economic times, MASA may want to consider a regional (rather 
than local) policy approach to certain wicked issues, such as child neglect 
because it would be less resource intensive to develop one regional policy than 
several local ones, and it would have a wider reach affecting several million 
children rather than a few hundred thousand. 
- The Chair needs to remain independent from any of the partner organisations 
represented on the Board.  
- In order to communicate more effectively to statutory services under its 
authority, MASAs need to develop a streamlined dissemination strategy which 
communicates synthesised, consistent and accessible information.  
- Following on from the previous point, it then needs to develop a feedback loop to 
ensure that such information is reaching the right people and having the 
required impact on practice. Further research now needs to be carried out using 
D.I theory to identify clearly what this might look like, and what might be 
feasible.  
- MASAs needs to move away from the assumption that email is an appropriate 
form of communication. Front-line practitioners are bombarded with email, and 
do not like online training. They prefer face to face communication and learning 
opportunities.  
- MASAs need to be more visible to front-line practitioners, and needs to engage 
them and value their views and experiences.  
- Moreover, this is particularly pertinent to the child neglect policy making 
process, which needs to be more bottom-up. Child neglect policy making needs 
to draw on the wealth of current practice that front-line practitioners have in 
relation to working with child neglect on a daily basis.  This would avoid policy 
resistance and increase policy buy-in.  
 
7.3 WHERE NEXT? 
What became apparent in undertaking this study was the magnitude of the task. The 
tangled web of complexities and elements of overlap (for example, between and within 
sectors, between and within agencies, between the government and the LSCB, between 
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the government and different practising bodies, between the LSCB and designated 
safeguarding managers, between the LSCB and front-line staff, between designated 
safeguarding managers and front-line staff) transpired to be far greater than anticipated 
for this study.  
 
One implication for policy and practice which emerged from this study is the 
development of a policy dissemination and implementation strategy. Drawing on 
dissemination and implementation (D.I) science, rather than governance theory, further 
research would be useful on this to examine more explicitly what this might look like. 
For example, would there be views in relation to employing designated, or workplace 
policy champions? What are the specific administrative or procedural barriers within 
organisations that might hinder MASA policy dissemination and implementation and 
could organisations overcome such barriers?   
 
As the LSCBs are replaced with Multi Agency Safeguarding Arrangement it will be 
interesting to examine the changing dynamic and accountability from safeguarding 
arrangements being traditionally local authority-led, to being a joint affair between local 
authority, Health and Police. Clearly, therefore, there are challenges ahead as the LSCBs 
cease and MASAs come into being with new roles and new governance network 
structures. This study has offered significant and illuminating insights into how wicked 
issues are conceptualised by strategic-level policy-makers; how knowledge is 
transferred (or not) through the network from government to the LSCBs and beyond to 
front-line practice. These findings could help MASA overcome some of the criticisms 
and issued levelled at LSCBs.  
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Appendix 1: LSCB Regulations 2006: Regulation 5, 
Functions of LSCBs 
 
5.—(1) The functions of an LSCB in relation to its objective (as defined in section 
14(1) of the Act (1)) are as follows—  
(a) Developing policies and procedures for safeguarding and promoting the 
welfare of children in the area of the authority, including policies and procedures in 
relation to— 
(i) the action to be taken where there are concerns about a child’s safety or 
welfare, including thresholds for intervention; 
(ii) Training of persons who work with children or in services affecting the safety 
and welfare of children; 
(iii) Recruitment and supervision of persons who work with children; 
(iv) Investigation of allegations concerning persons who work with children; 
(v) Safety and welfare of children who are privately fostered; 
(vi) Co-operation with neighbouring children’s services authorities and their 
Board partners; 
(b) communicating to persons and bodies in the area of the authority the need to 
safeguard and promote the welfare of children, raising their awareness of how this can 
best be done, and encouraging them to do so; 
(c) Monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of what is done by the authority 
and their Board partners individually and collectively to safeguard and promote the 
welfare of children, and advising them on ways to improve; 
(d) Participating in the planning of services for children in the area of the 
authority; 
(e) Undertaking reviews of serious cases and advising the authority and their 
Board partners on lessons to be learned. 
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(e) a serious case is one where—  
(a) Abuse or neglect of a child is known or suspected; and 
(b) Either— 
(i) the child has died; or 
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(ii) The child has been seriously harmed and there is cause for concern as to the 
way in which the authority, their Board partners or other relevant persons have worked 
together to safeguard the child. 
(3) An LSCB may also engage in any other activity that facilitates, or is conducive to, 
the achievement of its objective.  
 
(1) 
Section 14(1) of the Act defines the objective of an LSCB as (a) to co-ordinate what is 
done by each person or body represented on the Board for the purposes of safeguarding 
and promoting the welfare of children in the area of the authority by which it is 
established, and (b) to ensure the effectiveness of what is done by each such person or 
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Appendix 2: Literature Search Strategy 
 
Prior to embarking on the literature review, I carried out a systematic search of hard 
copy and electronic resources (Bryman, 2008; Aveyard, 2010; Hart, 2018) applied to 
the body of literature of my various key themes.  As the research is interdisciplinary I 
needed to scope the literature (research, professional, policy and grey sources) from 
social work as well as policy implementation sources (Hart, 2018). The literature search 
was carried out between January 2013 and June 2014.   
 
Search term generation 
Depending on the theme which I was searching, the inclusion and exclusion criteria 
varied slightly. For example when searching for child neglect, I was only interested in 
research within the UK, but searching for policy implementation, and also governance 
theory, some international works were relevant (see  figure xvii).  
 
Electronic searching 
Initially, I used various electronic search tools such as google (used with caution), 
google scholar and catalogues and databases (for example Swetswise, Sage Premier 
Journal Collection, PSYCHinfo, ERIC, Ingenta Connect, JSTOR etc). accessed via the 
university libraries (Bristol university and Newman university) and Athens (Thomas, 
2009; Robson, 2011).  
 
Grey literature and other resource searches 
Attendance at conferences (for example, BAPSCAN’s international Congress, SPA Annual 
conference) alerted me to unpublished studies, and interim reports. I also signed up to 
email alerts (Bryman, 2008) (for example, NSPCC Caspar) and Social media (for 
example, Twitter to follow the Policy and Politics Journal twitter feed, and BAPSCAN’s 
Twitter feed etc) which alerted me to new material being published during my research 
so that I could keep the literature review up-to-date (Bryman, 2008).  
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Reference lists 
I used a snowball literature search, through following up references used in other 
identified studies.  
 
Targeted author searches 
Once key researchers were identified, I conducted targeted author searches, using 
library catalogues and Google Scholar (see Figure xvii). 
 
Managing the literature 
Using the ipad, I was able to download the “iAnnotate” app. This was a useful app which 
allowed me to essential create my own library. I created files using the themes from my 
research (for example, child neglect, LSCBs, governance theory) and I could keep the 
electronic documents within relevant files. The iAnnotate app also allows you to make 
various notes on the documents.  
 
Reviewing the content 
Once I had found a particular source, I read the abstract to identify whether or not it 
was relevant. If the abstract seemed relevant, then I would read some more of the 
article, and save it if it was relevant.  
 
Reading the article took several phases. Firstly I skim read the item to get a grasp of 
what it was about. Then I would go back through the article taking more time to 
highlight relevant passages or to write comments to either follow something up further, 
or to join arguments/work up with other items that I may have found (Hart, 2018). In 
some cases I went back to an article several times during the writing of the research.  I 
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Figure xvii: Summary of literature search strategy 
Theme Inclusion / search criteria Exclusion criteria Outcome 
Child neglect 
 
Full text only, Academic journals, books, research, government 
papers, English language, 
Great Britain only 
Key authors: Olive Stevenson, Marion Brandon, Elaine Farmer, Jan 
Howarth, Davies and Ward.  
 
Specific practice issues 
(e.g. assessment, 
referrals, toolkits) 
Countries other than GB. 
Core theme 
Policy communication Full text only, Academic journals, books, research, government 
papers, English language.  
All countries 
Key authors: Hogwood and Gunn, Barrett and Fudge, Goggin et al., 
Bowe et al.  
 
Pre-1980s Discounted (see 
Chapter 3) 
Policy implementation Full text only, Academic journals, books, research, government 
papers, English language  
All countries 
Key authors: Wildavsky, Sabatier,  
 




Full text only, Academic journals, books, research, government 
papers, English language.  
Great Britain only 
Key authors: France et al., Michael Preston-Shoot 
 
 Core theme 
Managerialism and 
Professionalism 
Full text only, Academic journals, books, research, government 
papers, English language  
All countries 
Key authors: Janet Newman, Lupton et al. 
Pre-1980s Managerialism was 
adopted as a subsidiary 
theme but 
professionalism was 
discounted to narrow 
the focus. 
Accountability Full text only, Academic journals, books, research, government 
papers, English language  
Pre-1980s Adopted as a 
subsidiary theme 
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All countries 
New Public management Full text only, Academic journals, books, research, government 
papers, English language  
All countries 
Key authors: Rod Rhodes, Chris Hood 
 
Pre-1980s Discounted (see 
Chapter 3) 
Network governance Full text only, Academic journals, books, research, government 
papers, English language  
All countries 
Key authors: Jonathan Davies 
 
 Search widened to 
governance theory 
Street-level bureaucracy 
and the everyday maker 
Full text only, Academic journals, books, research, government 
papers, English language  
All countries 
Key authors: Michael Lipsky, H. Bang 
 
Pre-1980s Both discounted to 
narrow the focus of the 
research 
Boundary Spanners Full text only, Academic journals, books, research, government 
papers, English language  
All countries 
Key authors: Paul Williams 
 
 discounted to narrow 
the focus of the 
research 
Governance theory and 
governance network 
theory 
Full text only, Academic journals, Books, research, government 
papers, English language  
All countries 
Key authors: Sorensen, Torfing, Koppenjan, Klijn.  
 
Pre-1990s Core theme 
Wicked issues in social 
work 
Full text only, Academic journals, Books, research, government 
papers, English language  
All countries 
Key authors: Rittel and Webber, Klijn. 
 Core theme 
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